Community-based climate change adaptation strategies for integrated prawn-fish-rice farming in Bangladesh to promote social-ecological resilience

Farming freshwater prawns with fish in rice fields is widespread in coastal regions of southwest Bangladesh because of favourable resources and ecological conditions. This article provides an overview of an ecosystem-based approach to integrated prawn-fish-rice farming in southwest Bangladesh. The practice of prawn and fish farming in rice fields is a form of integrated aquaculture-agriculture, which provides a wide range of social, economic and environmental benefits. Integrated prawn-fish-rice farming plays an important role in the economy of Bangladesh, earning foreign exchange and increasing food production. However, this unique farming system in coastal Bangladesh is particularly vulnerable to climatechange. We suggest that community-based adaptation strategies must be developed to cope with the challenges. We propose that integrated prawn-fish-rice farming could be relocated from the coastal region to less vulnerable upland areas, but caution that this will require appropriate adaptation strategies and an enabling institutional environment.

Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG

This is volume II of my two-volume study of the nuclear strategies/strategy preferences of Britain, France and West Germany in the Cold War. It shows that the great variable is the mentalities, culture, and particular interpretations of particular historical experiences of these three countries. These mental frameworks are reconstructed, in the tradition of the French Annales/Mentalite schools (that in turn is rooted in anthropology) by looking at a very large nunber of public texts in the context of the public discourse about nuclear strategy in each country.

NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000

This is vol. I of my two-volume study of the nuclear strategies/strategy preferences of NATO collectively, and individually of Britain, France, and West Germany in the Cold War. It shows that NATO strategy was a fragile compromise, and that these three countries, all within range of Soviet medium/intermediate range nuclear missiles and thus with less geostrategic difference than in previous military threat contexts, had wildly divergent strategies/preferences which cannot be explained merely by geography. It raises the question of what made them so different, addressed in Volume II "Nuclear Mentalities" (q.v.)