Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the U.S.

This paper derives optimal monetary policy rules in setups where certainty equivalence does not hold because either central bank preferences are not quadratic, and/or the aggregate supply relation is nonlinear. Analytical results show that these features lead to sign and size asymmetries, and nonlinearities in the policy rule. Reduced-form estimates indicate that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule after 1983, but not before 1979. This finding is consistent with the view that the Fed's inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan regime differ considerably from the ones during the Burns-Miller regime.

The Transmission of Monetary Policy in a Multi-Sector Economy

This paper constructs and estimates a sticky-price, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with heterogenous production sectors. Sectors differ in price stickiness, capital-adjustment costs and production technology, and use output from each other as material and investment inputs following an Input-Output Matrix and Capital Flow Table that represent the U.S. economy. By relaxing the standard assumption of symmetry, this model allows different sectoral dynamics in response to monetary policy shocks. The model is estimated by Simulated Method of Moments using sectoral and aggregate U.S. time series. Results indicate 1) substantial heterogeneity in price stickiness across sectors, with quantitatively larger differences between services and goods than previously found in micro studies that focus on final goods alone, 2) a strong sensitivity to monetary policy shocks on the part of construction and durable manufacturing, and 3) similar quantitative predictions at the aggregate level by the multi-sector model and a standard model that assumes symmetry across sectors.

The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee

This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically ineffcient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank’s control is infrequently adjusted.