A tumor-specific cellular environment at the brain invasion border of adamantinomatous craniopharyngiomas.

Craniopharyngiomas (CP) are benign epithelial tumors of the sellar region and can be clinicopathologically distinguished into adamantinomatous (adaCP) and papillary (papCP) variants. Both subtypes are classified according to the World Health Organization grade I, but their irregular digitate brain infiltration makes any complete surgical resection difficult to obtain. Herein, we characterized the cellular interface between the tumor and the surrounding brain tissue in 48 CP (41 adaCP and seven papCP) compared to non-neuroepithelial tumors, i.e., 12 cavernous hemangiomas, 10 meningiomas, and 14 metastases using antibodies directed against glial fibrillary acid protein (GFAP), vimentin, nestin, microtubule-associated protein 2 (MAP2) splice variants, and tenascin-C. We identified a specific cell population characterized by the coexpression of nestin, MAP2, and GFAP within the invasion niche of the adamantinomatous subtype. This was especially prominent along the finger-like protrusions. A similar population of presumably astroglial precursors was not visible in other lesions under study, which characterize them as distinct histopathological feature of adaCP. Furthermore, the outer tumor cell layer of adaCP showed a distinct expression of MAP2, a novel finding helpful in the differential diagnosis of epithelial tumors in the sellar region. Our data support the hypothesis that adaCP, unlike other non-neuroepithelial tumors of the central nervous system, create a tumor-specific cellular environment at the tumor-brain junction. Whether this facilitates the characteristic infiltrative growth pattern or is the consequence of an activated Wnt signaling pathway, detectable in 90% of these tumors, will need further consideration.

The Speed of the Financial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare’s Bank

Finance is important for development, yet the onset of modern economic growth in Britain lagged the British financial revolution by over a century. We present evidence from a new West-End London private bank to explain this delay. Hoare’s Bank loaned primarily to a highly select and well-born clientele, although it did not discriminate against “unknown” borrowers in the early 18th century. It could not extend credit more generally because of government restrictions (usury limits) and policies (frequent wars). Britain’s financial development could have aided growth substantially, had it not been for the rigidities and turmoil introduced by government interference.

The Three Horsemen of Growth: Plague, War and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe

How did Europe overtake China? We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors, and use it to explain how European per capita incomes and urbanization rates could surge ahead of Chinese ones. That living standards could exceed subsistence levels at all in a Malthusian setting should be surprising. Rising fertility and falling mortality ought to have reversed any gains. We show that productivity growth in Europe can only explain a small fraction of rising living standards. Population dynamics - changes of the birth and death schedules - were far more important drivers of the longrun Malthusian equilibrium. The Black Death raised wages substantially, creating important knock-on effects. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, raising urban wages and attracting migrants from rural areas. European cities were unhealthy, especially compared to Far Eastern ones. Urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by more frequent wars (fed by city wealth) and disease spread by trade. Thus, higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. Without technological change, our model can account for the sharp rise in European urbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes. We complement our calibration exercise with a detailed analysis of intra-European growth in the early modern period. Using a panel of European states in the period 1300-1700, we show that war frequency can explain a good share of the divergent fortunes within Europe.