Search engine liability for autocomplete suggestions: personality, privacy and the power of the algorithm

This article is concerned with the liability of search engines for algorithmically produced search suggestions, such as through Google’s ‘autocomplete’ function. Liability in this context may arise when automatically generated associations have an offensive or defamatory meaning, or may even induce infringement of intellectual property rights. The increasing number of cases that have been brought before courts all over the world puts forward questions on the conflict of fundamental freedoms of speech and access to information on the one hand, and personality rights of individuals— under a broader right of informational self-determination—on the other. In the light of the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) in Google Spain v AEPD, this article concludes that many requests for removal of suggestions including private individuals’ information will be successful on the basis of EU data protection law, even absent prejudice to the person concerned.

Procedural justice, not absorptive capacity, matters in multinational enterprise ICT transfers

This paper empirically tests the effectiveness of information and communications technology (ICT) knowledge transfer and adoption in the multinational enterprise (MNE) as an issue of critical importance to contemporary MNE functioning. In contrast to mainstream thinking on absorptive capacity, but in line with prevailing international business theory, our research supports the proposition that perceptions of procedural justice, rather than absorptive capacity, determine effectiveness, especially in cases of high tacit knowledge transfers. Data was collected from senior ICT representatives in 86 Canadian subsidiaries of foreign owned MNEs. Each of these subsidiaries recently experienced a significant ICT transfer imposed by the parent organization. Support was found for the main propositions: Procedural justice significantly predicted successful ICT transfer and adoption, while absorptive capacity was not significant. These findings are consistent even when knowledge tacitness was high. The perceived success of the ICT transfer as well as its adoption varied widely across these firms. The potential reasons for this divergence in effectiveness are manifold, but our findings suggest that in situations of substantial knowledge tacitness, a higher level of procedural justice, rather than a higher level of absorptive capacity, is critical to effective transfer and adoption.

Looking back, moving forward: drama, disability and social justice

The aim of this chapter is to briefly outline how disability has been represented in theatre, what access disabled people have had to drama and theatre in the past, and what might be achieved in the pursuit of social justice with young people in relation to awareness of and provision for disability. It will focus in particular on how disability has been addressed in drama education and what assumptions have been made regarding drama and disability in education. In considering such issues one might perceive manifestations of what Freebody and Finneran (2013) recognise as an overlapping and ‘somewhat artificially created dichotomy between drama for social justice and drama about social justice.’ This chapter will examine some examples of how drama has been used to give students in mainstream schools insights into disability, and the philosophy that underpins the drama curriculum of one special school where the focus is on drama as social justice: the argument being that in some cases simply doing drama is, in effect, a manifestation of social justice. Finally, some of the progress made in recent years regarding access and engagement will be addressed through specific reference to the authors’ on-going work into ‘performing social research’ (Shah, 2013) and how theatres are increasingly attempting to give more access to disabled young people and their families by offering ‘relaxed performances.’

Fundamental insights into ontogenetic growth from theory and fish

The fundamental features of growth may be universal, because growth trajectories of most animals are very similar, but a unified mechanistic theory of growth remains elusive. Still needed is a synthetic explanation for how and why growth rates vary as body size changes, both within individuals over their ontogeny and between populations and species over their evolution. Here we use Bertalanffy growth equations to characterize growth of ray-finned fishes in terms of two parameters, the growth rate coefficient, K, and final body mass, m∞. We derive two alternative empirically testable hypotheses and test them by analyzing data from FishBase. Across 576 species, which vary in size at maturity by almost nine orders of magnitude, K scaled as m_∞^(-0.23). This supports our first hypothesis that growth rate scales as m_∞^(-0.25) as predicted by metabolic scaling theory; it implies that species which grow to larger mature sizes grow faster as juveniles. Within fish species, however, K scaled as m_∞^(-0.35). This supports our second hypothesis which predicts that growth rate scales as m_∞^(-0.33) when all juveniles grow at the same rate. The unexpected disparity between across- and within-species scaling challenges existing theoretical interpretations. We suggest that the similar ontogenetic programs of closely related populations constrain growth to m_∞^(-0.33) scaling, but as species diverge over evolutionary time they evolve the near-optimal m_∞^(-0.25) scaling predicted by metabolic scaling theory. Our findings have important practical implications because fish supply essential protein in human diets, and sustainable yields from wild harvests and aquaculture depend on growth rates.

Raz on rights: human rights, fundamental rights and balancing

After clarifying the outlines of Raz’s interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz’s definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations – a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights.