Person, existence and phenomenology: remarks on the conceptions of personalism of Emmanuel Mounier

This article aims to discuss the personalism of Emmanuel Mounier, especially his views on the person and existence, and its relation to phenomenology. Mounier does not refer to the influence of phenomenology on his thoughts. However, it is possible to notice that his philosophy was strongly influenced by phenomenological ideas. Personalism is a philosophy that says a person`s value as an absolute. The absolute here is understood as a purpose that gives meaning to all the political and social organization. Human existence is the starting point and fundamental postulate of personalism. This means that there is, therefore, a priority of the existence about the human nature, understanding this as an information ""ontological definitive"". This position is a requirement of epistemological reformulation, which means, within personalism, the attempt to develop a phenomenology of existence, located between the radical objectivism of the science and subjectivism of metaphysics.

The rational reconstruction of the research program on classic rationalism: Locke and the empiricist approach

This article intends to rationally reconstruct Locke`s theory of knowledge as incorporated in a research program concerning the nature and structure of the theories and models of rationality. In previous articles we argued that the rationalist program can be subdivided into the classical rationalistic subprogram, which includes the knowledge theories of Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant, the neoclassical subprogram, which includes the approaches of Duhem, Poincare and Mach, and the critical subprogram of Popper. The subdivision results from the different views of rationality proposed by each one of these subprograms, as well as from the tools made available by each one of them, containing theoretical instruments used to arrange, organize and develop the discussion on rationality, the main one of which is the structure of solution of problems. In this essay we intend to reconstruct the assumptions of Locke`s theory of knowledge, which in our view belongs to the classical rationalistic subprogram because it shares with it the thesis of the identity of (scientific) knowledge and certain knowledge.

Cranial anatomy of a new genus of hyperodapedontine rhynchosaur (Diapsida, Archosauromorpha) from the Upper Triassic of southern Brazil

Detailed description of the cranial anatomy of the rhynchosaur previously known as Scaphonyx sulcognathus allows its assignment to a new genus Teyumbaita. Two nearly complete skulls and a partial skull have been referred to the taxon, all of which come from the lower part of the Caturrita Formation, Upper Triassic of Rio Grande do Sul, southern Brazil. Cranial autapomorphies of Teyumbaita sulcognathus include anterior margin of nasal concave at midline, prefrontal separated from the ascending process of the maxilla, palatal ramus of pterygoid expanded laterally within palatines, dorsal surface of exoccipital markedly depressed, a single tooth lingually displaced from the main medial tooth-bearing area of the maxilla, and a number of other characters (such as skull broader than long; a protruding orbital anterior margin; anguli oils extending to anterior ramus of the jugal; bar between the orbit and the lower temporal fenestra wider than 0.4 of the total orbital opening; mandibular depth reaching more than 25% of the total length) support its inclusion in Hyperodapedontinae. T. sulcognathus is the only potential Norian rhynchosaur, suggesting that the group survived the end-Carnian extinction event.

Reductionism and the human duplication thought-experiment

The human duplication thought-experiment is examined, and basic positions concerning the possible outcomes of the experiment are spelled out. A first position sustains supervenience, either from a reductionist or an emergentist perspective, and such views are contrasted. Certain moral aspects of the thought-experiment are then considered, especially in relation to the idea of death. Taking reductionism as a working hypothesis, two possibilities are suggested for investigating the hard problem of qualia: the postulation of some novel sort of physical interaction, and the postulation of a counter-intuitive law of scaling. One possibility for the latter would lead to a violation of supervenience.

Thought and picture in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

When an elementary proposition is instituted, the pictorial relations establish a contact between the proposition and the fact. This seems to commit the Tractarian project with a psychological view, but this is not the case because the point of view of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is concerned with the conditions of possibility of the representation. In this paper my objective is twofold. First, I show that the thought plays a basic function in the institution of a picture. Second, I show that the fact that the thought plays an important role in the institution of a picture does not commit the Tractarian project with an inquiry of psychological nature.

The epistemological basis of the metaphysics of the Will of Arthur Schopenhauer

RESUMO: Analisamos neste artigo a teoria do conhecimento de Arthur Schopenhauer com base em sua dissertação Sobre a quádrupla raiz do princípio de razão suficiente (1813), seu ensaio Sobre a visão e as cores (1816), os dois primeiros livros de O mundo como vontade e representação (1819), bem como o apêndice a esta obra intitulado Crítica da filosofia kantiana. Aqui temos em mente a relação de Schopenhauer com as filosofias anteriores (em especial a de Kant) e a fundamentação de sua intuição do mundo como Vontade baseada em uma epistemologia de raízes kantianas.

O ACERTO DE CONTAS DE DIDEROT COM O CETICISMO

RESUMO: Este artigo é o segundo de uma tríade que trata do diálogo, mais precisamente do envolvimento, entre a filosofia de Denis Diderot e o ceticismo. O primeiro artigo, intitulado “O jovem Diderot e o ceticismo dos Pensamentos”, foi publicado na revista Dois Pontos, em sua edição dedicada ao tema do ceticismo (cf. PIVA, 2007), e limitou-se a uma análise minuciosa do problema da postura cética nos Pensamentos filosóficos, de 1746. O presente artigo, por seu turno, examina duas questões fundamentais, desta vez em O passeio do cético ou As alamedas, de 1747, último livro em que o ceticismo é evocado com destaque pelo enciclopedista, dois anos antes de ele render-se definitivamente ao materialismo ateu: 1) a interpretação que Diderot desenvolve do ceticismo e 2) sua posição diante dele. Já o terceiro e derradeiro texto da tríade examinará – evidentemente, numa próxima oportunidade – a presença do ceticismo no pensamento diderotiano da maturidade, ou seja, no período que se inicia em 1749, com a redação da Carta sobre os cegos, quando a questão da dúvida cética passa a perder em suas obras a relevância que tinha na origem de suas reflexões, mudando, até mesmo, de registro.

Locke, on freedom and will

This article aims to discuss Locke`s compatibilism, that is, the lokean thesis that freedom is compatible with the natural necessity. To this end, it is analized the chapter Of The Power (XXI, book II of the An Essay concerning Human Understanding), in which Locke clarifies the concepts of freedom and will. Although Locke, at times, involves himself with the incongruent thesis on compatibilism, he is a compatibilist. The impression that Locke would defend incompatibilists` theories ends up being abandoned when we analyze carefully his general argument about will and freedom. Locke literally defends that the volunteer does not differ from the necessary. As a compatibilist, Locke maintains that will is not free. Thus, the free man can not be the one that is free to want. A man regarded as a free agent is the one that has freedom of action, not freedom of will.