Letter from the acting Secretary of War, transmitting information relative to the claims of the State of Massachusetts for payment of the expenses of the militia ordered out by the executive authority of the state, during the late war

15th Congress, 1st session, 1817-1818, House. Doc. 81. February 20, 1817. Read, and ordered to lie upon the table.

A sermon, preached in Boston, July 23, 1812, the day of the publick fast, appointed by the Executive of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in consequence of the declaration of war against Great Britain

Published at the request of the hearers Printed by Greenough and Stebbins

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.