The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution

I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.

Private Governance of Financial Markets: the US Regulatory Regime on Hedge Funds

The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.

Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions

This paper explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition, and how different authoritarian rulers respond to foreign pressure. If sanctions are assumed to increase the price of loyalty to the regime, then rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. In contrast, when constraints are severe due to reduced aid and trade, dictators are expected to greatly increase their levels of repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970–2000) as well as on repression levels (1976–2001), we show that the empirical patterns conform well to our theoretical expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit more substantial sectors of the population and especially the urban classes. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers’ and officers’ wages. Conversely, personalist regimes reduce spending in all categories, especially capital expenditures, while increasing repression much more than other regime types when targeted by sanctions.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

Still in the Era of Area Studies? Political-Scientific Perspectives on European Competition Policy in the 2000s

This note reviews the political-scientific literature on European competition policy (ECP) in the 2000s. Based on a data set extracted from four well-known journals, and using an upfront methodology and explicit criteria, it analyzes the literature both quantitatively and qualitatively. On the quantitative side, it shows that, although a few sub-policy areas are still neglected, ECP is not the under-researched policy it used to be. On the qualitative side, the literature has greatly improved since the 1990s: Almost all articles now present a clear research question, and most advance specific theoretical claims/hypotheses. Yet, improvements can be made on research design, statistical testing, and, above all, state-of-the-art theorizing (e.g. in the game-theoretical treatment of delegation problems). Indeed, it is paradoxical that ECP specialists do not pay more attention to theoretical questions which are so central to the actual policy area they study.

Are Dictators Immune to Human Rights Shaming?

This paper examines whether human rights naming and shaming destabilizes the rule of authoritarian leaders. We argue that human rights shaming can destabilize autocratic leaders by signaling international disapproval to elites in the targeted country, increasing their capacity to replace the incumbent. In personalist regimes, shaming increases the risk of irregular exit because regime elite do not have a means to peacefully replace the incumbent. Shaming campaigns also decrease foreign aid and international trade in personalist regimes, denying the leader access to resources to pay his coalition – further destabilizing his rule. In non-personalist regimes where parties or the military allow elites to peacefully replace incumbents, human rights shaming increases the risk of regular turnover of power, but has little effect on the risk of irregular exit or international flows of aid and trade. These findings have implications for understanding when and where shaming campaigns are likely to reduce or deter repression.

Mujeres en la casa, la escuela y la fábrica. El singular discurso de la domesticidad de la escuela economista española (1861-1909)

Los textos de la Escuela Economista Española (segunda mitad del XIX) contienen una valoración del papel de las mujeres en la economía y la sociedad transgresor frente al discurso dominante, que defendía un único y exclusivo rol para todas las mujeres: el hogar y la maternidad. La mayoría de los miembros de esta corriente económica defienden el trabajo femenino en las fábricas, basándose en argumentos salariales; e incluso demandan una formación profesional para aquellas que en muchos casos ni tan siquiera eran alfabetizadas por ser mujeres. Los textos de estos economistas transmiten nuevas ideas sobre el papel económico y social de las mujeres en una España dominada por un discurso que negaba la necesidad del trabajo femenino para las familias trabajadoras.

Women at home, at school and in the factory. The particular discourse of domesticity done by the Spanish Escuela Economista (1861-1909)

The texts by the Spanish Economist School (second half of the 19th century) contain an assessment of the role of women in the economy and society that is transgressor in front of the prevailing discourse that defended a unique and exclusive role for all women: being at home and a mother. Most members of that economic trend defended female work in the factories, basing themselves on wage arguments and even asked for a professional training for those who in many cases could not even write and read for the fact of being a woman. The texts of those economists give new ideas about the economic and social role of women in a Spain dominated by a discourse that denied the necessity of female work for the working families.

GAPS: generador de aplicaciones sintéticas

Gaps es un generador de aplicaciones sintéticas de estructura compuesta Master/Worker de pipelines. Para crear una aplicación sintética, el investigador utilizará Gaspar, que recibe un fichero de texto con los parámetros de la aplicación a generar: cantidad de workers, etapas, tamaño de mensaje a enviar, etc., y genera un fichero con las propiedades de cada etapa. A partir de estos datos, Gaps, que esta hecho en C con MPI, genera y ejecuta la aplicación paralela. Estas aplicaciones se utilizan para comprobar en un entorno real los estudios analíticos que constituyen el modelo de rendimiento y sintonización dinámica.

Desarrollo de nuevas Funcionalidades para la Aplicación WebMap del GIS Corporativo de una empresa de distribución de agua en alta

La present memòria és el resultat del Projecte final del Màster en Tecnologia de la Informació Geogràfica, realitzat en la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, curs 2007-2009. Aquest document és per a il•lustrar el treball realitzat en a l'empresa Auding en conjunt en col•laboració amb la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. L'objectiu del projecte va ser és la creació de noves funcionalitats per a un GIS corporatiu d'una empresa de distribució d'aigua en alta. Aquest GIS és estratègic, doncs ja que permet millorar el tractament de la informació, la difusió de les dades, la planificació i la presa de decisions corporatiu.