Sticks, Stones and Words: Emotional Harm and the English Criminal Law

This article discusses the rule that criminal liability does not normally attach for the causing of emotional harm or mental distress in the absence of proof of a 'recognised psychiatric injury'. It considers what is involved in the diagnosis of psychiatric injury, and to what extent the difference between such injury and 'ordinary' mental distress is one of degree rather than one of kind. It reviews the situations in which the law already criminalises the infliction of emotional harm without proof of psychiatric injury, and assesses the policy arguments for drawing the distinction in the normal case. The article concludes that the law can and should adopt a more flexible approach to cases of this sort.

On Testing the 'Moral Law'

In a previous article in this journal, Daniel Kelly, Steven Stich, Kevin Haley, Serena Eng and Dan Fessler report data that, according to them, foster scepticism about an association between harm and morality existent in the Turiel tradition (Kelly et al., 2007). This article challenges their interpretation of the data. It does so by explicating some methodological problems in the Turiel tradition that Kelly et al. themselves in a way inherit and by drawing on new evidence coming from a partial replication of their research.

Common Mistake in Contract Law

English law has long struggled to understand the effect of a fundamental common mistake in contract formation. Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161 recognises that a common mistake which totally undermines a contract renders it void. Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671 recognises a doctrine of 'mistake in equity' under which a serious common mistake in contract formation falling short of totally undermining the contract could give an adversely affected party the right to rescind the contract. This article accepts that the enormous difficulty in differentiating these two kinds of mistake justifies the insistence by the Court of Appeal in The Great Peace [2003] QB 679 that there can be only one doctrine of common mistake. However, the article proceeds to argue that where the risk of the commonly mistaken matter is not allocated by the contract itself a better doctrine would be that the contract is voidable.

Sex Offender Registration: Some Observations on ‘Megan’s Law’ and the Sex Offenders Act 1997

“Megan’s Law” in the United States and Part 1 of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 in the United Kingdom, make provision for the creation of a register which will record the names and addresses of all persons convicted or cautioned for a sexual offence. Arguments expounded in favour of the legislation include the supposedly high recidivism among sex offenders, the inadequacy of supervision provisions, and the resulting need to ‘track’ the dangerous offender for public protection. In practice, however, there are a plethora of obstacles, such as cost and inadequate policing resources, which may impede its effectiveness in aiding law enforcement and reduce it to symbolic significance only. In addition, there are an array of ethical objections to the legislation, such as it breaches civil liberties and constitutes ‘double jeopardy’, which may prevent meaningful imposition.