Using the tax system to collect fines

In this article we consider the possibility that fines could be collected through the tax and social welfare systems in the same way as higher education contributions and child support payments are currently administered. We argue that the existing system of fine collection and enforcement leads to high default rates and reduces the usefulness of fines as a sanction. We consider a range of models for the implementation of an income-related fine collection system, and discuss their possible implications for issues including judicial independence, the time taken to repay fines and aggregate fine revenue.

Alternating offer games and private rulings of the Australian Tax Office

The concept of submitting oneself to a voluntary negotiation is by no means new to big business. Formal bargaining has been quite successful over the years in providing the venue for agents to explore a more logical and mathematical approach to bargaining. However in more recent times external influences have been applied to agents who provide better deals for favored executives. This external influence has displayed itself in taxtion negotiations to the extent that tax office agents have been dismissed for irresponsible conduct. We explore this specific type of negotiation using an alternating offer bargaining game to model the particular influences, which create unfair rulings in negotiations. By the constraints of this systematic mathematical approach to negotiation, we will explore the advantages of a more formal game theoretic approach. In this presentation we will also elaborate on finding Nash Equilibrium in alternating offer games.

Why does tax have to be so taxing? The Court revisits the Franked Investment Income litigation

Examines the European Court of Justice ruling in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Inland Revenue Commissioners (C-35/11) on whether the differential tax treatment of domestic and foreign-sourced dividends in the UK was compatible with the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital principles. Outlines its guidance on how to assess this compatibility. Considers the ruling's implications for the UK tax system, the relationship between tax sovereignty and the internal market and the third-country dimension of the free movement of capital principle.

What determines tax haven FDI

This paper examines the determinants of a multinational enterprise’s (MNEs) decision to invest in countries classified as tax havens. To the best of our knowledge this has not been analysed at the cross-country level before. We use the ownership-location-internalisation (OLI) paradigm and link it with financial specific advantages to develop a number of hypotheses which are subsequently tested by our empirical model. Our analysis is based on a large firm-level database covering 39,543 MNEs across the world for the period 2002- 2011. We find that higher corporate taxes faced by MNEs at home increase the likelihood of locating in a tax haven. Moreover, high technology manufacturing and services MNEs that possess large levels of intangible assets are also more likely to locate subsidiaries in tax havens. Finally, we find evidence that MNEs from countries with a more coordinated market orientation are less likely to locate in tax havens.