The impact of a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages according to socio-economic position: a systematic review of the evidence

OBJECTIVE: A tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSB) has been proposed to address population weight gain but the effect across socio-economic position (SEP) is unclear. The current study aimed to clarify the differential impact(s) of SSB taxes on beverage purchases and consumption, weight outcomes and the amount paid in SSB taxes according to SEP.

DESIGN: Databases (OVID and EMBASE) and grey literature were systematically searched in June 2015 to identify studies that examined effects of an SSB price increase on beverage purchases or consumption, weight outcomes or the amount paid in tax across SEP, within high-income countries.

RESULTS: Of the eleven included articles, three study types were identified: (i) those that examined the association between variation in SSB taxes and SSB consumption and/or body weight (n 3); (ii) price elasticity estimation of SSB demand (n 1); and (iii) modelling of hypothetical SSB taxes by combining price elasticity estimates with population SEP-specific beverage consumption, energy intake or body weight (n 7). Few studies statistically tested differences in outcomes between SEP groups. Nevertheless, of the seven studies that reported on changes in weight outcomes for the total population following an increase in SSB price, all reported either similar reductions in weight across SEP groups or greater reductions for lower compared with higher SEP groups. All studies that examined the average household amount paid in tax (n 5) reported that an SSB tax would be regressive, but with small differences between higher- and lower-income households (0·10-1·0 % and 0·03 %-0·60 % of annual household income paid in SSB tax for low- and high-income households, respectively).

CONCLUSIONS: Based on the available evidence, a tax on SSB will deliver similar population weight benefits across socio-economic strata or greater benefits for lower SEP groups. An SSB tax is shown to be consistently financially regressive, but to a small degree.

The responsiveness of government revenue to marginal tax rates

Ce document utilise des données fiscales et démographiques pour calculer les changements dans les recettes du gouvernement engendrés par les ajustements dans le taux marginal d'imposition, et cela en mettant l’accent sur la fourchette d'imposition la plus élevée. La portée de l’étude est une sélection de pays de l’O.C.D.E. Une analyse des changement de comportement des contribuables et des différentes alternatives dont le gouvernement dispose en termes de politique fiscale en suivaient. En fin, les possibles faiblesses dans des techniques de référence sont examinées en détail. 

Understanding the Impact of the Property Tax Appeal Process on Assessment Uniformity: Procedures, Structures, and Outcomes

Property taxes serve as a vital revenue source for local governments. The revenues derived from the property tax function as the primary funding source for a variety of critical local public service systems. Property tax appeal systems serve as quasi-administrative-judicial mechanisms intended to assure the public that property tax assessments are correct, fair, and equitable. Despite these important functions, there is a paucity of empirical research related to property tax appeal systems. This study contributes to property tax literature by identifying who participates in the property tax appeal process and examining their motivations for participation. In addition, the study sought to determine whether patterns of use and success in appeal systems affected the distribution of the tax burden. Data were collected by means of a survey distributed to single-family property owners from two Florida counties. In addition, state and county documents were analyzed to determine appeal patterns and examine the impact on assessment uniformity, over a three-year period. The survey data provided contextual evidence that single-family property owners are not as troubled by property taxes as they are by the conduct of local government officials. The analyses of the decision to appeal indicated that more expensive properties and properties excluded from initial uniformity analyses were more likely to be appealed, while properties with homestead exemptions were less likely to be appealed. The value change analyses indicated that appeals are clustered in certain geographical areas; however, these areas do not always experience a greater percentage of the value changes. Interestingly, professional representation did not increase the probability of obtaining a reduction in value. Other relationships between the variables were discovered, but often with weak predictive ability. Findings from the assessment uniformity analyses were also interesting. The results indicated that the appeals mechanisms in both counties improved assessment uniformity. On average, appealed properties exhibited greater horizontal and vertical inequities, as compared to non-appealed properties, prior to the appeals process. After, the appeal process was completed; the indicators of horizontal and vertical equity were largely improved. However, there were some indications of regressivity in the final year of the study.

The responsiveness of government revenue to marginal tax rates

Ce document utilise des données fiscales et démographiques pour calculer les changements dans les recettes du gouvernement engendrés par les ajustements dans le taux marginal d'imposition, et cela en mettant l’accent sur la fourchette d'imposition la plus élevée. La portée de l’étude est une sélection de pays de l’O.C.D.E. Une analyse des changement de comportement des contribuables et des différentes alternatives dont le gouvernement dispose en termes de politique fiscale en suivaient. En fin, les possibles faiblesses dans des techniques de référence sont examinées en détail. 

101 ways to save money on your tax - legally! : 2016-2017 edition

101 Ways to Save Money on Your Tax – Legally! is the Australian taxpayer's essential guide to maximising returns. Comprehensively updated for 2016-2017, this indispensable resource explains all of the changes to the May 2016 budget to help you pay what you owe and not a penny more. You'll find answers to common questions, tax traps to avoid and plenty of tips from Mr. Taxman himself that can save you hundreds or even thousands of dollars! Leverage your business, education, family, property, medical expenses, levies, shares and superannuation to get the tax return you deserve – and are fully entitled to under Australian law. You'll also find expert advice for tax-effective investments, tax planning and how to find a great accountant, so you can position yourself for an even bigger return next year!

101 ways to save money on your tax legally! : updated for 2015-2016

101 Ways to Save Money on Your Tax–Legally! 2015–2016 sheds light on how you can increase your tax return by maximising your deductions. This practical guide explores how individual, family, property, education, employment, small business, investment property, shares, superannuation, medical expenses, levies, and other deductions can be leveraged to ensure that you receive the tax return you deserve—and that you do not overpay the government. You'll also get advice regarding tax-effective investments, tax planning, and the best way to go about finding a great accountant.Every year, you give a portion of your income to the government. While this money funds essentials like infrastructure, you certainly do not want to give more than you need to. This insightful guide provides you with the information necessary to ensure that you receive as much money back as possible on your tax return.Discover how you can maximise your deductions to increase your tax return—and get what you are entitled to back from the government each yearUnderstand the tax law changes from the May 2015 budgetAccess tips that assist you in planning and filing your taxes with your best interests in mindIdentify tax traps, and get answers to frequently asked questions101 Ways to Save Money on Your Tax–Legally! 2015–2016 is an essential resource for every Australian who pays taxes.

Investors’ behavior in an emerging, tax free market

We provide empirical evidence on the stock market participants’ behavior in an emerging market, with a tax-free environment. Our results show that UAE investors exhibit overconfidence and home bias, and tend to sell prior winners and buy prior losers. We find that investors rely on familiarity and on their information channels to make decisions. The results indicate that investors are risk averse, especially after the global financial crisis, which has had contagion effect on UAE markets. Investors attribute this effect to the inability to manage systemic crisis and to problems of information asymmetry, insider trading, and lack of good governance during crisis.

Reforms required to the Australian tax system to improve biodiversity conservation on private land

Private land conservation forms an integral part of Australia’s natural resource management and biodiversity conservation efforts, and the past two decades have seen a significant growth in the establishment of in-perpetuity conservation covenants. Specifically, conservation covenants address key national goals such as building the National Reserve System and expanding the markets for ecosystem services. However, a number of financial barriers exist to achieving these goals, and the national tax review in the form of the Tax White Paper Task Force provides an opportunity to address these barriers. This article provides a number of specific recommendations which outline how these financial barriers for private land conservation might be addressed by the Federal Government.

Improving compliance of income tax in developing countries: Bangladesh perspective

The thesis examines tax compliance issues in developing countries in the field of income tax with special emphasis on Bangladesh. The thesis explores the state and taxpayers relationship as a fiduciary one. The effectiveness of specific legal tools in Bangladesh are discussed critically. Policy suggestions are made to improve compliance

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2007 Qualified Allocation Plan, April 3, 2008

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2008 Qualified Allocation Plan, June 14, 2007

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2009 First Amended Qualified Allocation Plan, February 10, 2012

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2009 Second Amended Qualified Allocation Plan, October 14, 2008

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2009 Qualified Allocation Plan, July 10, 2008

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2010 Qualified Allocation Plan, July 9, 2009

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.