Exploiting CAFS-ISP

In the summer of 1982, the ICLCUA CAFS Special Interest Group defined three subject areas for working party activity. These were: 1) interfaces with compilers and databases, 2) end-user language facilities and display methods, and 3) text-handling and office automation. The CAFS SIG convened one working party to address the first subject with the following terms of reference: 1) review facilities and map requirements onto them, 2) "Database or CAFS" or "Database on CAFS", 3) training needs for users to bridge to new techniques, and 4) repair specifications to cover gaps in software. The working party interpreted the topic broadly as the data processing professional's, rather than the end-user's, view of and relationship with CAFS. This report is the result of the working party's activities. The report content for good reasons exceeds the terms of reference in their strictest sense. For example, we examine QUERYMASTER, which is deemed to be an end-user tool by ICL, from both the DP and end-user perspectives. First, this is the only interface to CAFS in the current SV201. Secondly, it is necessary for the DP department to understand the end-user's interface to CAFS. Thirdly, the other subjects have not yet been addressed by other active working parties.

Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads: A Feasible Policy for Counter-Terrorism?

This article analyses the counter-terrorist operations carried out by Captain (later Major General) Orde Wingate in Palestine in 1938, and considers whether these might inform current operations. Wingate's Special Night Squads were formed from British soldiers and Jewish police specifically to counter terrorist and sabotage attacks. Their approach escalated from interdicting terrorist gangs to pre-emptive attacks on suspected terrorist sanctuaries to reprisal attacks after terrorist atrocities. They continued the British practice of using irregular units in counter-insurgency, which was sustained into the postwar era and contributed to the evolution of British Special Forces. Wingate's methods proved effective in pacifying terrorist-infested areas and could be applied again, but only in the face of 'friction' arising from changes in cultural attitudes since the 1930s, and from the political-strategic context of post-2001 counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist operations. In some cases, however, public opinion might not preclude the use of some of Wingate's techniques.