1963-1968. Dall'avvento dell'amministrazione di Lyndon B. Johnson al Trattato di Non-Proliferazione. gli Stati Uniti, la Francia, la NATO e l'Europa agli esordi della distensione. Storia di una "non-crisi" transatlantica e della riorganizzazione dell'Alleanza.

The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the détente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the “transatlantic bargain” became something not so easy to dealt with. The Federal Germany wanted to say a word in the nuclear affairs and, why not, put the finger on the trigger of the atlantic nuclear weapons. URSS, on the other hand, wanted to keep Germany down. The other allies did not want to share the onus of the defense of Europe, at most the responsability for the use of the weapons and, at least, to participate in the decision-making process. France, which wanted to detach herself from the policy of the United States and regained a world role, added difficulties to the manage of this course of action. Through the years of the Johnson’s office, the divergences of the policies placed by his advisers to gain the goal put the American foreign policy in deep water. The withdrawal of France from the organization but not from the Alliance, give Washington a chance to carry out his goal. The development of a clear-cut disarm policy leaded the Johnson’s administration to the core of the matter. The Non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, solved in a business-like fashion the problem with the allies. The question of nuclear sharing faded away with the acceptance of more deep consultative role in the nuclear affairs by the allies, the burden for the defense of Europe became more bearable through the offset agreement with the FRG and a new doctrine, the flexible response, put an end, at least formally, to the taboo of the nuclear age. The Johnson’s grand design proved to be different from the Kennedy’s one, but all things considered, it was more workable. The unpredictable result was a real détente with the Soviet Union, which, we can say, was a merit of President Johnson.

The role of indigenous people in national development processes: Participation and marginalisation of indigenous Bedouin in South Sinai tourism development

The Bedouin of South Sinai have been significantly affected by the politics of external powers for a long time. However, never had the interest of external powers in Sinai been so strong as since the Israeli-Egyptian wars in the second half of the 20th century when Bedouin interests started to collide with Egypt’s plans for a development of luxury tourism in South Sinai. rnrnThe tourism boom that has started in the 1980s has brought economic and infrastructure development to the Bedouin and tourism has become the most important source of income for the Bedouin. However, while the absolute increase of tourists to Sinai has trickled down to the Bedouin to some extent, the participation of Bedouin in the overall tourism development is under-proportionate. Moreover, the Bedouin have become increasingly dependent on monetary income and consequently from tourism as the only significant source of income while at the same time they have lost much of their land as well as their self-determination.rnrnIn this context, the Bedouin livelihoods have become very vulnerable due to repeated depressions in the tourism industry as well as marginalization. Major marginalization processes the Bedouin are facing are the loss of land, barriers to market entry, especially increasingly strict rules and regulations in the tourism industry, as well as discrimination by the authorities. Social differentiation and Bedouin preferences are identified as further factors in Bedouin marginalization.rnrnThe strategies Bedouin have developed in response to all these problems are coping strategies, which try to deal with the present problem at the individual level. Basically no strategies have been developed at the collective level that would aim to actively shape the Bedouin’s present and future. Collective action has been hampered by a variety of factors, such as the speed of the developments, the distribution of power or the decay of tribal structures.rnWhile some Bedouin might be able to continue their tourism activities, a large number of informal jobs will not be feasible anymore. The majority of the previously mostly self-employed Bedouin will probably be forced to work as day-laborers who will have lost much of their pride, dignity, sovereignty and freedom. Moreover, with a return to subsistence being impossible for the majority of the Bedouin, it is likely that an increasing number of marginalized Bedouin will turn to illegal income generating activities such as smuggling or drug cultivation. This in turn will lead to further repression and discrimination and could escalate in a serious violent conflict between the Bedouin and the government.rnrnDevelopment plans and projects should address the general lack of civil rights, local participation and protection of minorities in Egypt and promote Bedouin community development and the consideration of Bedouin interests in tourism development.rnrnWether the political upheavals and the resignation of president Mubarak at the beginning of 2011 will have a positive effect on the situation of the Bedouin remains to be seen.rn

Benchmarking in the SWISSspine registry: results of 52 Dynardi lumbar total disc replacements compared with the data pool of 431 other lumbar disc prostheses

The SWISSspine registry is the first mandatory registry of its kind in the history of Swiss orthopaedics and it follows the principle of "coverage with evidence development". Its goal is the generation of evidence for a decision by the Swiss federal office of health about reimbursement of the concerned technologies and treatments by the basic health insurance of Switzerland. Recently, developed and clinically implemented, the Dynardi total disc arthroplasty (TDA) accounted for 10% of the implanted lumbar TDAs in the registry. We compared the outcomes of patients treated with Dynardi to those of the recipients of the other TDAs in the registry. Between March 2005 and October 2009, 483 patients with single-level TDA were documented in the registry. The 52 patients with a single Dynardi lumbar disc prosthesis implanted by two surgeons (CE and OS) were compared to the 431 patients who received one of the other prostheses. Data were collected in a prospective, observational multicenter mode. Surgery, implant, 3-month, 1-year, and 2-year follow-up forms as well as comorbidity, NASS and EQ-5D questionnaires were collected. For statistical analyses, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and chi-square test were used. Multivariate regression analyses were also performed. Significant and clinically relevant reduction of low back pain and leg pain as well as improvement in quality of life was seen in both groups (P < 0.001 postop vs. preop). There were no inter-group differences regarding postoperative pain levels, intraoperative and follow-up complications or revision procedures with a new hospitalization. However, significantly more Dynardi patients achieved a minimum clinically relevant low back pain alleviation of 18 VAS points and a quality of life improvement of 0.25 EQ-5D points. The patients with Dynardi prosthesis showed a similar outcome to patients receiving the other TDAs in terms of postoperative low back and leg pain, complications, and revision procedures. A higher likelihood for achieving a minimum clinically relevant improvement of low back pain and quality of life in Dynardi patients was observed. This difference might be due to the large number of surgeons using other TDAs compared to only two surgeons using the Dynardi TDA, with corresponding variations in patient selection, patient-physician interaction and other factors, which cannot be assessed in a registry study.

An Ethical History of Photography in Combat and of Combat Photography in the United States during World War II

With the United States‘ entry into the Second World War, the word ?censorship? was seen largely as antithetical to, rather than a necessary counterpart to, victory among Americans. People did not want to be censored in their writing, photographs or speech,but it proved to be necessary even before the war began, in order to protect government secrets and the people on the home-front from scenes that were too disturbing. Even before the war had officially begun, there were problems with censorship among journalists and newspapers. The initial response of outrage in reference to censorship in the United States was common among journalists, newspapers, magazines, and radio news; nevertheless, there was a necessity for censorship among Americans, on the home frontand the front lines, and it would be tolerated throughout the war to ensure that enemies of America did not gain access to information that would assist in a defeat of the United States in the Second World War. The research I have conducted has dealt with the censorship of combat photography during World War II, in conjunction with the ethics that were in play at the time that affected the censors. Through exploring the work of three combat photographers — Tony Vaccaro, James R. Stephens and Charles E. Sumners — I wasable to effectively construct an explanatory ethical history of these three men. Research on the censorship and effects it had on the United States brought me to three distinctareas of censorship and ethics that would be explored: (1) the restrictions and limitations enforced by the Office of Censorship, (2) a general overview of war and photography as it influenced the soldiers and their families on the home-front, (3) and the combat photographers and personal and military censorship that influenced their work. Although their work was censored both by the military and the government, these men saw the war in a different light that remained with them long after the battles and war had ceased.Using the narratives of Tony Vaccaro, Charles E. Sumners and James R. Stephens as means for more in depth research, this thesis strives to create lenses through which to view the history and ethics of censorship that shaped combat photography during the Second World War and the images to which we refer as representative of that war today.