Intergroup bias in third-party punishment stems from both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination

Social norms pervade almost every aspect of social interaction. If they are violated, not only legal institutions, but other members of society as well, punish, i.e., inflict costs on the wrongdoer. Sanctioning occurs even when the punishers themselves were not harmed directly and even when it is costly for them. There is evidence for intergroup bias in this third-party punishment: third-parties, who share group membership with victims, punish outgroup perpetrators more harshly than ingroup perpetrators. However, it is unknown whether a discriminatory treatment of outgroup perpetrators (outgroup discrimination) or a preferential treatment of ingroup perpetrators (ingroup favoritism) drives this bias. To answer this question, the punishment of outgroup and ingroup perpetrators must be compared to a baseline, i.e., unaffiliated perpetrators. By applying a costly punishment game, we found stronger punishment of outgroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators and weaker punishment of ingroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators. This demonstrates that both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination drive intergroup bias in third-party punishment of perpetrators that belong to distinct social groups.

A neural marker of costly punishment behavior

Human readiness to incur personal costs to punish norm violators is a key force in the maintenance of social norms. The willingness to punish is, however, characterized by vast individual heterogeneity that is poorly understood. In fact, this heterogeneity has so far defied explanations in terms of individual-level demographic or psychological variables. Here, we use resting electroencephalography, a stable measure of individual differences in cortical activity, to show that a highly specific neural marker--baseline cortical activity in the right prefrontal cortex--predicts individuals' punishment behavior. The analysis of task-independent individual variation in cortical baseline activity provides a new window into the neurobiology of decision making by bringing dispositional neural markers to the forefront of the analysis.

Dopaminergic stimulation increases selfish behavior in the absence of punishment threat.

RATIONALE People often face decisions that pit self-interested behavior aimed at maximizing personal reward against normative behavior such as acting cooperatively, which benefits others. The threat of social sanctions for defying the fairness norm prevents people from behaving overly selfish. Thus, normative behavior is influenced by both seeking rewards and avoiding punishment. However, the neurochemical processes mediating the impact of these influences remain unknown. Several lines of evidence link the dopaminergic system to reward and punishment processing, respectively, but this evidence stems from studies in non-social contexts. OBJECTIVES The present study investigates dopaminergic drug effects on individuals' reward seeking and punishment avoidance in social interaction. METHODS Two-hundred one healthy male participants were randomly assigned to receive 300 mg of L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine (L-DOPA) or a placebo before playing an economic bargaining game. This game involved two conditions, one in which unfair behavior could be punished and one in which unfair behavior could not be punished. RESULTS In the absence of punishment threats, L-DOPA administration led to more selfish behavior, likely mediated through an increase in reward seeking. In contrast, L-DOPA administration had no significant effect on behavior when faced with punishment threats. CONCLUSIONS The results of this study broaden the role of the dopaminergic system in reward seeking to human social interactions. We could show that even a single dose of a dopaminergic drug may bring selfish behavior to the fore, which in turn may shed new light on potential causal relationships between the dopaminergic system and norm abiding behaviors in certain clinical subpopulations.

The mass-hierarchy and CP-violation discovery reach of the LBNO long-baseline neutrino experiment

The next generation neutrino observatory proposed by the LBNO collaboration will address fundamental questions in particle and astroparticle physics. The experiment consists of a far detector, in its first stage a 20 kt LAr double phase TPC and a magnetised iron calorimeter, situated at 2300 km from CERN and a near detector based on a highpressure argon gas TPC. The long baseline provides a unique opportunity to study neutrino flavour oscillations over their 1st and 2nd oscillation maxima exploring the L/E behaviour, and distinguishing effects arising from δCP and matter. In this paper we have reevaluated the physics potential of this setup for determining the mass hierarchy (MH) and discovering CP-violation (CPV), using a conventional neutrino beam from the CERN SPS with a power of 750 kW. We use conservative assumptions on the knowledge of oscillation parameter priors and systematic uncertainties. The impact of each systematic error and the precision of oscillation prior is shown. We demonstrate that the first stage of LBNO can determine unambiguously the MH to > 5δ C.L. over the whole phase space. We show that the statistical treatment of the experiment is of very high importance, resulting in the conclusion that LBNO has ~ 100% probability to determine the MH in at most 4-5 years of running. Since the knowledge of MH is indispensable to extract δCP from the data, the first LBNO phase can convincingly give evidence for CPV on the 3δ C.L. using today’s knowledge on oscillation parameters and realistic assumptions on the systematic uncertainties.

Does perpetrator punishment satisfy victims' feelings of revenge?

Criminal victimization often provokes strong feelings of revenge. Two studies were conducted to investigate whether legal punishment of the perpetrator reduces victims’ feelings of revenge. A cross-sectional study of 174 crime victims revealed that punishment severity does not predict feelings of revenge at a time several years after the trial. A longitudinal study of 31 crime victims revealed that, for the time interval from a few weeks before the trial to a few weeks after the trial, punishment severity significantly predicts a decrease in feelings of revenge; nevertheless intraindividual and interindividual stability of these feelings was high. Taken together, results of the two studies suggest that perpetrator punishment only partially, and moreover only transitorily, satisfies victims’ feelings of revenge. Therefore, satisfaction of victims’ feelings of revenge cannot be taken as empirical justification for tightening of sentencing norms.

Punishment goals of crime victims

Research on subjective punishment goals has focused on the perspective of third-party observers of criminal offenses and neglected the perspective of victims. This study investigates punishment goals among 174 adult crime victims (rape and nonsexual assault) for each participant’s real criminal case. Scales measuring support for punishment goals are constructed by factor analysis of an 18-item list. Results show that 5 highly supported goals can be distinguished: retaliation, recognition of victim status, confirmation of societal values, victim security, and societal security. Analysis of relations between punishment goal scales and personal variables, situational variables, and demanded punishment severity corroborates the view that the punishment goals revealed can be classified according to the two independent dichotomies of moral versus instrumental goals, and micro versus macro goals.

Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness—the punishment of selfishness is not

Peer-punishment is an important determinant of cooperation in human groups. It has been suggested that, at the proximate level of analysis, punitive preferences can explain why humans incur costs to punish their deviant peers. How punitive preferences could have evolved in humans is still not entirely understood. A possible explanation at the ultimate level of analysis comes from signaling theory. It has been argued that the punishment of defectors can be a type-separating signal of the punisher's cooperative intent. As a result, punishers are selected more often as interaction partners in social exchange and are partly compensated for the costs they incur when punishing defectors. A similar argument has been made with regard to acts of generosity. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether the punishment of a selfish division of money in a dictator game is a sign of trustworthiness and whether punishers are more trustworthy interaction partners in a trust game than non-punishers. We distinguish between second-party and third-party punishment and compare punitive acts with acts of generosity as signs of trustworthiness. We find that punishers are not more trustworthy than non-punishers and that punishers are not trusted more than non-punishers, both in the second-party and in the third-party punishment condition. To the contrary, second-party punishers are trusted less than their non-punishing counterparts. However, participants who choose a generous division of money are more trustworthy and are trusted more than participants who choose a selfish division or participants about whom no information is available. Our results suggest that, unlike for punitive acts, the signaling benefits of generosity are to be gained in social exchange.