Ventricular arrhythmia in coronary artery disease: limits of a risk stratification strategy based on the ejection fraction alone and impact of infarct localization.

AIMS: Estimates of the left ventricular ejection fraction (LVEF) in patients with life-threatening ventricular arrhythmias related to coronary artery disease (CAD) have rarely been reported despite it has become the basis for determining patient's eligibility for prophylactic defibrillator. We aimed to determine the extent and distribution of reduced LVEF in patients with sustained ventricular tachycardia or ventricular fibrillation. METHODS AND RESULTS: 252 patients admitted for ventricular arrhythmia related to CAD were included: 149 had acute myocardial infarction (MI) (Group I, 59%), 54 had significant chronic obstructive CAD suggestive of an ischaemic arrhythmic trigger (Group II, 21%) and 49 patients had an old MI without residual ischaemia (Group III, 19%). 34% of the patients with scar-related arrhythmias had an LVEF > or =40%. Based on pre-event LVEF evaluation, it can be estimated that less than one quarter of the whole study population had a known chronic MI with severely reduced LVEF. In Group III, the proportion of inferior MI was significantly higher than anterior MI (81 vs. 19%; absolute difference, -62; 95% confidence interval, -45 to -79; P < or = 0.0001), though median LVEF was higher in inferior MI (0.37 +/- 10 vs. 0.29 +/- 10; P = 0.0499). CONCLUSION: Patients included in defibrillator trials represent only a minority of the patients at risk of sudden cardiac death. By applying the current risk stratification strategy based on LVEF, more than one third of the patients with old MI would not have qualified for a prophylactic defibrillator. Our study also suggests that inferior scars may be more prone to ventricular arrhythmia compared to anterior scars.

On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking

We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank level. We show that when the market power is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market power, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in. We further show that a merger of two neighboring banks increases the likelihood of prudent behaviour. Finally, introduction of a deposit insurance scheme exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem.

Subclinical hyperthyroidism and the risk of coronary heart disease and mortality.

BACKGROUND: Data from prospective cohort studies regarding the association between subclinical hyperthyroidism and cardiovascular outcomes are conflicting.We aimed to assess the risks of total and coronary heart disease (CHD) mortality, CHD events, and atrial fibrillation (AF) associated with endogenous subclinical hyperthyroidism among all available large prospective cohorts. METHODS: Individual data on 52 674 participants were pooled from 10 cohorts. Coronary heart disease events were analyzed in 22 437 participants from 6 cohorts with available data, and incident AF was analyzed in 8711 participants from 5 cohorts. Euthyroidism was defined as thyrotropin level between 0.45 and 4.49 mIU/L and endogenous subclinical hyperthyroidism as thyrotropin level lower than 0.45 mIU/L with normal free thyroxine levels, after excluding those receiving thyroid-altering medications. RESULTS: Of 52 674 participants, 2188 (4.2%) had subclinical hyperthyroidism. During follow-up, 8527 participants died (including 1896 from CHD), 3653 of 22 437 had CHD events, and 785 of 8711 developed AF. In age- and sex-adjusted analyses, subclinical hyperthyroidism was associated with increased total mortality (hazard ratio[HR], 1.24, 95% CI, 1.06-1.46), CHD mortality (HR,1.29; 95% CI, 1.02-1.62), CHD events (HR, 1.21; 95%CI, 0.99-1.46), and AF (HR, 1.68; 95% CI, 1.16-2.43).Risks did not differ significantly by age, sex, or preexisting cardiovascular disease and were similar after further adjustment for cardiovascular risk factors, with attributable risk of 14.5% for total mortality to 41.5% forAF in those with subclinical hyperthyroidism. Risks for CHD mortality and AF (but not other outcomes) were higher for thyrotropin level lower than 0.10 mIU/L compared with thyrotropin level between 0.10 and 0.44 mIU/L(for both, P value for trend, .03). CONCLUSION: Endogenous subclinical hyperthyroidism is associated with increased risks of total, CHD mortality, and incident AF, with highest risks of CHD mortality and AF when thyrotropin level is lower than 0.10 mIU/L.

Common and Idiosyncratic Factors of the Exchange Risk Premium in Emerging European Markets

Existing empirical evidence suggests that the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIRP) condition may not hold due to an exchange risk premium. For a panel data set of eleven emerging European economies we decompose this exchange risk premium into an idiosyncratic (country-specific) elements and a common factor using a principal components approach. We present evidence of a stationary idiosyncratic component and nonstationary common factor. This result leads to the conclusion of a nonstationary risk premium for these countries and a violation of the UIRP in the long-run, which is in contrast to previous studies often documenting a stationary premium in developed countries. Furthermore, we report that the variation in the premium is largely attributable to a common factor influenced by economic developments in the United States.

Three essays on bankruptcy risk

Abstract Market prices of corporate bond spreads and of credit default swap (CDS) rates do not match each other. In this paper, we argue that the liquidity premium, the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) option and actual market segmentation explain the pricing differences. Using the European transaction data from Reuters and Bloomberg, we estimate the liquidity premium that is time- varying and firm-specific. We show that when time-dependent liquidity premiums are considered, corporate bond spreads and CDS rates behave in a much closer way than previous studies have shown. We find that high equity volatility drives pricing differences that can be explained by the CTD option.

Learning about Risk and Return: A Simple Model of Bubbles and Crashes

This paper demonstrates that an asset pricing model with least-squares learning can lead to bubbles and crashes as endogenous responses to the fundamentals driving asset prices. When agents are risk-averse they need to make forecasts of the conditional variance of a stock’s return. Recursive updating of both the conditional variance and the expected return implies several mechanisms through which learning impacts stock prices. Extended periods of excess volatility, bubbles and crashes arise with a frequency that depends on the extent to which past data is discounted. A central role is played by changes over time in agents’ estimates of risk.

Inequality and Risk-Taking Behaviour

This paper investigates social influences on attitudes to risk and offers an evolutionary explanation of risk-taking by young low-ranked males. Becker, Murphy and Werning (2005) found that individuals about to participate in a status tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth and status. Here their model is generalised by use of the insight of Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) that in a tournament or status competition one can consider equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endowments. While Becker et al. found that risk-taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments, it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament. Further, it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is sufficiently low. Thus, the disadvantaged in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are sufficiently unequal. Finally, as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling, it can cause greater inequality of wealth.

Universal banking, competition and risk in a macro model

A stylized macroeconomic model is developed with an indebted, heterogeneous Investment Banking Sector funded by borrowing from a retail banking sector. The government guarantees retail deposits. Investment banks choose how risky their activities should be. We compared the benefits of separated vs. universal banking modelled as a vertical integration of the retail and investment banks. The incidence of banking default is considered under different constellations of shocks and degrees of competitiveness. The benefits of universal banking rise in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks to trading strategies and are positive even for very bad common shocks, even though government bailouts, which are costly, are larger compared to the case of separated banking entities. The welfare assessment of the structure of banks may depend crucially on the kinds of shock hitting the economy as well as on the efficiency of government intervention.

Aggregate and welfare effects of long run inflation risk under inflation and price-level targeting

This paper presents a DSGE model in which long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. Aggregate and welfare effects of long run inflation risk are assessed under two monetary regimes: inflation targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT). These effects differ because IT implies base-level drift in the price level, while PT makes the price level stationary around a target price path. Under IT, the welfare cost of long run inflation risk is equal to 0.35 percent of aggregate consumption. Under PT, where long run inflation risk is largely eliminated, it is lowered to only 0.01 per cent. There are welfare gains from PT because it raises average consumption for the young and lowers consumption risk substantially for the old. These results are strongly robust to changes in the PT target horizon and fairly robust to imperfect credibility, fiscal policy, and model calibration. While the distributional effects of an unexpected transition to PT are sizeable, they are short-lived and not welfare-reducing.

Low-frequency drug-resistant HIV-1 and risk of virological failure to first-line NNRTI-based ART: a multicohort European case-control study using centralized ultrasensitive 454 pyrosequencing.

OBJECTIVES: It is still debated if pre-existing minority drug-resistant HIV-1 variants (MVs) affect the virological outcomes of first-line NNRTI-containing ART. METHODS: This Europe-wide case-control study included ART-naive subjects infected with drug-susceptible HIV-1 as revealed by population sequencing, who achieved virological suppression on first-line ART including one NNRTI. Cases experienced virological failure and controls were subjects from the same cohort whose viraemia remained suppressed at a matched time since initiation of ART. Blinded, centralized 454 pyrosequencing with parallel bioinformatic analysis in two laboratories was used to identify MVs in the 1%-25% frequency range. ORs of virological failure according to MV detection were estimated by logistic regression. RESULTS: Two hundred and sixty samples (76 cases and 184 controls), mostly subtype B (73.5%), were used for the analysis. Identical MVs were detected in the two laboratories. 31.6% of cases and 16.8% of controls harboured pre-existing MVs. Detection of at least one MV versus no MVs was associated with an increased risk of virological failure (OR = 2.75, 95% CI = 1.35-5.60, P = 0.005); similar associations were observed for at least one MV versus no NRTI MVs (OR = 2.27, 95% CI = 0.76-6.77, P = 0.140) and at least one MV versus no NNRTI MVs (OR = 2.41, 95% CI = 1.12-5.18, P = 0.024). A dose-effect relationship between virological failure and mutational load was found. CONCLUSIONS: Pre-existing MVs more than double the risk of virological failure to first-line NNRTI-based ART.

Unemployment Risk and Wage Differentials

Workers in less secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure jobs. We show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in equilibrium when all workers are identical and firms differ only in job security (i.e. the probability that the worker is not sent into unemployment). In a setting where workers search for new positions both on and off the job, the worker's marginal willingness to pay for job security is endogenous: it depends on the behavior of all firms in the labor market and increases with the rent the employing firm leaves to the worker. We solve for the labor market equilibrium, finding that wages increase with job security for at least all firms in the risky tail of the distribution of firm-level unemployment risk. Meanwhile, unemployment becomes persistent for low-wage and unemployed workers, a seeming pattern of 'unemployment scarring' created entirely by firm heterogeneity. Higher in the wage distribution, workers can take wage cuts to move to more stable employment.

Asset Prices, Business Cycles, and Markov-Perfect Fiscal Policy when Agents are Risk-Sensitive

We study a business cycle model in which a benevolent fiscal authority must determine the optimal provision of government services, while lacking credibility, lump-sum taxes, and the ability to bond finance deficits. Households and the fiscal authority have risk sensitive preferences. We find that outcomes are affected importantly by the household's risk sensitivity, but not by the fiscal authority's. Further, while household risk-sensitivity induces a strong precautionary saving motive, which raises capital and lowers the return on assets, its effects on fluctuations and the business cycle are generally small, although more pronounced for negative shocks. Holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household risk-sensitivity lower the risk-free rate and raise the return on equity, increasing the equity premium. Finally, although risk-sensitivity has little effect on the provision of government services, it does cause the fiscal authority to lower the income tax rate. An additional contribution of this paper is to present a method for computing Markov-perfect equilibria in models where private agents and the government are risk-sensitive decisionmakers.