Could the presumption of innocence protect the guilty?

At criminal trial, we demand that those accused of criminal wrongdoing be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. What are the moral and/or political grounds of this demand? One popular and natural answer to this question focuses on the moral badness or wrongness of convicting and punishing innocent persons, which I call the direct moral grounding. In this essay, I suggest that this direct moral grounding, if accepted, may well have important ramifications for other areas of the criminal justice process, and in particular those parts in which we (through our legislatures and judges) decide how much punishment to distribute to guilty persons. If, as the direct moral grounding suggests, we should prefer under-punishment to over-punishment under conditions of uncertainty, due to the moral seriousness of errors which inappropriately punish persons, then we should also prefer erring on the side of under-punishment when considering how much to punish those who may justly be punished. Some objections to this line of thinking are considered.

Law of large numbers for super-brownian motions with a single point source

We investigate the super-Brownian motion with a single point source in dimensions 2 and 3 as constructed by Fleischmann and Mueller in 2004. Using analytic facts we derive the long time behavior of the mean in dimension 2 and 3 thereby complementing previous work of Fleischmann, Mueller and Vogt. Using spectral theory and martingale arguments we prove a version of the strong law of large numbers for the two dimensional superprocess with a single point source and finite variance.

Online data processing consent under EU law: a theoretical framework and empirical evidence from the UK

This article analyses the results of an empirical study on the 200 most popular UK-based websites in various sectors of e-commerce services. The study provides empirical evidence on unlawful processing of personal data. It comprises a survey on the methods used to seek and obtain consent to process personal data for direct marketing and advertisement, and a test on the frequency of unsolicited commercial emails (UCE) received by customers as a consequence of their registration and submission of personal information to a website. Part One of the article presents a conceptual and normative account of data protection, with a discussion of the ethical values on which EU data protection law is grounded and an outline of the elements that must be in place to seek and obtain valid consent to process personal data. Part Two discusses the outcomes of the empirical study, which unveils a significant departure between EU legal theory and practice in data protection. Although a wide majority of the websites in the sample (69%) has in place a system to ask separate consent for engaging in marketing activities, it is only 16.2% of them that obtain a consent which is valid under the standards set by EU law. The test with UCE shows that only one out of three websites (30.5%) respects the will of the data subject not to receive commercial communications. It also shows that, when submitting personal data in online transactions, there is a high probability (50%) of incurring in a website that will ignore the refusal of consent and will send UCE. The article concludes that there is severe lack of compliance of UK online service providers with essential requirements of data protection law. In this respect, it suggests that there is inappropriate standard of implementation, information and supervision by the UK authorities, especially in light of the clarifications provided at EU level.

Unwritten law in Hobbesian political thought

In Hobbesian terminology, ‘unwritten laws’ are natural laws enforced within a polity, by a non-sovereign judge, without some previous public promulgation. This article discusses the idea in the light of successive Hobbesian accounts of ‘law’ and ‘obligation’. Between De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes dropped the idea that natural law is strictly speaking law, but he continued to believe unwritten laws must form a part of any legal system. He was unable to explain how such a law could claim a legal status. His loyalty to the notion, in spite of all the trouble that it caused, is a sign of his belief that moral knowledge is readily accessible to all.

Retributivists! The harm principle is not for you!

Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, whilst retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. For some versions of the harm principle, this is because retributivism is logically incompatible with it, or its grounds. For others, retributivists can only endorse the harm principle at the cost of endorsing implausible positions about the content of the criminal law.

Time and retribution

Retributivists believe that punishment can be deserved, and that deserved punishment is intrinsically good. They also believe that certain crimes deserve certain quantities of punishment. On the plausible assumption that the overall amount of any given punishment is a function of its severity and duration, we might think that retributivists (qua retributivists) would be indifferent as to whether a punishment were long and light or short and sharp, provided the offender gets the overall amount of punishment he deserves. In this paper I argue against this, showing that retributivists should actually prefer shorter and more severe punishments to longer, gentler options. I show this by focusing on, and developing a series of interpretations of, the retributivist claim that not punishing the guilty is bad, focussing on the relationship between that badness and time. I then show that each interpretation leads to a preference for shorter over longer punishment.