Ultra-Thin PCC Overlays, January 2005

· Evaluate conventional methods of slab removal and asphalt surface preparation for subsequent overlays of portland cement concrete (PCC) in the “remove and replace” areas. · Evaluate existing asphaltic concrete surface under the “remove and patch” areas of rehabilitation areas and evaluate joint formation in the areas of patching. · Evaluate polypropylene fiber enhanced concrete at the three-inch depth to determine the cost/benefit of its inclusion. · Evaluate the performance of the rehabilitated ultra-thin whitetopping sections and the extended performance of the existing ultra-thin sections with and without patching. · Validate existing ultra-thin whitetopping design procedures of the Portland Cement Association (PCA) and American Concrete Pavement Association (ACPA) for application in Iowa.

2000 Summary Iowa Beef Cow Business Record, 2001

2000 Summary Iowa Beef Cow Business Record

The Collective-Quality Promotion in the Agribusiness Sector: An Overview, October 2005

This paper reviews the economic effects of collective-quality promotion through a survey of the recent literature devoted to common labeling and professional groups. Benefits and costs of common labeling and professional groups for improving quality are detailed. Some empirical facts are presented, mainly focusing on some European examples, since many European countries have a long history of producer-owned marketing programs. This paper shows that in some cases the collective-quality promotion can be a successful strategy for firms/farmers.

Tariff Escalation and Invasive Species Risk, October 2005

We investigate the interface between trade and invasive species (IS) risk, focusing on the existing tariff escalation in agro-forestry product markets and its implication for IS risk. Tariff escalation in processed agro-forestry products exacerbates the risk of IS by biasing trade flows toward increased trade of primary commodity flows and against processed-product trade. We show that reducing tariff escalation by lowering the tariff on processed goods increases allocative efficiency and reduces the IS externality, a win-win situation. We also identify policy menus for trade reforms involving tariffs on both raw input and processed goods, leading to winwin situations.

Cooperatives and Contracting in Agriculture: The Case of West Liberty Foods, October 2005

The West Liberty Foods turkey cooperative was formed in 1996 to purchase the assets and assume operations of Louis Rich Foods (an investor-owned processing rm), which, at the time, announced the imminent shutdown of its West Liberty, Iowa, processing facility. We study the creation and performance of this �new generation� cooperative using eld interviews with grower members and company management. We describe changes, before and after the buyout, in the contractual apparatus used for procuring live turkeys, and in the communication requirements, work expectations, and nancial positions of growers. During the private ownership period, most of the inputs (except labor and facilities) were provided by the rm; there was substantial supervision of the growers' actions; growers faced little price and production risk; and growers' equity was due largely to ownership of land and other farm assets. Our interviews reveal that, after cooperative formation, growers were exposed to considerable additional risk; monitoring of growers by the rm was less intensive; grower time and effort commitments to turkey production increased substantially; and a signicant fraction of rm (cooperative) equity came from growers' willingness to leverage their farm and personal assets (and hence indirectly their existing relationships with local lenders). We argue that some of these changes are consistent with a nancial contract where asset pledging and its corollary risk generate higher work effort by growers and a reduction in agency rents. These economies likely compensate for an organizational deadweight loss traditionally associated with cooperative governance.

Inspection Intensity and Market Structure, October 2005

An investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms’ incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection.

Tariff Equivalent of Technical Barriers to Trade with Imperfect Substitution and Trade Costs, November 2005

The price-wedge method yields a tariff-equivalent estimate of technical barriers to trade (TBT). An extension of this method accounts for imperfect substitution between domestic and imported goods and incorporates recent findings on trade costs. We explore the sensitivity of this revamped TBT estimate to its key determinants (substitution elasticity, preference for home good, and trade cost). We use the augmented approach to investigate the ongoing US-Japan apple trade dispute and find that removing the Japanese TBT would yield limited export gains to the United States. We then draw policy implications of our findings.

On the Segregation of Genetically Modified, Conventional, and Organic Products in European Agriculture: A Multi-market Equilibrium Analysis, October 2005

Evaluating the possible benefits of the introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops must address the issue of consumer resistance as well as the complex regulation that has ensued. In the European Union (EU) this regulation envisions the “co-existence” of GM food with conventional and quality-enhanced products, mandates the labelling and traceability of GM products, and allows only a stringent adventitious presence of GM content in other products. All these elements are brought together within a partial equilibrium model of the EU agricultural food sector. The model comprises conventional, GM and organic food. Demand is modelled in a novel fashion, whereby organic and conventional products are treated as horizontally differentiated but GM products are vertically differentiated (weakly inferior) relative to conventional ones. Supply accounts explicitly for the land constraint at the sector level and for the need for additional resources to produce organic food. Model calibration and simulation allow insights into the qualitative and quantitative effects of the large-scale introduction of GM products in the EU market. We find that the introduction of GM food reduces overall EU welfare, mostly because of the associated need for costly segregation of non-GM products, but the producers of quality-enhanced products actually benefit.

Managing Quality under Heterogeneous Consumer Demand and Product Quality, October 2005

Based on accepted advances in the marketing, economics, consumer behavior, and satisfaction literatures, we develop a micro-foundations model of a firm that needs to manage the quality of a product that is inherently heterogeneous in the presence of varying customer tastes or expectations for quality. Our model blends elements of the returns to quality, customer lifetime value, and service profit chain approaches to marketing. The model is then used to explain several empirical results pertaining to the marketing literature by explicitly articulating the trade-offs between customer satisfaction and costs (including opportunity costs) of quality. In this environment firms will find it optimal to allow some customers to go unsatisfied. We show that the relationship between the expected number of repeated purchases by an individual customer is endogenous to the choice of quality by the firm, indicating that the number of purchases cannot be chosen freely to estimate a customer’s lifetime value.

How Much “Safety” Is Available under the U.S. Proposal to the WTO?, November 2005

Critics of the U.S. proposal to the World Trade Organization (WTO) made in October 2005 are correct when they argue that adoption of the proposal would significantly reduce available support under the current farm program structure. Using historical prices and yields from 1980 to 2004, we estimate that loan rates would have to drop by 9 percent and target prices would have to drop by 10 percent in order to meet the proposed aggregate Amber Box and Blue Box limits. While this finding should cheer those who think that reform of U.S. farm programs is long overdue, it alarms those who want to maintain a strong safety net for U.S. agriculture. The dilemma of needing to reform farm programs while maintaining a strong safety net could be resolved by redesigning programs so that they target revenue rather than price. Building on a base of 70 percent Green Box income insurance, a program that provides a crop-specific revenue guarantee equal to 98 percent of the product of the current effective target price and expected county yield would fit into the proposed aggregate Amber and Blue Box limits. Payments would be triggered whenever the product of the season-average price and county average yield fell below this 98 percent revenue guarantee. Adding the proposed crop-specific constraints lowers the coverage level to 95 percent. Moving from programs that target price to ones that target revenue would eliminate the rationale for ad hoc disaster payments. Program payments would automatically arrive whenever significant crop losses or economic losses caused by low prices occurred. Also, much of the need for the complicated mechanism (the Standard Reinsurance Agreement) that transfers most risk of the U.S. crop insurance to the federal government would be eliminated because the federal government would directly assume the risk through farm programs. Changing the focus of federal farm programs from price targeting to revenue targeting would not be easy. Farmers have long relied on price supports and the knowledge that crop losses are often adequately covered by heavily subsidized crop insurance or by ad hoc disaster payments. Farmers and their leaders would only be willing to support a change to revenue targeting if they see that the current system is untenable in an era of tight federal budgets and WTO limits.

Ag Online, January 22, 2002

Monthly newsletter for the College of Agricultural for Iowa State University

Biosecurity and Infectious Animal Disease, November 2005

The spatial dimension of agricultural production is important when a communicable disease enters a region. This paper considers two sorts of biosecurity risk that producers can seek to protect against. One concerns the risk of spread: that neighboring producers do not take due care in protecting against being infected by a disease already in the region. In this case, producer efforts substitute with those of near neighbors. For representative spatial production structures, we characterize Nash equilibrium protection levels and show how spatial production structure matters. The other sort of risk concerns entry: that producers do not take due care in preventing the disease from entering the region. In this case, producer heterogeneity has subtle effects on welfare loss due to strategic behavior. Efforts by producers complement, suggesting that interfarm communication will help to redress the problem.

Business Organization and Coordination in Marketing Specialty Hogs: A Comparative Analysis of Two Firms from Iowa, November 2005

We study business organization and coordination of specialty-market hog production using a comparative analysis of two Iowa pork niche-marketing firms. We describe and analyze each firms management of five key organizational challenges: planning and logistics, quality assurance, process verication and management of �credence attributes,� business structure, and profit sharing. Although each firm is engaged in essentially the same activity, there are substantial differences across the two firms in the way production and marketing are coordinated. These differences are partly explained by the relative size and age of each firm, thus highlighting the importance of organizational evolution in agricultural markets, but are also partly the result of a formal organizational separation between marketing and production activities in one of the firm.

EU Enlargement and Technology Transfer to New Member States, November 2005

The European Union (EU) accomplished its biggest enlargement process in 2004 in terms of the number of countries, area, and population. This study focuses on the impact of enlargement, the resulting technology transfer on the grain sectors of the New Member States (NMS), and the consequent welfare implications. The study finds that EU enlargement has important implications for the EU and the NMS, but its impact on the world grain markets is minimal. The results show that producers in the NMS gain from accession because of higher prices, whereas consumers in most NMS face a welfare loss. Incorporating technology transfer into the accession increases the welfare gain of producers despite falling prices because of the larger supply shift. The loss of welfare for consumers in most NMS is lower in this case because of the decline in grain prices.

Iowa Gender Wage Study, 1999

In 1993, Iowa Workforce Development (then the Department of Employment Services) conducted a survey to determine if there was a gender gap in wages paid. The results of that survey indicated that women were paid 68 cents per dollar paid to males. We felt a need to determine if this relationship of wages paid to each gender has changed since the 1993 study. In 1999, the Commission on the Status of Women requested that Iowa Workforce Development conduct research to update the 1993 information. A survey, cosponsored by the Commission on the Status of Women and Iowa Workforce Development, was conducted in 1999. The results of the survey showed that women earned 73 percent of what men earned when both jobs were considered. (The survey asked respondents to provide information on a primary job and a secondary job.) The ratio for the primary job was 72 percent, while the ratio for the secondary job was 85 percent. Additional survey results detail the types of jobs respondents had, the types of companies for which they worked and the education and experience levels. All of these characteristics can contribute to these ratios. While the large influx of women into the labor force may be over, it is still important to look at such information to determine if future action is needed. We present these results with that goal in mind. We are indebted to those Iowans, female and male, who voluntarily completed the survey. This study was completed under the general direction of Judy Erickson. The report was written by Shazada Khan, Teresa Wageman, Ann Wagner, and Yvonne Younes with administrative and technical assistance from Michael Blank, Margaret Lee and Gary Wilson. The Iowa State University Statistical Lab provided sampling advice, data entry and coding and data analysis.