997 resultados para Market Extension


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Voucher from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension for April and May, paid to James and Benson Co. for fence repairs, May 11, 1857.

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Pay roll voucher # 17 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension, for the Northern Division for the month of May, 1857, approved by F. Shanly, chief engineer and W.G. Thompson, assistant engineer, May 27, 1857.

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Pay roll voucher #16 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension, for the office approved by F. Shanly, chief engineer, May 30, 1857.

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Pay roll voucher #18 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension, for the Southern Division approved by F. Shanly, chief engineer and F.A. Doyle assistant engineer, May 31, 1857.

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Voucher from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension for W.G. Thompson for the Northern Division. There are attached notes from the Welland Railway Company to John Mitchell for putting up shelves; to William Waud, staff; and to William Martin to repair the office (copy), June 10, 1857.

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Pay roll voucher #20 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension, for the Northern Division approved by F. Shanly, chief engineer and W.G. Thompson, assistant engineer (copy) June 1857.

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Pay roll voucher #21 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension, for the Southern Division approved by F. Shanly, chief engineer and Francis A. Doyle, assistant engineer (copy) June 29, 1857.

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Pay roll voucher #19 from the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension, for the office approved by F. Shanly, chief engineer (copy), July 1, 1857.

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Pay roll voucher #26 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension, for the Southern Division, for the month of July, 1857 approved by F. Shanly, chief engineer and Francis A. Doyle (copy), July 28, 1857.

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Voucher from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension to Francis A. Doyle for fees at the Fonthill Registry Office (copy), July 28, 1857.

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Pay roll voucher #24 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension, for the office, for the month of July, 1857 approved by F. Shanly, chief engineer (copy), July 31, 1857.

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Voucher from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension to W.G. Thompson regarding horse hire (copy), Jul. 30, 1857.

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Pay roll voucher #25 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension, for the Northern Division, for the month of July, 1857 approved by F. Shanly, chief engineer and W. G. Thompson (copy), July 30, 1857.

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This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied : no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.