Can you seek security for costs in international arbitration in Australia

International arbitrations can be conducted under either federal or State legislation in Australia. In both cases complexities arise in the resolution of procedural questions, such as whether security for costs can be granted. There is scant Australian case law on such issues. This article considers whether an arbitral tribunal or a court has the power [*2] to order security for costs in an international arbitration in Australia. After analysing Australia's international arbitration laws and discussing New Zealand and House of Lords' authority, it is argued that unless the parties have specifically empowered the arbitral tribunal to order security for costs, only the relevant court has that power, and even that is uncertain.

Principal selection: homosocialibility, the search for security and the production of normalized principal identities

Researchers investigating the decline of potential applicants for principalships have demonstrated that teachers perceive there to be a significant problem in current selection procedures. This article reports an investigation in two Australian states into principal selection. Drawing on a corpus of interviews, two case studies and administrative guidelines, we highlight five key problems in the interview process: (1) the dependence of selection panels on a written application; (2) the dilemma of experience versus potential; (3) the covert rule about the appointment of preferred applicants; (4) the quandary of panel competency; and (5) the evidence of inconsistency of decisions. We argue that the selection process amounts to a reproductive technology which, in the quest for certainty and safety, results in particular kinds of people being successful. This amounts we suggest, whether the selection process is managed by progressive or conservative personnel, to a form of homosociability the tendency to select people just like oneself.

Preventive detention and the right to personal liberty and security under Article 5 ECHR

'Preventive detention' refers to detention by executive order as a  precautionary measure based on predicted criminal conduct. Detention is without criminal charge or trial as detention is based on the prediction of a future offence. This paper examines Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ('ECHR'), in particular Article 5(1)(c) and Article 5(3). To explore this issue, this paper conducts a textual analysis of Article 5 and examines both the travaux preacuteparatoires of the ECHR, as well as jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. This article argues that preventive detention is specifically provided for under the second ground of detention in Article 5(1)(c). A person in preventive detention, however, must be brought promptly before judicial authority under Article 5(3).

A comparative analysis of opinions of Americans, Australians and Malaysians on the use of biometric devices in workplaces for security and monitoring of worker productivity

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, the use of biometric devices such as fingerprint scans, retina and iris scans and facial recognition in everyday situations for national security and border control, have become commonplace. This has resulted in the biometric industry moving from being a niche technology to one that is ubiquitous. As a result. more and more employers are using biometrics to secure staff access to their facilities as well as for tracking staff work hours, maintaining 'discipline' and carry out surveillance against thefts. detecting work hour abuses and fraud. However, the data thus collected and the technologies themselves are feared of having the potential for and actually being misused - both in terms of the violating staff privacy and discrimination and oppression of targeted workers. This paper examines the issue of using biometric devices in organisational settings their advantages, disadvantages and actual and potential abuses from the point of view of critical theory. From the perspectives of Panoptic surveillance and hegemonic organisational control, the paper examines the issues related to privacy and identification, biometrics and privacy, biometrics and the 'body', and surveillance and modernity. The paper also examines the findings ofa survey carried out in Australia. Malaysia and the USA on respondents' opinions on the use of biometric devices in everyday life including at workplaces. The paper concludes that along with their applications in border control and national security, the use of biometric devices should be covered by relevant laws and regulations. guidelines and codes of practice. in order to balance the rights to privacy and civil liberties of workers with employers' need for improved productivity, reduced costs, safeguards related to occupational health and safety, equal opportunity, and workplace harassment of staff and other matters, that employers are legally responsible for.

Detecting collusion attacks in security protocols

Security protocols have been widely used to safeguard secure electronic transactions. We usually assume that principals are credible and shall not maliciously disclose their individual secrets to someone else. Nevertheless, it is impractical to completely ignore the possibility that some principals may collude in private to achieve a fraudulent or illegal purpose. Therefore, it is critical to address the possibility of collusion attacks in order to correctly analyse security protocols. This paper proposes a framework by which to detect collusion attacks in security protocols. The possibility of security threats from insiders is especially taken into account. The case study demonstrates that our methods are useful and promising in discovering and preventing collusion attacks.

Speed, international security, and "New War" coverage in cyberspace

Mass media representations foster a view that the "War on Terror" is taking place both everywhere and nowhere, presenting Western governments with an opportunity to mobilize public support in new and ubiquitous ways. Starting with Virilio's critique of technology, speed, and de-territorialization, this article discusses the ways in which mass support is mobilized by the state in conventional pursuit of geopolitical objectives. Drawing on  contemporary international relations theory, the authors introduce the concept of "securitization" and discuss how war coverage in cyberspace has been used to securitize international threats, such as "global terrorism," to justify state intervention, including war. It is concluded that one of the paradoxes of war coverage in cyberspace is that whereas cyber-technologies should democratize the politics of war by liberating access to information about war, the state has coopted information and communication technologies to facilitate new forms of mass mobilization for war itself.