Ictiofauna de dos praderas de Posidonia oceanica (L.) Delile, 1813 con distinto grado de conservación

Ictiofauna de dos praderas de Posidonia oceanica (L.) Delile con distinto grado de conservación.

Lire dans les entrailles : les « aventures de la toxicologie » (1813-1914)

International audience

Plan of the entrance of Barataria with a projected battery proposed by Lt. Coll. G.T. Ross. No. 9 Rapport May 3d 1813 /

Relief shown pictorially. Depths shown by soundings.

Religião e cultura : um breve itinerário do fim do mundo antigo aos dias de Kierkegaard

Kierkegaard nos mostra, em boa parte de suas obras, sua categórica rejeição em aceitar que a religião cristã pudesse ser reduzida a uma questão de cultura. Mesmo vivendo numa época em que muitos parecem aceitar essa premissa, o filósofo enfrenta inúmeras dificuldades para fazer valer seu posicionamento e, por outro lado, sua proposta parece, ao mesmo tempo, profundamente discutível e polêmica. O cristianismo parece se confundir com a cultura desde seus primórdios e, inclusive, talvez tenha dependido disso para sua sobrevivência até a atualidade. Desse modo, a tese kierkegaardiana de recusa a uma ligação mais efetiva entre cristianismo e cultura não pode ter, em si mesma, um aspecto intolerante ou reacionário? Para investigar tal questão, almejamos analisar aspectos da obra kierkegaardiana e, a partir de um dado recorte, o contexto de implantação do cristianismo no fim do mundo antigo. _______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT

Socratic ironies: reading Hadot, reading Kierkegaard

This paper examines the seemingly unlikely rapport between the ‘Christian existentialist’, radically Protestant thinker, Søren Kierkegaard and French classicist and historian of philosophy, Pierre Hadot, famous for advocating a return to the ancient pagan sense of philosophy as a way of life. Despite decisive differences we stress in our concluding remarks, we argue that the conception of philosophy in Hadot as a way of life shares decisive features with Kierkegaard’s understanding of the true ‘religious’ life: as something demanding existential engagement from its proponent, as well as the learning or recitation of accepted doctrines. The mediating figure between the two authors, the paper agrees with Irina (2012), is Socrates and his famous irony. In order to appreciate Kierkegaard’s rapport with Hadot, then (and in contrast to Gregor, who has also treated the two figures) we first of all consider Hadot’s treatment of the enigmatic ‘old wise man’ who remains central to Kierkegaard’s entire authorship. (Part 1) However, to highlight Hadot’s Socratic proximity to Kierkegaard (in contrast to Irina), we set up Hadot’s Socrates against the contrasting portrait readers can find in John M. Cooper’s recent work on Socrates and philosophy as a way of life. Part II of the essay turns back from Hadot’s and Kierkegaard’s Socrates towards Hadot’s own work, and argues—again moving beyond both Gregor and Irina’s works on Hadot and Kierkegaard—that the shape of Hadot’s ‘authorship’, including his remarkably classical style, can be understood by way of Kierkegaard’s notion of indirect communication. In our concluding remarks, in the spirit of Kierkegaard, we pinpoint the fundamental difference between the two thinkers, arguing that for Hadot in contrast to Kierkegaard, a stress on existential commitment in no way speaks against the philosophical defence of a form of rational universalism. Reading Hadot via Kierkegaard allows us to appreciate Hadot’s novelty as attempting to ‘squaring the circle’ between an emphasis on subjectivity and, as it were, the subjective dimensions of philosophers’ pursuit of rational universality.

The problem of spontaneous goodness: from Kierkegaard to Løgstrup (via Zhuangzi and Eckhart)

Historically, Western philosophy has struggled to accommodate, or has simply denied, the moral value of spontaneous, non-reflective action. One important exception is in the work of K.E. Løgstrup, whose phenomenological ethics involves a claim that the ‘ethical demand’ of care for the other can only be realized through spontaneous assent to ‘sovereign expressions of life’ such as trust and mercy. Løgstrup attacks Kierkegaard for devaluing spontaneous moral action, but as I argue, Kierkegaard too offers an implicit view of spontaneous moral response (‘second immediacy’) as a regulative ideal. In attempting to articulate the model of character-formation that such an ethics requires, we can see both Løgstrup and Kierkegaard as engaging with an ancient problematic, running from Classical Daoism to medieval mysticism, of achieving spontaneity through purgation rather than edification—not building the subject up, but demolishing personality in order to become a conduit for a transcendent normativity.

Dissolving views, memory and sensory experience: The Cosmopoligraphicon or the ‘World in Many Pictures’ in Melbourne, Australia, in 1855

While magic lanterns and dissolving views were a global phenomenon in the nineteenth century, scholars are only starting to examine in depth their social dimensions. This article seeks to extend our understanding of dissolving views by analysing the audience sensory experience in a specific historical context – gold rush Melbourne in 1855. It argues that while a Melbourne audience admired the technological wonder of the magic lantern and the dissolving views, their sensory experience was informed by the colonial social context. The audiences appear to have delighted in immersing themselves in the dissolving views, both learning about the world and reacquainting themselves with parts of the (old) world they had left behind. This article further argues that dissolving views were more than a visual spectacle: they actively engaged the senses in ways that gave emotional meanings to the dissolving views and linked a Melbourne gold rush audience with the world left behind, yet still accessible remotely through memory and sensory imagination.

Book review. becoming two in love: Kierkegaard, Irigaray, and the ethics of sexual difference

Book review of Roland J. De Vries, Becoming Two in Love: Kierkegaard, Irigaray, and the Ethics of Sexual Difference. Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2013 (ISBN 978-1-61097-517-9)

Existentialist methodology and perspective: writing the first-person

Without proposing anything quite so grandiose as a return to existentialism, in this paper we aim to articulate and minimally defend certain core existentialist insights concerning the first-person perspective, the relationship between theory and practice, and the mode of philosophical presentation conducive to best making those points. We will do this by considering some of the central methodological objections that have been posed around the role of the first-person perspective and “lived experience” in the contemporary literature, before providing some neo-existentialist rejoinders. We will suggest that the dilemma that contemporary philosophy poses to existentialism, vis-à-vis methodology, is that it is: a) committed to lived experience as some sort of given that might be accessed either introspectively or retrospectively (with empirical science posing prima facie obstacles to the veridicality of each); and/or b) it advocates transformative experiences, and the power of philosophy in connection with such experiences, to radically revise our doxastic and inter-connected web of beliefs. In short, the charge is conservatism on the one hand, radicalism on the other. Each of these concerns will be addressed in turn, utilizing ideas from Kierkegaard (as the source for many existentialist themes, methodological concerns, and formal practices) and from the German and French twentieth century versions of existentialism

“Coelho, Domingos Pinto (1855-1944)”

“Coelho, Domingos Pinto (1855-1944)”