Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Social capital and government in the production of public goods

As a response to the rapidly growing empirical literature on social capital and the evidence of its correlation with government performance, we build a theoretical framework to study the interactions between social capital and government's action. This paper presents a model of homogeneous agents in an overlapping generations framework incorporating social capital as the values transmitted from parent to child. The government's role is to provide public goods. First, government expenditure is exogenously given. Then, it will be chosen at the preferred level of the representative agent. For both setups the equilibrium outcomes are characterized and the resulting dynamics studied. Briefly we include an analysis of the effect of productivity growth on the evolution of social capital. The results obtained caution caution against both the crowding out effect of the welfare state and the impact of sustained economic growth on social capital.

Increasing quasiconcave production and utility functions with diminishing returns to scale

In microeconomic analysis functions with diminishing returns to scale (DRS) have frequently been employed. Various properties of increasing quasiconcave aggregator functions with DRS are derived. Furthermore duality in the classical sense as well as of a new type is studied for such aggregator functions in production and consumer theory. In particular representation theorems for direct and indirect aggregator functions are obtained. These involve only small sets of generator functions. The study is carried out in the contemporary framework of abstract convexity and abstract concavity.

Rational sabotage in cooperative production

In this paper we consider a model of cooperative production in which rational agents have the possibility to engage in sabotage activities that decrease output. It is shown that sabotage depends on the interplay between the degree of congestion, the technology of sabotage, the number of agents the degree of meritocracy and the form of the sharing rule. In particular it is shown that, ceteries paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems. We address two questions: The degree of meritocracy that is compatible with absence of sabotage and the existence of a Nash equilibrium with and without sabotage.

An input-output analysis of the "key" sectors in CO2 emissions from a production perspective: an application to the spanish economy

Here we present an approach that allows the identification of the "key" productive sectors responsible for CO2 emission. For this purpose, we develop an input–output methodology from a supply perspective. We focus on the impact of an increase in the value-added of the different productive sectors on total CO2 emissions and we identify the productive sectors responsible for the increase in CO2 emissions when there is an increase in the income of the economy. The approach shows the contribution of the various sectors to CO2 emission from a production perspective and allows us to identify the sectors that deserve more consideration for mitigation policies. This analysis is complementary to the input–output analysis from a demand perspective. The methodology is applied to the Spanish economy.

Economic impacts of alternative water policy scenarios in the Spanish production system: an input-output analysis

The objective of this paper is to analyse the economic impacts of alternative water policies implemented in the Spanish production system. The methodology uses two versions of the input-output price model: a competitive formulation and a mark-up formulation. The input-output framework evaluates the impact of water policy measures on production prices, consumption prices, intermediate water demand and private welfare. Our results show that a tax on the water used by sectors considerably reduces the intermediate water demand, and increases the production and consumption prices. On the other hand, according to Jevons' paradox, an improvement in technical efficiency, which leads to a reduction in the water requirements of all sectors and an increase in water production, increases the amount of water consumed. The combination of a tax on water and improved technical efficiency takes the pressure off prices and significantly reduces intermediate water demand. JEL Classification: C67 ; D57 ; Q25. Keywords: Production prices; Consumption prices; Water uses; Water policy; Water taxation.

Cooperative production and efficiency

We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.

Artificial diets for the production of natural enemies (predators and parasitoids) of greenhouse pest insects

The aim of this contract was to finalise in vitro rearing on artificial diets of entomophagous insects useful to control insect pests mainly in greenhouses through an analytical and rational approach. The work focuses on the development and optimisation of artificial diets for one coccinellid (Harmonia axyridis), two heteropteran predators (Orius laevigatus, Dicyphus tamaninii), and a braconid parasitoid of aphids (Aphidius ervi). The definition of the artificial diets was based on biochemical analyses of their natural food (aphids) or substitution food for the predators (Ephestia kuehniella eggs). Reliable quality control parameters of the entomophages produced were used in order to adjust dietary composition and formulation of the different diets tested.