Resistance to reform: Reconsidering the role of individual-specific uncertainty

Individual-specific uncertainty may increase the chances of reform beingenacted and sustained. Reform may be more likely to be enacted because amajority of agents might end up losing little from reform and a minoritygaining a lot. Under certainty, reform would therefore be rejected, butit may be enacted with uncertainty because those who end up losing believethat they might be among the winners. Reform may be more likely to besustained because, in a realistic setting, reform will increase theincentives of agents to move into those economic activities that benefit.Agents who respond to these incentives will vote to sustain reform infuture elections, even if they would have rejected reform under certainty.These points are made using the trade-model of Fernandez and Rodrik (AER,1991).

For public service or money: Understanding geographical imbalances in the health workforce in Ethiopia

Geographical imbalances in the health workforce have been a consistent feature of nearly all health systems, and especially in developing countries. In this paper we investigate the willingness to work in a rural area among final year nursing and medical students in Ethiopia. Analyzing data obtained from contingent valuation questions, we find that household consumption and the student s motivation to help the poor, which is our proxy for intrinsic motivation, are the main determinants of willingness to work in a rural area. We investigate whoe is willing to help the poor and find that women are significantly more likely than men. Other variables, including a rich set of psychosocial characteristics, are not significant. Finally, we carry out some simulation on how much it would cost to make the entire cohort of starting nurses and doctors chooseto take up a rural post.