Does evolution lead to maximizing behavior?

A long-standing question in biology and economics is whether individual organisms evolve to behave as if they were striving to maximize some goal function. We here formalize this "as if" question in a patch-structured population in which individuals obtain material payoffs from (perhaps very complex multimove) social interactions. These material payoffs determine personal fitness and, ultimately, invasion fitness. We ask whether individuals in uninvadable population states will appear to be maximizing conventional goal functions (with population-structure coefficients exogenous to the individual's behavior), when what is really being maximized is invasion fitness at the genetic level. We reach two broad conclusions. First, no simple and general individual-centered goal function emerges from the analysis. This stems from the fact that invasion fitness is a gene-centered multigenerational measure of evolutionary success. Second, when selection is weak, all multigenerational effects of selection can be summarized in a neutral type-distribution quantifying identity-by-descent between individuals within patches. Individuals then behave as if they were striving to maximize a weighted sum of material payoffs (own and others). At an uninvadable state it is as if individuals would freely choose their actions and play a Nash equilibrium of a game with a goal function that combines self-interest (own material payoff), group interest (group material payoff if everyone does the same), and local rivalry (material payoff differences).

Evolution of reduced post-copulatory molecular interactions in Drosophila populations lacking sperm competition.

In many species with internal fertilization, molecules transferred in the male ejaculate trigger and interact with physiological changes in females. It is controversial to what extent these interactions between the sexes act synergistically to mediate the female switch to a reproductive state or instead reflect sexual antagonism evolved as a by product of sexual selection on males. To address this question, we eliminated sexual selection by enforcing monogamy in populations of Drosophila melanogaster for 65 generations and then measured the expression of male seminal fluid protein genes and genes involved in the female response to mating. In the absence of sperm competition, male and female reproductive interests are perfectly aligned and any antagonism should be reduced by natural selection. Consistent with this idea, males from monogamous populations showed reduced expression of seminal fluid protein genes, 16% less on average than in polygamous males. Further, we identified 428 genes that responded to mating in females. After mating, females with an evolutionary history of monogamy exhibited lower relative expression of genes that were up regulated in response to mating and higher expression of genes that were down-regulated - in other words, their post-mating transcriptome appeared more virgin-like. Surprisingly, these genes showed a similar pattern even before mating, suggesting that monogamous females evolved to be less poised for mating and the accompanying receipt of male seminal fluid proteins. This reduced investment by both monogamous males and females in molecules involved in post-copulatory interactions points to a pervasive role of sexual conflict in shaping these interactions.

The Evolution of the European Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications

The paper reviews the historical transformation of the European regulatory framework for electronic communications from the era dominated by state-owned enterprises to the presence of regulated competition. In the course of these developments, the vision of the roles of the public and private sectors in electronic communications changed in expected and unexpected ways. While the period is characterized by a shift toward less direct state intervention, the intensity of regulation has increased in many areas. Most recently, in the wake of the financial crisis, new forms of state intervention can be observed, including public investment in communications infrastructure and public-private partnerships. As a result of the reforms, Europe has been able to achieve major successes but it also suffered unanticipated setbacks compared to other regions. The European Union emerged as the global leader in mobile communications during the 1990s and was able to roll-out first-generation broadband access networks more rapidly than many of its peers. Recently, however, Europe as a whole has not performed as well in deploying next-generation networks and advanced mobile communications services. The paper offers a political-economic explanation for these developments and assesses their effects on the performance of the European electronic communications sector and the economy. From this analysis, the European model emerges as a unique institutional arrangement with peculiar advantages and disadvantages. Once these are recognized, sensible next steps to build the strengths while avoiding the weaknesses of the model can be seen more clearly.