Genetic exchange in an arbuscular mycorrhizal fungus results in increased rice growth and altered mycorrhiza-specific gene transcription.

Arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi (AMF) are obligate symbionts with most terrestrial plants. They improve plant nutrition, particularly phosphate acquisition, and thus are able to improve plant growth. In exchange, the fungi obtain photosynthetically fixed carbon. AMF are coenocytic, meaning that many nuclei coexist in a common cytoplasm. Genetic exchange recently has been demonstrated in the AMF Glomus intraradices, allowing nuclei of different Glomus intraradices strains to mix. Such genetic exchange was shown previously to have negative effects on plant growth and to alter fungal colonization. However, no attempt was made to detect whether genetic exchange in AMF can alter plant gene expression and if this effect was time dependent. Here, we show that genetic exchange in AMF also can be beneficial for rice growth, and that symbiosis-specific gene transcription is altered by genetic exchange. Moreover, our results show that genetic exchange can change the dynamics of the colonization of the fungus in the plant. Our results demonstrate that the simple manipulation of the genetics of AMF can have important consequences for their symbiotic effects on plants such as rice, which is considered the most important crop in the world. Exploiting natural AMF genetic variation by generating novel AMF genotypes through genetic exchange is a potentially useful tool in the development of AMF inocula that are more beneficial for crop growth.

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix