How often does direct real estate increase the risk-adjusted performance of the US mixed-asset portfolio?

The “case for real estate” in the mixed-asset portfolio is a topic of continuing interest to practitioners and academics. The argument is typically made by comparing efficient frontiers of portfolio with real estate to those that exclude real estate. However, most investors will have held inefficient portfolios. Thus, when analysing the real estate’s place in the mixed-asset portfolio it seems illogical to do so by comparing the difference in risk-adjusted performance between efficient portfolios, which few if any investor would have held. The approach adopted here, therefore, is to compare the risk-adjusted performance of a number of mixed-asset portfolios without real estate (which may or not be efficient) with a very large number of mixed-asset portfolios that include real estate (which again may or may not be efficient), to see the proportion of the time when there is an increase in risk-adjusted performance, significant or otherwise using appraisal-based and de-smoothed annual data from 1952-2003. So to the question how often does the addition of private real estate lead to increases the risk-adjusted performance compared with mixed-asset portfolios without real estate the answer is almost all the time. However, significant increases are harder to find. Additionally, a significant increase in risk-adjusted performance can come from either reductions in portfolio risk or increases in return depending on the investors’ initial portfolio structure. In other words, simply adding real estate to a mixed-asset portfolio is not enough to ensure significant increases in performance as the results are dependent on the percentage added and the proper reallocation of the initial portfolio mix in the expanded portfolio.

Explaining deviations from NAV in UK property companies: rationality and sentimentality

One of the most vexing issues for analysts and managers of property companies across Europe has been the existence and persistence of deviations of Net Asset Values of property companies from their market capitalisation. The issue has clear links to similar discounts and premiums in closed-end funds. The closed end fund puzzle is regarded as an important unsolved problem in financial economics undermining theories of market efficiency and the Law of One Price. Consequently, it has generated a huge body of research. Although it can be tempting to focus on the particular inefficiencies of real estate markets in attempting to explain deviations from NAV, the closed end fund discount puzzle indicates that divergences between underlying asset values and market capitalisation are not a ‘pure’ real estate phenomenon. When examining potential explanations, two recurring factors stand out in the closed end fund literature as often undermining the economic rationale for a discount – the existence of premiums and cross-sectional and periodic fluctuations in the level of discount/premium. These need to be borne in mind when considering potential explanations for real estate markets. There are two approaches to investigating the discount to net asset value in closed-end funds: the ‘rational’ approach and the ‘noise trader’ or ‘sentiment’ approach. The ‘rational’ approach hypothesizes the discount to net asset value as being the result of company specific factors relating to such factors as management quality, tax liability and the type of stocks held by the fund. Despite the intuitive appeal of the ‘rational’ approach to closed-end fund discounts the studies have not successfully explained the variance in closed-end fund discounts or why the discount to net asset value in closed-end funds varies so much over time. The variation over time in the average sector discount is not only a feature of closed-end funds but also property companies. This paper analyses changes in the deviations from NAV for UK property companies between 2000 and 2003. The paper present a new way to study the phenomenon ‘cleaning’ the gearing effect by introducing a new way of calculating the discount itself. We call it “ungeared discount”. It is calculated by assuming that a firm issues new equity to repurchase outstanding debt without any variation on asset side. In this way discount does not depend on an accounting effect and the analysis should better explain the effect of other independent variables.

Non-normal real estate return distributions by property type in the U.K.

Investment risk models with infinite variance provide a better description of distributions of individual property returns in the IPD database over the period 1981 to 2003 than Normally distributed risk models, which mirrors results in the U.S. and Australia using identical methodology. Real estate investment risk is heteroscedastic, but the Characteristic Exponent of the investment risk function is constant across time yet may vary by property type. Asset diversification is far less effective at reducing the impact of non-systematic investment risk on real estate portfolios than in the case of assets with Normally distributed investment risk. Multi-risk factor portfolio allocation models based on measures of investment codependence from finite-variance statistics are ineffectual in the real estate context.

The impact of real estate on the mixed-asset portfolio in periods of financial stress

The case for holding real estate in the mixed-asset portfolio is typically made on its stabilising effect as a result of its diversification benefits. However, portfolio diversification often fails when it is most needed, i.e. during periods of financial stress. In these periods, the variability of returns for most asset classes increases thus reducing the stabilising effect of a diversified portfolio. This paper applies the approach of Chow et al (1999) to the US domestic mixed-asset portfolio to establish whether real estate, represented by REITs, is especially useful in times of financial stress. To this end monthly returns data on five assets classes: large cap stocks, small cap stocks, long dated government bonds, cash (T-Bills) and real estate (REITs) are evaluated over the period January 1972 to December 2001. The results indicate that the inclusion of REITs in the mixed-asset portfolio can lead to increases or decreases in returns depending on the asset class replaced and whether the period is one of calm or stress. However, the inclusion of REITs invariably leads to reductions in portfolio risk that are greater than any loss in return, especially in periods of financial stress. In other words, REITs acts as a stabilising force on the mixed-asset portfolio when it is most needed, i.e. in periods of financial stress.

The case for REITs in the mixed-asset portfolio in the short and long run

The poor performance of the Stock Market in the US up to the middle of 2003 has meant that REITs are increasingly been seen as an attractive addition to the mixed-asset portfolio. However, there is little evidence to indicate the consistency of the role REITs should play a role in the mixed-asset portfolio over different investment horizons. The results highlight that REITs do play a significant role over both different time horizons and holding periods. The findings show that REITs attractiveness as a diversification asset increase as the holding period increases. In addition, their diversification qualities span the entire efficient frontier, providing return enhancement properties at the lower end, switching to risk reduction qualities at the top end of the frontier.

An analysis of commercial real estate returns: an anatomy of smoothing in asset and index returns

In this article, we investigate the commonly used autoregressive filter method of adjusting appraisal-based real estate returns to correct for the perceived biases induced in the appraisal process. Many articles have been written on appraisal smoothing but remarkably few have considered the relationship between smoothing at the individual property level and the amount of persistence in the aggregate appraisal-based index. To investigate this issue we analyze a large sample of appraisal data at the individual property level from the Investment Property Databank. We find that commonly used unsmoothing estimates at the index level overstate the extent of smoothing that takes place at the individual property level. There is also strong support for an ARFIMA representation of appraisal returns at the index level and an ARMA model at the individual property level.