Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Cournot model with investments to change the market size

We present a new deterministic dynamical model on the market size of Cournot competitions, based on Nash equilibria of R&D investment strategies to increase the size of the market of the firms at every period of the game. We compute the unique Nash equilibrium for the second subgame and the profit functions for both firms. Adding uncertainty to the R&D investment strategies, we get a new stochastic dynamical model and we analyse the importance of the uncertainty to reverse the initial advantage of one firm with respect to the other.

Symmetry and order parameter dynamics of the human odometer

Bipedal gaits have been classified on the basis of the group symmetry of the minimal network of identical differential equations (alias cells) required to model them. Primary bipedal gaits (e.g., walk, run) are characterized by dihedral symmetry, whereas secondary bipedal gaits (e.g., gallop-walk, gallop- run) are characterized by a lower, cyclic symmetry. This fact has been used in tests of human odometry (e.g., Turvey et al. in P Roy Soc Lond B Biol 276:4309–4314, 2009, J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 38:1014–1025, 2012). Results suggest that when distance is measured and reported by gaits from the same symmetry class, primary and secondary gaits are comparable. Switching symmetry classes at report compresses (primary to secondary) or inflates (secondary to primary) measured distance, with the compression and inflation equal in magnitude. The present research (a) extends these findings from overground locomotion to treadmill locomotion and (b) assesses a dynamics of sequentially coupled measure and report phases, with relative velocity as an order parameter, or equilibrium state, and difference in symmetry class as an imperfection parameter, or detuning, of those dynamics. The results suggest that the symmetries and dynamics of distance measurement by the human odometer are the same whether the odometer is in motion relative to a stationary ground or stationary relative to a moving ground.

Measures in Sectorization Problems

Sectorization means dividing a whole into parts (sectors), a procedure that occurs in many contexts and applications, usually to achieve some goal or to facilitate an activity. The objective may be a better organization or simplification of a large problem into smaller sub-problems. Examples of applications are political districting and sales territory division. When designing/comparing sectors some characteristics such as contiguity, equilibrium and compactness are usually considered. This paper presents and describes new generic measures and proposes a new measure, desirability, connected with the idea of preference.

Sectorization: measures and an electromagnetism based approach

Sectorization means dividing a set of basic units into sectors or parts, a procedure that occurs in several contexts, such as political, health and school districting, social networks and sales territory or airspace assignment, to achieve some goal or to facilitate an activity. This presentation will focus on three main issues: Measures, a new approach to sectorization problems and an application in waste collection. When designing or comparing sectors different characteristics are usually taken into account. Some are commonly used, and they are related to the concepts of contiguity, equilibrium and compactness. These fundamental characteristics will be addressed, by defining new generic measures and by proposing a new measure, desirability, connected with the idea of preference. A new approach to sectorization inspired in Coulomb’s Law, which establishes a relation of force between electrically charged points, will be proposed. A charged point represents a small region with specific characteristics/values creating relations of attraction/repulsion with the others (two by two), proportional to the charges and inversely proportional to their distance. Finally, a real case about sectorization and vehicle routing in solid waste collection will be mentioned.