Die Religion des Judenthums und die politisch-socialen Principien unseres Jahrhunderts : zur Kritik der Philippson'schen Resolution auf der 1. israel. Synode zu Leipzig : (29. Juni - 4. Juli)

von M. Maass

Die Judenfrage vor Gericht : Klage d. deutsch-israelitischen Gemeindebundes in Leipzig gegen Autor u. Verleger d. "Egon Waldegg'schen Judenfrage" ; nach d. Proceßacten veröff.

von R. von Grumbkow

On the signature of positive braids and adjacency for torus knots

The objects of study in this thesis are knots. More precisely, positive braid knots, which include algebraic knots and torus knots. In the first part of this thesis, we compare two classical knot invariants - the genus g and the signature σ - for positive braid knots. Our main result on positive braid knots establishes a linear lower bound for the signature in terms of the genus. In the second part of the thesis, a positive braid approach is applied to the study of the local behavior of polynomial functions from the complex affine plane to the complex numbers. After endowing polynomial function germs with a suitable topology, the adjacency problem arises: for a fixed germ f, what classes of germs g can be found arbitrarily close to f? We introduce two purely topological notions of adjacency for knots and discuss connections to algebraic notions of adjacency and the adjacency problem.

Three essays on prices and selection

Competitive Market Segmentation Abstract In a two-firm model where each firm sells a high-quality and a low-quality version of a product, customers differ with respect to their brand preferences and their attitudes towards quality. We show that the standard result of quality-independent markups crucially depends on the assumption that the customers' valuation of quality is identical across firms. Once we relax this assumption, competition across qualities leads to second-degree price discrimination. We find that markups on low-quality products are higher if consuming a low-quality product involves a firm-specific disutility. Likewise, markups on high-quality products are higher if consuming a high-quality product creates a firm-specific surplus. Selection upon Wage Posting Abstract We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called "positive selection" leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors. Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing Competition, Raising Prices Abstract In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses.