965 resultados para Strategic delegation, monetary union, time-consistency, monetary policy
Resumo:
Esta tese é uma coleção de quatro artigos em economia monetária escritos sob a supervisão do Professor Rubens Penha Cysne. O primeiro desses artigos calcula o viés presente em medidas do custo de bem-estar da inflação devido a não se levar em conta o potencial substitutivo de moedas que rendem juros, como depósitos bancários.[1] O segundo se concentra na questão teórica de se comparar os escopos dos tradicionais modelos money-in-the-utility-function e shopping-time através do estudo das propriedades das curvas de demanda que eles geram.[2] O terceiro desses trabalhos revisita um artigo clássico de Stanley Fischer sobre a correlação entre a taxa de crescimento da oferta monetária e a taxa de acumulação de capital no caminho de transição.[3] Finalmente, o quarto diz respeito à posição relativa de cada uma de seis medidas do custo de bem-estar da inflação (uma das quais é nova) em relação às outras cinco, e uma estimativa do erro relativo máximo em que o pesquisador pode incorrer devido a sua escolha de empregar uma dessas medidas qualquer vis-à-vis as outras.[4] This thesis collects four papers on monetary economics written under the supervision of Professor Rubens Penha Cysne. The first of these papers assesses the bias occuring in welfare-cost-of-inflation measures due to failing to take into consideration the substitution potential of interest-bearing monies such as bank deposits.[1] The second one tackles the theoretical issue of comparing the generality of the money-in-the-utility-function- and the shopping-time models by studying the properties of the demand curves they generate.[2] The third of these works revisits a classic paper by Stanley Fischer on the correlation between the growth rate of money supply and the rate of capital accumulation on the transition path.[3] Finally, the fourth one concerns the relative standing of each one of six measures of the welfare cost of inflation (one of which is new) with respect to the other five, and an estimate of the maximum relative error one can incur by choosing to employ a particular welfare measure in place of the others.[4] [1] Cysne, R.P., Turchick, D., 2010. Welfare costs of inflation when interest-bearing deposits are disregarded: A calculation of the bias. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34, 1015-1030. [2] Cysne, R.P., Turchick, D., 2009. On the integrability of money-demand functions by the Sidrauski and the shopping-time models. Journal of Banking & Finance 33, 1555-1562. [3] Cysne, R.P., Turchick, D., 2010. Money supply and capital accumulation on the transition path revisited. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 42, 1173-1184. [4] Cysne, R.P., Turchick, D., 2011. An ordering of measures of the welfare cost of inflation in economies with interest-bearing deposits. Macroeconomic Dynamics, forthcoming.
Resumo:
Esta tese de Doutorado é dedicada ao estudo de instabilidade financeira e dinâmica em Teoria Monet ária. E demonstrado que corridas banc árias são eliminadas sem custos no modelo padrão de teoria banc ária quando a popula ção não é pequena. É proposta uma extensão em que incerteza agregada é mais severa e o custo da estabilidade financeira é relevante. Finalmente, estabelece-se otimalidade de transições na distribui ção de moeda em economias em que oportunidades de trocas são escassas e heterogêneas. Em particular, otimalidade da inflação depende dos incentivos dinâmicos proporcionados por tais transi ções. O capí tulo 1 estabelece o resultado de estabilidade sem custos para economias grandes ao estudar os efeitos do tamanho populacional na an álise de corridas banc árias de Peck & Shell. No capí tulo 2, otimalidade de dinâmica é estudada no modelo de monet ário de Kiyotaki & Wright quando a sociedade é capaz de implementar uma polí tica inflacion ária. Apesar de adotar a abordagem de desenho de mecanismos, este capí tulo faz um paralelo com a an álise de Sargent & Wallace (1981) ao destacar efeitos de incentivos dinâmicos sobre a interação entre as polí ticas monet ária e fiscal. O cap ítulo 3 retoma o tema de estabilidade fi nanceira ao quanti car os custos envolvidos no desenho ótimo de um setor bancário à prova de corridas e ao propor uma estrutura informacional alternativa que possibilita bancos insolventes. A primeira an álise mostra que o esquema de estabilidade ótima exibe altas taxas de juros de longo prazo e a segunda que monitoramento imperfeito pode levar a corridas bancárias com insolvência.
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
Includes bibliography
Resumo:
Introduction The social agenda is long-term in nature, in the sense that poverty alleviation along with a better distribution of income, wealth and opportunities are long-term goals. A sound macroeconomic policy, on the other hand, has to do largely with the consistent management of short-term policy instruments pursuing a sustainable and predictable pace for aggregate economic variables and major prices (wages, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates). In spite of the different arena and rationale in which they play, there are strong links between the two. First and most obvious, macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform are more likely to be sustainable when they are equitable. Second, social intervention —i.e., policies, programmes and reforms aimed at improving social performance in the long run—, needs stable funding which is not always available in view of macroeconomic constraints. Third, macroeconomic instability —especially episodes of recession or hyperinflation— increases poverty and inequality, while restoring macroeconomic equilibrium does not restore previous social balances. Finally, there is no unique macroeconomic policy mix to tackle a given situation, and the policy options may not be neutral from a social standpoint. Monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, together with structural reform, have major consequences for the social wellbeing of societies, not only in terms of protection against shocks and crises but also in terms of equity. Many, if not all, of the necessary social policies are of a domestic nature. This report thus concentrates on domestic strategies aimed at maximizing the linkages between consistent macroeconomic policies and social progress. Pursuing them, however, depends to a considerable extent on the international enabling environment in which the global financial system, the unsettled debt crisis and increasing ODA flows play a significant role. Countries operate in a world economy where market players everywhere immediately scrutinize domestic monetary, financial or fiscal policy decisions and the performance of exchange rate regimes of individual countries. Under these conditions, the room for manoeuvre of policymakers has become considerably constrained. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly complex to incorporate the social dimensions into such policy decisions, to the extent that external analysts consider that authorities are sacrificing sound macroeconomic policies. The main message of the report is that the expediency of short-term economic efficiency as embedded in much of the advice on macroeconomic stability needs to be tempered by long-term development objectives. The report starts with a short historical background which describes the ascendancy of macroeconomic policies over social development policies (chapter I). It continues with an evaluation of the relation between macroeconomic consistency and social effort (chapter II), and the importance of sustainable and stable growth for social progress (chapter III). The report then turns to the need for an equity-enhancing growth strategy (chapter IV) and an analysis of the priorities of social policies in an integrated approach to growth (chapter V). The final chapter adds some final institutional remarks.