Eastern Policy of the EU: the Visegrad Countries' Perspective. OSW Point of View, February 2003

1. After its enlargement, scheduled for 2004, the European Union will face a completely new situation at its eastern borders. This new situation calls for a new concept of the EU eastern activities, i.e. for development of the new Eastern Policy of the EU. 2. Due to a number of specific features such as geographical location, closeness of ties, direct risk factors etc., the Visegrad countries will and should be particularly interested in the process of formulating the new EU Eastern Policy. Consequently, they should be the co-makers of this policy. 3. The new EU Eastern Policy should differ fundamentally from the Union's traditional eastern relations. Firstly, its scope should not cover the entire CIS area: instead, the policy should focus on some of the European successor states of the former Soviet Union, namely Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, as well as Moldova, following the accession of Romania. It does not seem advisable to exclude the Russian Federation from this policy and to develop and implement a separate policy towards it. The new Eastern Policy should be an autonomous component and one of the most important elements in the overall foreign policy of the EU. 4. Secondly, the new Eastern Policy should be founded on the following two pillars: a region-oriented strategy, which could be called the Eastern Dimension, and reshaped strategies for individual countries. The Eastern Dimension should set up a universal framework of co-operation, defining its basic mechanisms and objectives. These should include: the adaptation assistance programme, JHA, transborder co-operation, social dialogue and transport infrastructures. The approach, however, should be kept flexible, taking into account the specific situation of each country. This purpose should be served by keeping in place the existing bilateral institutional contacts between the EU and each of its eastern neighbours, and by developing a national strategy for each neighbour.

A new Visegrad Group in the new European Union - possibilities and opportunities for development. OSW Point of View, June 2003

The Visegrad Group has fulfilled the tasks it was set when established. It seems unjustified, therefore, to ponder the need for it to function further. However, it is advisable to lay out new tasks, suitable for the group's operation in the new European reality - following EU accession of Visegrad countries in May 2004.

Closing the gap? Military co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. OSW Report, December 2012

The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.

The gas target model for the Visegard 4 Region: conceptual analysis. OSW Report, May 2013

The similarity of issues and geographical proximity have led the Visegrad 4 countries (V4) to undertake closer collaboration in natural gas policy, notably by agreeing on a common security of supply strategy, including regional emergency planning, and a common implementation of the Gas Target Model (GTM) that European regulators have proposed for the medium-long term design of the EU gas market, and which has been endorsed by the Madrid Regulatory Forum. As a contribution to this collaboration, the present paper will analyse how the GTM may be implemented in the V4 region, with a view to maximize the benefits that arise from joint implementation. A most relevant conclusion of the GTM is that markets should be large enough to attract market players and investments, so that sufficient diversity of sources may be reached and market power indicators are kept below dangerous levels. In most cases, this requires physical and/or virtual interconnection of present markets, which is also useful to achieve the required security of supply standards, as envisaged in the Regulation 994/2010/EC.

Visegrad development aid in the Eastern Partnership Region. OSW Report, February 2014

The international development cooperation systems of the Visegrad countries are all rather new, in most cases only about a decade old. They are still undergoing reforms and the countries are striving to strengthen their own profiles as development donors in the world by gradually increasing their bilateral ODA. Although their resources are limited and were further cut due to the financial and economic crisis, the bilateral ODA ratio of the Visegrad countries as a group spent in the EaP region gradually increased after 2009. Given that the individual systems are still developing and the countries are focusing on creating their own brand, it is highly unlikely that in the near future it would be in their interest to set up a common development fund – either for the EaP region or in general. Instead of creating new institutions, however, a rationalization of the current cooperation systems and a consolidation of existing resources is feasible and should be considered.

Rosyjski rewizjonizm wobec zachodu. Prace OSW 33/2009. = Russia's revisionist policy towards the west. OSW Study 33/2009

Russia’s actions so far have led to a kind of deadlock. Moscow has managed to stop NATO enlargement into the CIS area, persuade the USA not to deploy the missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, and avoid major consequences after the war with Georgia; nevertheless, the full implementation of its objectives remains unlikely.

Strategia unii europejskiej dla regionu dunaju. Implikacje dla Polski i Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Prace OSW 37/2011. = European Union Strategy for the Danube region. Implications for the Polish and the Visegrad Group. OSW Study 37/2011

Strategia dunajska jest drugim po strategii bałtyckiej przykładem rosnącego znaczenia makroregionów w Unii Europejskiej. Na politykę regionalną patrzy się przy tym coraz częściej przez pryzmat realizacji nie tylko spójności wewnętrznej, ale także działań na rzecz lepszego powiązania państwa z otoczeniem zewnętrznym – zarówno unijnym, jak i pozaunijnym. Polska współtworzy strategię bałtycką, ale nie została włączona do ścisłego grona państw przygotowujących strategię dunajską. Wyzwaniem dla Grupy Wyszehradzkiej jest określenie stanowiska w sprawie roli strategii makroregionalnych w budowaniu spójności Europy Środkowej i harmonijnego rozwoju całej UE. Postulat lepszej koordynacji polityk i środków UE w celu wdrażania strategii makroregionalnych należy traktować także jako wezwanie do zacieśnienia współpracy między Polską a jej południowymi sąsiadami, bezpośrednio zaangażowanymi w realizację strategii dunajskiej.

The fragile ‘reset’. The balance sheet and the prospects for changes in Russian-US relations. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), April 2011

The ‘reset’ policy proposed by the USA has brought Russia a number of geopolitical, prestigious and economic benefits. The most important of those are: the resumption of arms control, the USA’s withdrawal from plans to locate elements of its strategic missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the entry into force of the so-called 123 Agreement. In response, Russia has assisted the United States in resolving the Iranian crisis, and offered help with the Afghanistan operation, covering the transit of supplies and supporting the Afghan government. Moscow has also eased up on its anti-American rhetoric. The changes which have taken place in Russian-US relations are not durable. The two parties have not resolved their major disputes (for example, regarding missile defence), and any differences are hushed up for tactical reasons.

German companies strengthen their cooperation with Russian gas suppliers. OSW Commentary No. 64, 2011-10-24

Germany’s decision to give up the use of nuclear energy will force it to find a conventional low-carbon energy source as a replacement; in the short term, in addition to coal, this is likely to be gas. Due to their continued high debt and the losses associated with the end of atomic power, German companies will not be able to spend large funds on investing in conventional energy. First of all, they will aim to raise capital and repay their debts. The money for this will come from selling off their less profitable assets; this will include sales on the gas market. This will create opportunities for natural gas exporters and extraction companies such as Gazprom to buy back some of the German companies’ assets (electricity companies, for example). The German companies will probably continue to seek to recover the costs incurred in the investment projects already underway, such as Nord Stream, the importance of which will grow after Russian gas imports increase. At the same time, because of their debts, the German companies will seek to minimise their investment costs by selling some shares on the conventional energy market, to Russian corporations among others; the latter would thus be able to increase their stake in the gas market in both Western (Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries) and Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic). It is possible that while establishing the details of cooperation between the Russian and German companies, Russia will try to put pressure on Germany to give up competing projects such as Nabucco. However, a well-diversified German energy market should be able to defend itself against attempts to increase German dependence on Russian gas supplies and the dictates of high prices.

Breaking the boundaries. The transformation of Central European gas markets. OSW Point of View Number 46, December 2014

According to the European Council decision of February 2011, the process of creating the European Union’s internal gas market should be completed by the end of 2014. Therefore, it is worth summarising the changes which have taken place in the gas markets of Central Europe so far. The past few years have seen not only a period of gradual ‘marketisation’ of the national gas sectors, but also the building of new gas infrastructure, a redrawing of the gas flow map, and changes in the ownership of the Central European gas companies. Another change in Central Europe is the fact that individual states and companies are moving away from their traditional focus on their national gas markets; instead, they are beginning to develop a variety of concepts for the regional integration of Central European markets. This publication attempts to grasp the main elements of the ongoing transformation of Central Europe’s gas markets, with particular emphasis on the situation in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

Extending Working Lives: A comparative analysis of how governments influence lifelong learning, CEPS Special Report No. 111, July 2015

This report offers a comparative policy study on adult learning within the scope of complementary research conducted by Beblavý et al. (2013) on how people upgrade their skills during their adult lifetimes. To achieve our objectives, we identified regulatory policies and financial support in 11 countries for two main categories of learning: formal higher education and employer-based training. Drawing upon the results of the country reports carried out by our partners in the MoPAct project, we found that in none of the countries examined is there an ‘older student’ policy. In most cases grants and financial support are awarded only up until a certain age. In all of the countries studied, standard undergraduate and post-graduate studies are available for part-time students. The distribution of full-time students and part-time students in tertiary education varies from one country to another as well as from one age group to another. The participation in full-time tertiary education programmes decreases with the age of students. In Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and the UK, there are no mandatory policies to ensure employer-based training. However, in Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, employer-based training is more clearly regulated and the employers might have obligations to provide training for their staff. Taking into consideration Beblavý et al. (2013), we observe that comparative differences across countries can be related to policy differences only in some cases. The policy framework seems to impact more the employer-based training than the educational attainment (upgrade of ISCED level). In Denmark, the Netherlands, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Poland, we find a perfect match between policy outcomes and the results of Beblavý et al. (2013) related to employer-based training. This is not the case in the United Kingdom, where the two aspects observed are not correlated.

The refugee crisis: Schengen’s slippery slope. EPC Commentary, 22 September 2015

While the European Union (EU) is facing one of the most divisive crises in its history, the pressure to take immediate action is enormous. Yet, negotiations in the Council have shown that the prospect of a common European response to the manifold effects and underlying reasons of the refugee crisis still belongs to the distant future. Only a few days after Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker delivered his State of the Union address – avowing that Schengen will not be abolished under his term – national decisions to reintroduce temporary border controls are multiplying. Germany, one of the most ardent defenders of a borderless Union, decided to temporarily reinstate border checks. Austria and Slovenia came next. Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, the Netherlands and France might follow.