Stage of change of cigarette smoking in drug dependent patients.

Nicotine cessation programmes in Switzerland, which are commonly based on the stage of change model of Prochaska and DiClemente (1983), are rarely offered to patients with illicit drug dependence. This stands in contrast to the high smoking rates and the heavy burden of tobacco-related problems in these patients. The stage of change was therefore assessed by self-administered questionnaire in 100 inpatients attending an illegal drug withdrawal programme. Only 15% of the patients were in the contemplation or decision stage. 93% considered smoking cessation to be difficult or very difficult. These data show a discrepancy between the motivation to change illegal drug consumption habits and the motivation for smoking cessation. The high proportion of patients remaining in the precontemplation stage for smoking cessation, in spite of their motivation for illicit drug detoxification, may be due to the perception that cessation of smoking is more difficult than illicit drug abuse cessation.

Monetary policy and rational asset price bubbles

I examine the impact of alternative monetary policy rules on arational asset price bubble, through the lens of an overlapping generations model with nominal rigidities. A systematic increase in interestrates in response to a growing bubble is shown to enhance the fluctuations in the latter, through its positive effect on bubble growth. Theoptimal monetary policy seeks to strike a balance between stabilization of the bubble and stabilization of aggregate demand. The paper'smain findings call into question the theoretical foundations of the casefor "leaning against the wind" monetary policies.

Optimal public rationing and price response.

We study optimal public health care rationing and private sector price responses. Consumers differ in their wealth and illness severity (defined as treatment cost). Due to a limited budget, some consumers must be rationed. Rationed consumers may purchase from a monopolistic private market. We consider two information regimes. In the first, the public supplier rations consumers according to their wealth information (means testing). In equilibrium, the public supplier must ration both rich and poor consumers. Rationing some poor consumers implements price reduction in the private market. In the second information regime, the public supplier rations consumers according to consumers' wealth and cost information. In equilibrium, consumers are allocated the good if and only if their costs are below a threshold (cost effectiveness). Rationing based on cost results in higher equilibrium consumer surplus than rationing based on wealth.