Atividade antibacteriana do Aspergillus niger van Tieghem, 1867; pesquisas em 14 amostras da National Collection of Type Cultures (M. R. C.)

1. Pesquisamos a atividade antibacteriana em 14 amostras de Aspergillus niger da National Collection of Type Cultures. 2. Em meio de Raulin e Mosseray, sete amostras apresentaram atividade total, nunca superior a 1:10, contra Staphylococcus aureus nº 553, sendo que as amostras 1.161 e 2.390 permaneceram ativas por mais de 40 dias. 3. A utilização do meio de Czapek-Dox com 5% de "corn-steep" não melhorou os resultados obtidos com o meio de Raulin e Mosseray. 4. No meio de levedo peptonado, todas as amostras apresentaram-se inativas.

Annales du Muséum national d'histoire naturelle.

v.2 (1803)

Annales du Muséum national d'histoire naturelle.

v.5 (1804)

Annales du Muséum national d'histoire naturelle.

v.9 (1807)

Annales du Muséum national d'histoire naturelle.

v.10 (1807)

Annales du Muséum national d'histoire naturelle.

v.14 (1809)

Annales du Muséum national d'histoire naturelle.

v.19 (1812)

Repeated games played in a network

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.

Airline competition and network structure

This paper characterizes the equilibria in airline networks and their welfare implications in an unregulated environment. Competing airlines may adopt either fully-connected (FC) or hub-and-spoke (HS) network structures; and passengers exhibiting low brand loyalty to their preferred carrier choose an outside option to travel so that markets are partially served by airlines. In this context, carriers adopt hubbing strategies when costs are sufficiently low, and asymmetric equilibria where one carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other chooses a HS strategy may arise. Quite interestingly, flight frequency can become excessive under HS network configurations.

1st National Accessiblity Plan 2004-2012: achieving equal opportunities and full participation through design for all

According to official statistics, disabled people in Spain number 3.5 million and make up 8.8% of the Spanish population. This group of people are increasingly being recognised as members of society with equal rights, and many of their demands are gradually being transformed into solutions that benefit society as a whole. One example is improved accessibility. Accessible built environments are more human and inclusive places, as well as being easier to get around. Improved accessibility is now recognised as a requirement shared by all members of society, although it is achieved thanks to the demands of disabled people and their representatives. The 1st National Accessibility Plan is a strategic framework for action aimed at ensuring that new products, services and built environments are designed to be accessible for as many people as possible (Design for All) and that existing ones are gradually duly adapted.

The Spread of free-riding behavior in a social network

We study a model where agents, located in a social network, decide whether to exert effort or not in experimenting with a new technology (or acquiring a new skill, innovating, etc.). We assume that agents have strong incentives to free ride on their neighbors' effort decisions. In the static version of the model efforts are chosen simultaneously. In equilibrium, agents exerting effort are never connected with each other and all other agents are connected with at least one agent exerting effort. We propose a mean-field dynamics in which agents choose in each period the best response to the last period's decisions of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium of such a dynamics and show how the pattern of free riders in the network depends on properties of the connectivity distribution.