An analysis of decoupling procedures in generating thermal Green's functions of O([lambda]â ´) by the Zubarev equation of motion method

The Zubarev equation of motion method has been applied to an anharmonic crystal of O( ,,4). All possible decoupling schemes have been interpreted in order to determine finite temperature expressions for the one phonon Green's function (and self energy) to 0()\4) for a crystal in which every atom is on a site of inversion symmetry. In order to provide a check of these results, the Helmholtz free energy expressions derived from the self energy expressions, have been shown to agree in the high temperature limit with the results obtained from the diagrammatic method. Expressions for the correlation functions that are related to the mean square displacement have been derived to 0(1\4) in the high temperature limit.

CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Conceptualizing Institutional Capacity Building Through a Learning Process Set in Motion by a Foundation

Employing critical pedagogy and transformative theory as a theoretical framework, I examined a learning process associated with building capacity in community-based organizations (CBOs) through an investigation of the Institutional Capacity Building Program (ICBP) initiated by a Foundation. The study sought to: (a) examine the importance of institutional capacity building for individual and community development; (b) investigate elements of a process associated with a program and characteristics of a learning process for building capacity in CBOs; and (c) analyze the Foundation’s approach to synthesizing, systematizing, and sharing learning. The study used a narrative research design that included 3 one-on-one, hour-long interviews with 2 women having unique vantage points in ICBP: one is a program facilitator working at the Foundation and the other runs a CBO supported by the Foundation. The interviews’ semistructured questions allowed interviewees to share stories regarding their experience with the learning process of ICB and enabled themes to emerge from their day-to-day experience. Through the analysis of this learning process for institutional capacity building, a few lessons can be drawn from the experience of the Foundation.

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.

Letter to S.D. Woodruff informing him that a motion was passed by council

Letter to S.D. Woodruff informing him that a motion was passed by council. This was signed by Charles Stuart, March 19, 1855.