Venezuelan economic laboratory. The Case of the altruistic economy of Felipe Pérez Martí

Felipe Pérez Martí, who was the Venezuelan Minister of Planning and Development in the government of Hugo Chávez, proposes an economic model that he calls the altruistic economy or fourth way, which leads cooperative game theory to its logical extremes postulating a pure communism. Here we sustain that, first, it is impossible in the model of Pérez Martí to marginally allocate non-primary goods to those most in need or who most value them, facing a problem of defective economic calculation, and second, in order to achieve equality, he would have to replace his atomic local planners by a central planner, who would be unable to overcome the problem of imperfect and and incomplete information.

The Design and efficiency of loyalty rewards

The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards in markets for final consumption goods. While the literature has emphasized the role of loyalty rewards as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), in this paper I analyze the ability of alternative designs to foster consumer participation and increase total surplus. First, the efficiency of loyalty rewards depend on their specific design. A commitment to the price of repeat purchases can involve substantial efficiency gains by reducing price-cost margins. However, discount policies imply higher future regular prices and are likely to reduce total surplus. Second, firms may prefer to set up inefficient rewards (discounts), especially in those circumstances where a commitment to the price of repeat purchases triggers Coasian dynamics.

Redistributive taxation, public expenditure, and size of governent

We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expenditure. This joint treatment permits analyzing the interdependencies between the two policies: one cannot be chosen independently of the other. Empirical evidence reveals that partisan confrontation essentially falls on expenditure policies rather than on income taxation. We examine the case in which the expenditure policy (or the size of government) is chosen by majority voting and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This adjustment consists of designing the income tax schedule that, given the expenditure policy, achieves consensus among the population. The model determines the consensus in- come tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and the size of government. The main results are that inequality is negatively related to the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in public expenditure, and positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending on substitutability between government supplied and market goods. These implications are validated using OECD data.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Implementation of IPM programs on European greenhouse tomato production areas: Tools and constraints

Whiteflies and whitefly-transmitted viruses are some of the major constraints on European tomato production. The main objectives of this study were to: identify where and why whiteflies are a major limitation on tomato crops; collect information about whiteflies and associated viruses; determine the available management tools; and identify key knowledge gaps and research priorities. This study was conducted within the framework of ENDURE (European Network for Durable Exploitation of Crop Protection Strategies). Two whitefly species are the main pests of tomato in Europe: Bemisia tabaci and Trialeurodes vaporariorum. Trialeurodes vaporariorum is widespread to all areas where greenhouse industry is present, and B. tabaci has invaded, since the early 1990’s, all the subtropical and tropical areas. Biotypes B and Q of B. tabaci are widespread and especially problematic. Other key tomato pests are Aculops lycopersici, Helicoverpa armigera, Frankliniella occidentalis, and leaf miners. Tomato crops are particularly susceptible to viruses causingTomato yellow leaf curl disease (TYLCD). High incidences of this disease are associated to high pressure of its vector, B. tabaci. The ranked importance of B. tabaci established in this study correlates with the levels of insecticide use, showing B. tabaci as one of the principal drivers behind chemical control. Confirmed cases of resistance to almost all insecticides have been reported. Integrated Pest Management based on biological control (IPM-BC) is applied in all the surveyed regions and identified as the strategy using fewer insecticides. Other IPM components include greenhouse netting and TYLCD-tolerant tomato cultivars. Sampling techniques differ between regions, where decisions are generally based upon whitefly densities and do not relate to control strategies or growing cycles. For population monitoring and control, whitefly species are always identified. In Europe IPM-BC is the recommended strategy for a sustainable tomato production. The IPM-BC approach is mainly based on inoculative releases of the parasitoids Eretmocerus mundus and Encarsia formosa and/or the polyphagous predators Macrolophus caliginosus and Nesidiocoris tenuis. However, some limitations for a wider implementation have been identified: lack of biological solutions for some pests, costs of beneficials, low farmer confidence, costs of technical advice, and low pest injury thresholds. Research priorities to promote and improve IPM-BC are proposed on the following domains: (i) emergence and invasion of new whitefly-transmitted viruses; (ii) relevance of B. tabaci biotypes regarding insecticide resistance; (iii) biochemistry and genetics of plant resistance; (iv) economic thresholds and sampling techniques of whiteflies for decision making; and (v) conservation and management of native whitefly natural enemies and improvement of biological control of other tomato pests.

Le dieu à miracles: ambition et rayonnement de Bhagavan Shri Sathya Sai Baba

(Résumé de l'ouvrage) En Europe occidentale on hésite entre le fin des héros, saints et martyrs comme points d'ancrage et guide de collectivités (religieuses ou politiques), et les quêtes d'identité et d'identification. Scepticisme humaniste et individualisme dévaluent des héros nationaux au profit d'emballements médiatiques éphémères pour des vedettes du sport, de l'humanitaire (mère Teresa), des familles royales (la princesse Diana). Se raréfient des modèles stables, inspirant des conduites privées et sociales raisonnablement gérées, et une adhésion durable et fervente. L'ouvrage offre l'analyse de nouveaux contextes où s'effectuent la promotion et l'exaltation de la sainteté, de l'exemplarité ou du martyre, dans des sociétés extra-européennes (Maroc, Inde, Afghanistan) et apparemment laïcisées (France, Bulgarie).

Sectoral composition and macroeconomic dynamics

We analyze the transitional dynamics of a model with heterogeneous consumption goods. In this model, convergence is driven by two different forces: the typical diminishing returns to capital and the sectoral change inducing the variation in relative prices. We show that this second force affects the growth rate if the two consumption goods are not Edgeworth independent and if these two goods are produced with technologies exhibiting different capital intensities. Because the afore mentioned dynamic sectoral change arises only under heterogeneous consumption goods, the transitional dynamics of this model exhibits striking differences with the growth model with a single consumption good. We also show that these differences in the transitional dynamics can give raise to large discrepancies in the welfare cost of shocks between the economy with a unique consumption good and the economy with multiple consumption goods.