What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.

Large Bayesian VARMAs

Vector Autoregressive Moving Average (VARMA) models have many theoretical properties which should make them popular among empirical macroeconomists. However, they are rarely used in practice due to over-parameterization concerns, difficulties in ensuring identification and computational challenges. With the growing interest in multivariate time series models of high dimension, these problems with VARMAs become even more acute, accounting for the dominance of VARs in this field. In this paper, we develop a Bayesian approach for inference in VARMAs which surmounts these problems. It jointly ensures identification and parsimony in the context of an efficient Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. We use this approach in a macroeconomic application involving up to twelve dependent variables. We find our algorithm to work successfully and provide insights beyond those provided by VARs.