Constrained school choice

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures impede students to submit a preference list that contains all their acceptable schools. Therefore, any desirable property of the mechanisms is likely toget distorted. We study the non trivial preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number (quota) of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guaranteestability. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston Mechanism which yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes, independently of the quota. Hence, the transition to any of the two mechanisms is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal actionas lower priority students may occupy more preferred schools.

Europeanization and the Emergence of a European Society

This article examines the European integration process from a sociological perspective, where the main focus is the examination of the social consequences of the integration process. The European Union has advanced significantly in the economic, social, and political integration processes. This has resulted in a rapid Europeanization of behavior. There has hardly been any progress, however, toward the development of European social groups. This article examines the causes of this lag and concludes that it is highly unlikely that in the middle run there be significant progress toward the Europeanization of society.