Investigación sobre las causas que pudieron originar el hundimiento de la cubierta del tercer depósito del Canal de Isabel II en 1905

En la presente investigación se analiza la causa del hundimiento del cuarto compartimento del Tercer Depósito del Canal de Isabel II el 8 de abril de 1905, uno de los más graves de la historia de la construcción en España: fallecieron 30 personas y quedaron heridas otras 60. El Proyecto y Construcción de esta estructura era de D. José Eugenio Ribera, una de las grandes figuras de la ingeniería civil en nuestro país, cuya carrera pudo haber quedado truncada como consecuencia del siniestro. Dado el tiempo transcurrido desde la ocurrencia de este accidente, la investigación ha partido de la recopilación de la información relativa al Proyecto y a la propia construcción de la estructura, para revisar a continuación la información disponible sobre el hundimiento. De la construcción de la cubierta es interesante destacar la atrevida configuración estructural, cubriéndose una inmensa superficie de 74.000 m2 mediante una sucesión de bóvedas de hormigón armado de tan sólo 5 cm de espesor y un rebajamiento de 1/10 para salvar una luz de 6 m, que apoyaban en pórticos del mismo material, con pilares también muy esbeltos: 0,25 m de lado para 8 m de altura. Y todo ello en una época en la que la tecnología y conocimiento de las estructuras con este "nuevo" material se basaban en buena medida en el desarrollo de patentes. En cuanto a la información sobre el hundimiento, llama la atención en primer lugar la relevancia de los técnicos, peritos y letrados que intervinieron en el juicio y en el procedimiento administrativo posterior, poniéndose de manifiesto la trascendencia que el accidente tuvo en su momento y que, sin embargo, no ha trascendido hasta nuestros días. Ejemplo de ello es el papel de Echegaray -primera figura intelectual de la época- como perito en la defensa de Ribera, de D. Melquiades Álvarez -futuro presidente del Congreso- como abogado defensor, el General Marvá -uno de los máximos exponentes del papel de los ingenieros militares en la introducción del hormigón armado en nuestro país-, que presidiría la Comisión encargada del peritaje por parte del juzgado, o las opiniones de reconocidas personalidades internacionales del "nuevo" material como el Dr. von Emperger o Hennebique. Pero lo más relevante de dicha información es la falta de uniformidad sobre lo que pudo ocasionar el hundimiento: fallos en los materiales, durante la construcción, defectos en el diseño de la estructura, la realización de unas pruebas de carga cuando se concluyó ésta, etc. Pero la que durante el juicio y en los Informes posteriores se impuso como causa del fallo de la estructura fue su dilatación como consecuencia de las altas temperaturas que se produjeron aquella primavera. Y ello a pesar de que el hundimiento ocurrió a las 7 de la mañana... Con base en esta información se ha analizado el comportamiento estructural de la cubierta, permitiendo evaluar el papel que diversos factores pudieron tener en el inicio del hundimiento y en su extensión a toda la superficie construida, concluyéndose así cuáles fueron las causas del siniestro. De los resultados obtenidos se presta especial atención a las enseñanzas que se desprenden de la ocurrencia del hundimiento, enfatizándose en la relevancia de la historia -y en particular de los casos históricos de error- para la formación continua que debe existir en la Ingeniería. En el caso del hundimiento del Tercer Depósito algunas de estas "enseñanzas" son de plena actualidad, tales como la importancia de los detalles constructivos en la "robustez" de la estructuras, el diseño de estructuras "integrales" o la vigilancia del proceso constructivo. Por último, la investigación ha servido para recuperar, una vez más, la figura de D. José Eugenio Ribera, cuyo papel en la introducción del hormigón armado en España fue decisivo. En la obra del Tercer Depósito se arriesgó demasiado, y provocó un desastre que aceleró la transición hacia una nueva etapa en el hormigón estructural al abrigo de un mayor conocimiento científico y de las primeras normativas. También en esta etapa sería protagonista. This dissertation analyses the cause of the collapse of the 4th compartment of the 3th Reservoir of Canal de Isabel II in Madrid. It happened in 1905, on April 8th, being one of the most disastrous accidents occurred in the history of Spanish construction: 30 people died and 60 were injured. The design and construction supervision were carried out by D. José Eugenio Ribera, one of the main figures in Civil Engineering of our country, whose career could have been destroyed as a result of this accident. Since it occurred more than 100 years ago, the investigation started by compiling information about the structure`s design and construction, followed by reviewing the available information about the accident. With regard to the construction, it is interesting to point out its daring structural configuration. It covered a huge area of 74.000 m2 with a series of reinforced concrete vaults with a thickness of not more than 5 cm, a 6 m span and a rise of 1/10th. In turn, these vaults were supported by frames composed of very slender 0,25 m x 0,25 m columns with a height of 8 m. It is noteworthy that this took place in a time when the technology and knowledge about this "new" material was largely based on patents. In relation to the information about the collapse, its significance is shown by the important experts and lawyers that were involved in the trial and the subsequent administrative procedure. For example, Echegaray -the most important intellectual of that time- defended Ribera, Melquiades Álvarez –the future president of the Congress- was his lawyer, and General Marvá -who represented the important role of the military engineers in the introduction of reinforced concrete in our country-, led the Commission that was put in charge by the judge of the root cause analysis. In addition, the matter caught the interest of renowned foreigners like Dr. von Emperger or Hennebique and their opinions had a great influence. Nonetheless, this structural failure is unknown to most of today’s engineers. However, what is most surprising are the different causes that were claimed to lie at the root of the disaster: material defects, construction flaws, errors in the design, load tests performed after the structure was finished, etc. The final cause that was put forth during the trial and in the following reports was attributed to the dilatation of the roof due to the high temperatures that spring, albeit the collapse occurred at 7 AM... Based on this information the structural behaviour of the roof has been analysed, which allowed identifying the causes that could have provoked the initial failure and those that could have led to the global collapse. Lessons have been learned from these results, which points out the relevance of history -and in particular, of examples gone wrong- for the continuous education that should exist in engineering. In the case of the 3th Reservoir some of these lessons are still relevant during the present time, like the importance of detailing in "robustness", the design of "integral" structures or the due consideration of construction methods. Finally, the investigation has revived, once again, the figure of D. José Eugenio Ribera, whose role in the introduction of reinforced concrete in Spain was crucial. With the construction of the 3th Reservoir he took too much risk and caused a disaster that accelerated the transition to a new era in structural concrete based on greater scientific knowledge and the first codes. In this new period he would also play a major role.

Opinion of Gov. Williamson and Gen. Wall, on the rights vested in the Delaware and Raritan Canal and Camden and Amboy Railroad companies, by the acts of the state of New Jersey passed in relation to them.

Signed (page 20): I.H. Williamson, Elizabethtown, Dec. 8th, 1834 ... Garret D. Wall, Burlington, Dec. 19th, 1834.

Structural and thermal performance of cold-formed steel stud wall systems under fire conditions

Cold-formed steel stud walls are a major component of Light Steel Framing (LSF) building systems used in commercial, industrial and residential buildings. In the conventional LSF stud wall systems, thin steel studs are protected from fire by placing one or two layers of plasterboard on both sides with or without cavity insulation. However, there is very limited data about the structural and thermal performance of stud wall systems while past research showed contradicting results, for example, about the benefits of cavity insulation. This research was therefore conducted to improve the knowledge and understanding of the structural and thermal performance of cold-formed steel stud wall systems (both load bearing and non-load bearing) under fire conditions and to develop new improved stud wall systems including reliable and simple methods to predict their fire resistance rating. Full scale fire tests of cold-formed steel stud wall systems formed the basis of this research. This research proposed an innovative LSF stud wall system in which a composite panel made of two plasterboards with insulation between them was used to improve the fire rating. Hence fire tests included both conventional steel stud walls with and without the use of cavity insulation and the new composite panel system. A propane fired gas furnace was specially designed and constructed first. The furnace was designed to deliver heat in accordance with the standard time temperature curve as proposed by AS 1530.4 (SA, 2005). A compression loading frame capable of loading the individual studs of a full scale steel stud wall system was also designed and built for the load-bearing tests. Fire tests included comprehensive time-temperature measurements across the thickness and along the length of all the specimens using K type thermocouples. They also included the measurements of load-deformation characteristics of stud walls until failure. The first phase of fire tests included 15 small scale fire tests of gypsum plasterboards, and composite panels using different types of insulating material of varying thickness and density. Fire performance of single and multiple layers of gypsum plasterboards was assessed including the effect of interfaces between adjacent plasterboards on the thermal performance. Effects of insulations such as glass fibre, rock fibre and cellulose fibre were also determined while the tests provided important data relating to the temperature at which the fall off of external plasterboards occurred. In the second phase, nine small scale non-load bearing wall specimens were tested to investigate the thermal performance of conventional and innovative steel stud wall systems. Effects of single and multiple layers of plasterboards with and without vertical joints were investigated. The new composite panels were seen to offer greater thermal protection to the studs in comparison to the conventional panels. In the third phase of fire tests, nine full scale load bearing wall specimens were tested to study the thermal and structural performance of the load bearing wall assemblies. A full scale test was also conducted at ambient temperature. These tests showed that the use of cavity insulation led to inferior fire performance of walls, and provided good explanations and supporting research data to overcome the incorrect industry assumptions about cavity insulation. They demonstrated that the use of insulation externally in a composite panel enhanced the thermal and structural performance of stud walls and increased their fire resistance rating significantly. Hence this research recommends the use of the new composite panel system for cold-formed LSF walls. This research also included steady state tensile tests at ambient and elevated temperatures to address the lack of reliable mechanical properties for high grade cold-formed steels at elevated temperatures. Suitable predictive equations were developed for calculating the yield strength and elastic modulus at elevated temperatures. In summary, this research has developed comprehensive experimental thermal and structural performance data for both the conventional and the proposed non-load bearing and load bearing stud wall systems under fire conditions. Idealized hot flange temperature profiles have been developed for non-insulated, cavity insulated and externally insulated load bearing wall models along with suitable equations for predicting their failure times. A graphical method has also been proposed to predict the failure times (fire rating) of non-load bearing and load bearing walls under different load ratios. The results from this research are useful to both fire researchers and engineers working in this field. Most importantly, this research has significantly improved the knowledge and understanding of cold-formed LSF walls under fire conditions, and developed an innovative LSF wall system with increased fire rating. It has clearly demonstrated the detrimental effects of using cavity insulation, and has paved the way for Australian building industries to develop new wall panels with increased fire rating for commercial applications worldwide.