Política y criminalidad en el «nuevo Estado» franquista. La criminalización del «enemigo» en el Derecho penal de posguerra

La consolidación del «nuevo Estado» franquista conllevó la elaboración de una doctrina y una legislación penal que permitiera reprimir a los enemigos políticos de la dictadura, así como conseguir el control de la sociedad. Este estudio analiza la criminalización de la desviación social durante la posguerra. La criminalización es la selección de un grupo de personas, a las que el poder del Estado somete mediante la coacción punitiva de sus acciones. En este proceso de «construcción social» del delito, destacó la categorización del «otro» como un enemigo peligroso y dañino moral y socialmente, también en la justicia común en España.

A admissibilidade jurídico-penal do crime de burla por omissão

O estudo da problemática da admissibilidade jurídico-penal do crime de burla por omissão, enquadrando-se na órbitra dos crimes comissivos por omissão, impõe, a título de questão prévia, a análise do conteúdo e alcance da cláusula de equiparação da omissão à acção, ínsita no art. 10.º do C.P, e, bem assim, a indagação do seu fundamento e da sua compatibilidade com o princípio jurídico-constitucional da legalidade das normas incriminadoras e suas exigências de determinação típica decorrentes dos princípios nullum crimen sine (prævia) lege e nulla poena sine (prævia) lege., matéria a que nos debruçaremos na Parte I da presente dissertação e que deverá ser essencialmente entendida à luz do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana e da necessidade de um equilíbrio entre a certeza e a segurança jurídicas com a tutela de determinados bens-jurídicos fundamentais, enquanto pilares essenciais de qualquer Estado de Direito Democrático. Na parte II, tentaremos determinar o significado e alcance da conduta enganosa e astuciosa do crime de burla, previsto e punido pelo n.º 1 do art.º 217.º do C.P., desbravando, antes de mais, a sua evolução normativa até aos tempos hodiernos, após o que definiremos a estrutura normativa do tipo. Buscaremos, de seguida, uma aproximação ao conceito de engano e a determinação das formas e modalidades que a conduta enganosa e astuciosa poderá assumir: Exigirá a conduta típica uma mise-en-scène perpetrada pelo agente ou poderá bastar-se com uma mera mentira? Alcançada a sua (possível) determinação, estaremos já em condições de nos debruçarmos sobre a problemática da admissibilidade jurídico-penal da burla por omissão, altura em que, sob uma perspectiva crítica e acompanhada da análise igualmente crítica de casos, avançaremos com argumentos favoráveis e contrários a essa admissibilidade, sem, naturalmente, deixarmos de auscultar a tendência de entendimento da nossa Jurisprudência.

Money for structural reforms in the eurozone: making sense of contractual arrangements. Egmont Paper 57, May 2013

Executive Summary. Both the Commission’s proposal for a ‘Competitiveness and Convergence Instrument’ and the ‘contractual arrangement’ presented by President Van Rompuy share a common concept: associating EU money with national structural reforms under a binding arrangement. The targeted ‘structural reforms’ are the labour market reforms and product and services market reforms in eurozone ‘peripheral’ countries facing the most severe external imbalances. Their implementation would speed up and facilitate the ‘internal devaluation’ process of these countries. In the worst case scenario, failure to adopt the necessary reforms and to adjust wages and prices downwards may lead the most vulnerable countries to leave the eurozone under social and political pressure. Contracts seek to reduce this risk by increasing compliance with the country-specific recommendations for structural reforms issued by the EU institutions within the European Semester, and in particular with the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). As for the financial support, it follows two different, albeit overlapping rationales. First, the perspective of obtaining EU funding would incentivize the governments of vulnerable countries to adopt reforms that would bear a high political and social cost in the short term. That is, without some form of incentive, it is unlikely that the necessary reforms would be undertaken and this could have significant negative consequences for the EMU as a whole. The second rationale amounts to outright solidarity: EU support is needed to cushion the inevitable socio-economic costs implied not only by the structural reform, but also by the internal devaluation taking place. To make sense of contractual arrangements, some points should be considered in future discussions: 1. Contracts on a voluntary basis only: Contracts cannot be mandatory unlike initially suggested in the Van Rompuy report. This stems not only from the inherent definition of a ‘contract’ – where mutual consent is key – but also from the non-binding nature of the preventive arm of the MIP. Making the country-specific recommendations issued by the EU institutions systematically binding would imply transfers of sovereignty from the national to the EU level that go well beyond the present discussion. Instead, contracts would introduce the possibility of making the preventive arm binding for some countries where corrections are most needed and urgent for the EMU as a whole.

Réformes institutionnelles sans révision du traité? = Institutional reforms without treaty revision? Research Paper in Law 3/2006

No abstract.

What direction for reforms in China? CEPS Commentary, 9 January 2014

Following the recent ‘third plenum’ in China, CEPS Director Daniel Gros finds that China has reached a difficult crossroads in terms of making the necessary reforms that will foster continued growth and productivity. Continuing in the direction that so far has been followed with astounding success, namely giving the market a greater role and opening to the rest of the world, might no longer be sufficient. He points out, for example, that combating pollution requires more state intervention, not less. And similarly, strengthening a huge, potentially unstable, financial system requires stronger oversight and some continuing separation from the global financial system. Navigating this change in the right direction will be crucial not only for China, but also for the global economy.

The OTC derivatives markets after financial reforms. CEPS ECMI Commentary No. 36, May 2014

Over the past five years, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets have received heightened regulatory attention, due to their opaqueness, size and interconnectedness, with a view to improving the robustness, safety and resilience of this market segment. There has been continued progress in the follow-up to the G-20 commitments, with the EU (EMIR, MIFID II, CRD/CRR IV, MAD) and the US (Swap Execution Facility or SEF, Title VII of Dodd-Frank Act, Basel III) leading in the implementation timelines and capturing approximately 80-90% of the overall market. Based on the data compiled for the yearly ECMI Statistical Package, this commentary provides a snapshot of the current status of the global OTC derivatives markets by: i) identifying general trends over the past decade, ii) looking at the changes in the market structure (instruments and participants), iii) estimating the uncollateralised derivatives exposure and iv) examining the relationship between OTC derivatives and exchange-traded derivatives (ETD).