An intelligent procurement marketplace for web services composition

This paper presents an intelligent procurement marketplace for finding the best mix of web services to dynamically compose the business process desired by a web service requester. We develop a combinatorial auction approach that leads to an integer programming formulation for the web services composition problem. The model takes into account the Quality of Service (QoS) and Service Level Agreements (SLA) for differentiating among multiple service providers who are capable of fulfilling a functionality. An important feature of the model is interface aware composition.

Incentive compatible mechanisms for group ticket allocation in software maintenance services

A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers. The decision of allocating the ticket to one or more engineers is generally taken by the lead, based on customer delivery deadlines and a guided complexity assessment from each maintenance engineer. The key challenge in such a scenario is two folds, un-truthful (hiked up) elicitation of ticket complexity by each engineer to the lead and the decision of allocating the ticket to a group of engineers who will solve the ticket with in customer deadline. The decision of allocation should ensure Individual and Coalitional Rationality along with Coalitional Stability. In this paper we use game theory to examine the issue of truthful elicitation of ticket complexities by engineers for solving ticket as a group given a specific customer delivery deadline. We formulate this problem as strategic form game and propose two mechanisms, (1) Division of Labor (DOL) and (2) Extended Second Price (ESP). In the proposed mechanisms we show that truth telling by each engineer constitutes a Dominant Strategy Nash Equilibrium of the underlying game. Also we analyze the existence of Individual Rationality (IR) and Coalitional Rationality (CR) properties to motivate voluntary and group participation. We use Core, solution concept from co-operative game theory to analyze the stability of the proposed group based on the allocation and payments.

Influence of planning and governance on the level of urban services

A theoretical framework to analyse the interaction of planning and governance on the extent of outgrowth and level of services is proposed. An indicator framework for quantifying sprawl is also proposed and the same is operationalised for Bangalore. The indicators comprise spatial metrics (derived from temporal satellite remote sensing data) and other metrics obtained from a house-hold survey. The interaction of different indicators with respect to the core city and the outgrowth is determined by multi-dimensional scaling. The analysis reveals the underlying similarities (and dissimilarities) that relate with the different governance structures that prevail here. The paper concludes outlining the challenges in addressing urban sprawl while ensuring adequate level of services that planning and governance have to ensure towards achieving sustainable urbanisation.