Responsiveness of astrocytes in serum-free aggregate cultures to epidermal growth factor: dependence on the cell cycle and the epidermal growth factor concentration.

Serum-free aggregating cell cultures of fetal rat telencephalon treated with low doses (0.5 nM) of epidermal growth factor (EGF) showed a small, transient increase in DNA synthesis but no significant changes in total DNA and protein content. By contrast, treatment with high doses (13 nM) of EGF caused a marked stimulation of DNA synthesis as well as a net increase in DNA and protein content. The expression of the astrocyte-specific enzyme, glutamine synthetase, was greatly enhanced both at low and at high EGF concentrations. These results suggest that at low concentration EGF stimulates exclusively the differentiation of astrocytes, whereas at high concentration, EGF has also a mitogenic effect. Nonproliferating astrocytes in cultures treated with 0.4 microM 1-beta-D-arabinofuranosyl-cytosine were refractory to EGF treatment, indicating that their responsiveness to EGF is cell cycle-dependent. Binding studies using a crude membrane fraction of 5-day cultures showed a homogeneous population of EGF binding sites (Kd approximately equal to 2.6 nM). Specific EGF binding sites were found also in non-proliferating (and nonresponsive) cultures, although they showed slightly reduced affinity and binding capacity. This finding suggests that the cell cycle-dependent control of astroglial responsiveness to EGF does not occur at the receptor level. However, it was found that the specific EGF binding sites disappear with progressive cellular differentiation.

15 years of new growth economics: What have we learnt?

This paper evaluates the empirical and theoretical contributions of theEconomic Growth Literature since the publication of Paul Romer s seminalpaper in 1986.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages ofeconomic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Partisan competition, growth and the franchise

We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests use the suffrage to influence implemented policies. Through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: When (1) there exist an economic conflict among the elite, (2) landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of industrial workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. We provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of 11 countries.

Why England? Demand, growth and inequality during the Industrial Revolution

Why was England first? And why Europe? We present a probabilistic model that builds on big-push models by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), combined with hierarchical preferences. The interaction of exogenous demographic factors (in particular the English low-pressure variant of the European marriage pattern)and redistributive institutions such as the old Poor Law combined to make an Industrial Revolution more likely. Essentially, industrialization is the result of having a critical mass of consumers that is rich enough to afford (potentially) mass-produced goods. Our model is then calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1750 and the observed transition until 1850.This allows us to address explicitly one of the key features of the British IndustrialRevolution unearthed by economic historians over the last three decades the slowness of productivity and output change. In our calibration, we find that the probability of Britain industrializing is 5 times larger than France s. Contrary to the recent argument by Pomeranz, China in the 18th century had essentially no chance to industrialize at all. This difference is decomposed into a demographic and a policy component, with the former being far more important than the latter.

World population growth and fertility patterns, 1960-2000. A simple model explaining the evolution of world's fertility during the second half of the 20th Century

In this paper we attempt to describe the general reasons behind the world populationexplosion in the 20th century. The size of the population at the end of the century inquestion, deemed excessive by some, was a consequence of a dramatic improvementin life expectancies, attributable, in turn, to scientific innovation, the circulation ofinformation and economic growth. Nevertheless, fertility is a variable that plays acrucial role in differences in demographic growth. We identify infant mortality, femaleeducation levels and racial identity as important exogenous variables affecting fertility.It is estimated that in poor countries one additional year of primary schooling forwomen leads to 0.614 child less per couple on average (worldwide). While it may bepossible to identify a global tendency towards convergence in demographic trends,particular attention should be paid to the case of Africa, not only due to its differentdemographic patterns, but also because much of the continent's population has yet toexperience improvement in quality of life generally enjoyed across the rest of theplanet.

Gazelle companies: Growth drivers and an evolution analysis

Gazelle companies are relevant because they generate much more employment than other companies and deliver high returns to their shareholders. This paper analyzes their behavior in the years of high growth and their evolution in the following years. The main factors that explain their success are competitive advantages based on human resources, innovation, internationalization, the excellence in processes and a conservative financial policy. Nevertheless, as time goes by they can be divided in two groups: a group which continues having growth, but most of them with lower growth rates; and the rest which face great problems or even disappear. The present study identifies several key factors that explain this different evolution.

The economic tragedy of the XXth Century: Growth in Africa

The dismal growth performance of Africa is the worst economic tragedy ofthe XXth century. We document the evolution of per capita GDP for thecontinent as a whole and for subset of countries south of the Saharadesert. We document the worsening of various income inequality indexesand we estimate poverty rates and headcounts. We then analyze some ofthe central robust determinants of economic growth reported bySala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2003) and project the annual growthrates Africa would have enjoyed if these key determinants had taken OECDrather than African values. Expensive investment goods, low levels ofeducation, poor health, adverse geography, closed economies, too muchpublic expenditure and too many military conflicts are seen as keyexplanations of the economic tragedy.

Wealth, financial intermediation and growth

This paper presents empirical support for the existence of wealth effects in the contribution of financial intermediation to economic growth, and offers a theoretical explanation for these effects. Using GMM dynamic panel data techniques applied to study the growth-promoting effects of financial intermediation, we show that the exogenous contribution of financial development on economic growth has different effects for different levels of income per capita. We find that this contribution is generally increasing with thelevel of income per capita of the economy, up to a relatively high level of income. This contribution is consistently lower for poor countries; and for some low levels of income per capita it can be negative. We provide a model to account for these wealth effects. The model is a overlapping generations growth model where financial intermediaries implement liquidity risk sharing among depositors. We show that at early stages of economic development, a bank can increase welfare of its depositors only at the cost of lowering investment and growth. However, once the economy has crossed certain wealth threshold, the liquidity role of banks becomes unambiguously growth enhancing. As wealth increases, banks offer improving liquidity insurance, and higher growth; however, for high levels of wealth, growth generated byfinancial intermediation declines as the economy attains the optimal level of consumption risk sharing.

Education, growth and income inequality

Estimates of the e¤ect of education on GDP (the social return to education)have been hard to reconcile with micro evidence on the private return. We present a simple explanation that combines two ideas: imperfect substitution between worker types and endogenous skill biased technological progress. When types of workers are imperfect substitutes, the supply of human capital is negatively related to its return, and a higher education level compresses wage di¤erentials. We use cross-country panel data on income inequality to estimate the private return and GDP data to estimate the social return. The results show that the private return falls by 2 percentage points when the average education level increases by a year, which is consistent with Katz and Murphy's [1992] estimate of the elasticity of substitution between worker types. We find no evidence for dynamics in the private return, and certainly not for a reversal of the negative e¤ect as described in Acemoglu [2002]. The short run social return equals the private return.

Human capital distribution, growth and convergence

This paper studies the dynamic relationship between distribution and endogenous growth in an overlapping generations model with accumulation of human and physical capital. It is shown how human capital can determine a relationship between per capita growth rates and inequality in the distribution of income. Family background effects and spillovers in the transmission of human capital generate a dynamics in which aggregate variables depend not only on the stock, but also on the distribution of human capital. The evolution of this distribution over time is then characterized under different assumptions on private returns and the form of the externality in the technology for humancapital. Conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of a constant growth equilibrium with a stationary distribution are derived. Increasing returns, idiosyncratic abilities and the possibility of poverty traps are explicitely characterized in a closed form solution of the equilibrium dynamics, showing the role played by technology and preferences parameters.

Systemic crises and growth

In this paper, we document the fact that countries that have experienced occasional financial crises have on average grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. We measure the incidence of crisis with the skewness of credit growth, and find that it has a robust negative effect on GDP growth. This link coexists with the negative link between variance and growth typically found in the literature. To explain the link between crises and growth we present a model where weak institutions lead to severe financial constraints and low growth. Financial liberalization policies that facilitaterisk-taking increase leverage and investment. This leads to higher growth, but also toa greater incidence of crises. Conditions are established under which the costs of crises are outweighed by the benefits of higher growth.

Glutamine Stimulates Biosynthesis and Secretion of Insulin-like Growth Factor 2 (IGF2), an Autocrine Regulator of Beta Cell Mass and Function.

IGF2 is an autocrine ligand for the beta cell IGF1R receptor and GLP-1 increases the activity of this autocrine loop by enhancing IGF1R expression, a mechanism that mediates the trophic effects of GLP-1 on beta cell mass and function. Here, we investigated the regulation of IGF2 biosynthesis and secretion. We showed that glutamine rapidly and strongly induced IGF2 mRNA translation using reporter constructs transduced in MIN6 cells and primary islet cells. This was followed by rapid secretion of IGF2 via the regulated pathway, as revealed by the presence of mature IGF2 in insulin granule fractions and by inhibition of secretion by nimodipine and diazoxide. When maximally stimulated by glutamine, the amount of secreted IGF2 rapidly exceeded its initial intracellular pool and tolbutamide, and high K(+) increased IGF2 secretion only marginally. This indicates that the intracellular pool of IGF2 is small and that sustained secretion requires de novo synthesis. The stimulatory effect of glutamine necessitates its metabolism but not mTOR activation. Finally, exposure of insulinomas or beta cells to glutamine induced Akt phosphorylation, an effect that was dependent on IGF2 secretion, and reduced cytokine-induced apoptosis. Thus, glutamine controls the activity of the beta cell IGF2/IGF1R autocrine loop by increasing the biosynthesis and secretion of IGF2. This autocrine loop can thus integrate changes in feeding and metabolic state to adapt beta cell mass and function.

The structural dynamics of output growth and inflation: some international evidence

We examine the dynamics of output growth and inflation in the US, Euro area and UK using a structural time varying coefficient VAR. There are important similarities in structural inflation dynamics across countries; output growth dynamics differ. Swings in the magnitude of inflation and output growth volatilities and persistences are accounted for by a combination of three structural shocks. Changes over time in the structure of the economy are limited and permanent variations largely absent. Changes in the volatilities of structural shocks matter.

Did colonization matter for growth? An empirical exploration into the historical causes of Africa's underdevelopment

We investigate the impact of 20th--century European colonizationon growth in Africa. We find that in the 1960--88 period growth has beenfaster for dependencies than for colonies; for British and Frenchcolonies than for Portuguese, Belgian and Italian ones; and for countrieswith less economic penetration during the colonial period. On average,African growth accelerates after decolonization. Proxies for colonialheritage add explanatory power to growth regressions and make indicatorsfor human capital, political and ethnic instability lose significance.Colonial variables capture the same effects of a sub--Saharan dummy andreduce its significance when jointly included in a cross sectionalregression with 98 countries.