Altruism, uncertain lifetime and the distribution of wealth

This paper studies the dynamics of the distribution of wealth in ageneral equilibrium framework. It considers an overlapping generationsmodel with production and altruistic preferences in which individualsface an uncertain lifetime and annuity markets do not exist. Thispaper focuses on the role that accidental bequests, voluntary bequests,and non--negativity constraints on bequests play in the dynamics of thedistribution of wealth. It is proved that the equilibrium interestrate is lower than the one that satisfies the modified goldenrule. In this economy, a social security system not only plays aninsurance role, but also prevents capital overaccumulation. In fact,this paper shows that a pay--as--you--go social security systemdecentralizes the social planner solution as a competitive equilibrium.

Interviews and adverse selection

Interviewing in professional labor markets is a costly process for firms. Moreover, poor screening can have a persistent negative impact on firms bottom lines and candidates careers. In a simple dynamic model where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability, potentially large inefficiencies arise from information-based unemployment, where able workers are rejected by firms because of their lack of offers in previous interviews. This effect may make the market less efficient than random matching. We show that the first best can be achieved using either a mechanism with transfers or one without transfers.

The algebraic equality of two asymptotic tests for the hypothesis that a normal distribution has a specified correlation matrix

It is proved the algebraic equality between Jennrich's (1970) asymptotic$X^2$ test for equality of correlation matrices, and a Wald test statisticderived from Neudecker and Wesselman's (1990) expression of theasymptoticvariance matrix of the sample correlation matrix.

Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.

The drive for quality - the impact on accounting in the wine industry

There is a substancial literature on the accounting procedures needed to trackdown the costs of quality control and quality failure. In a drive for improved quality the changes in the process of production or service delivery will also give rise to new accounting needs. In this article we take one example of an industry, wine production, where in most countries there has been a movement towards expanding higher quality production. We report on interviews with wine producers in the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Spain, and identify avariety of ways in which a more sophisticated approach to accounting has become necessary as a result of the drive for quality.