Hypothesis Testing

PowerPoint slides for Hypothesis Testing. Examples are taken from the Medical Literature

Hypothesis Testing.ppt (10)

PowerPoint Slides for Hypothesis testing Used in Research Skills for Biomedical Science

Usability testing on EdShare

The first set of Usability testing on EdShare (7th June). Tests where carried out using Silverback on the Mac. This is unedited footage - Each video is around 20minutes long.

Programming Principles: Testing and Debugging

In this session we look at the sorts of errors that occur in programs, and how we can use different testing and debugging strategies (such as unit testing and inspection) to track them down. We also look at error handling within the program and at how we can use Exceptions to manage errors in a more sophisticated way. These slides are based on Chapter 6 of the Book 'Objects First with BlueJ'

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Software Development: Testing

This presentation discusses the role and purpose of testing in the systems/Software Development Life Cycle. We examine the consequences of the 'cost curve' on defect removal and how agile methods can reduce its effects. We concentrate on Black Box Testing and use Equivalence Partitioning and Boundary Value Analysis to construct the smallest number of test cases, test scenarios necessary for a test plan.

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Measuring and testing for the systemically important financial institutions

This paper analyzes the measure of systemic importance ∆CoV aR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009, 2010) within the context of a similar class of risk measures used in the risk management literature. In addition, we develop a series of testing procedures, based on ∆CoV aR, to identify and rank the systemically important institutions. We stress the importance of statistical testing in interpreting the measure of systemic importance. An empirical application illustrates the testing procedures, using equity data for three European banks.

Statistical inference for testing Gini coefficients: an application for Colombia

This paper uses Colombian household survey data collected over the period 1984-2005 to estimate Gini coe¢ cients along with their corresponding standard errors. We Önd a statistically signiÖcant increase in wage income inequality following the adoption of the liberalisation measures of the early 1990s, and mixed evidence during the recovery years that followed the economic recession of the late 1990s. We also Önd that in several cases the observed di§erences in the Gini coe¢ cients across cities have not been statistically signiÖcant.

Testing for Stock Market Integration in a Developing Economy: Colombia

This paper examines the linkage between two parallel stock exchanges trading the same shares in Colombia, namely the Bogotá Stock Exchange and the Medellín Stock Exchange. We provide empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that these two markets can be best described as fully integrated over a period of almost four decades, which is consistent with the view that arbitrage opportunities are only possible in the short but not in the long run. In addition, we find evide

Testing the law of one price in food markets: evidence for Colombia using disaggregated data

This paper applies stationarity tests to examine evidence of market integration for a relatively large sample of food products in Colombia. We Önd little support for market integration when using the univariate KPSS tests for stationarity. However, within a panel context and after allowing for cross sectional dependence, the Hadri tests provide much more evidence supporting the view that food markets are integrated or, in other words, that the law of one price holds for most products.

Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

We develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers. Insurers offer separating contracts which take into account the individual risk, so that taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its e¢ ciency. We obtain that, if effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, they face a moral hazard problem which induces them to under-provide insurance. We obtain the counterintuitive result that moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low enough. Also, agents may perform the test for lower levels of prevention e¢ ciency when effort is not observable