954 resultados para Robert Crosser, chairman of subcommitte.


Motion for a Resolution tabled by the following Members: van Aerssen, Adonnino, Aigner, Alber, Albers, von Alemann, Almirante, Ansquer, Antoniozzi, Arndt, Baduel-Glorioso, Bangemann, Barbagli, Barbi, Battersby, Baudis, Berkhouwer, Bersani, Lord Bethell, Bettiza, Beumer, Beyer de Ryke, von Bismarck, Bocklet, Bombard, Bonaccini, Boot, Bord, Bournias, Boyes, Brok, Calvez, Cerettoni Romagnoli, Casanmagnano-Cerretti, Sir Fred Catherwood, Cecovini, Chanterie, Clinton, Colleselli, Collins, Collomb, Costanzo, Couste, Cronin, Croux, Curry, Dalsass, D'Angelosante, Davern, De Gucht, Delatte, Del Duca, Deleau, Delorozoy, Deschamps, Diana, Diligent, Lord Douro, Dury, Eisma, Lady Elles, Enright, Estgen, Ewing, Fellermaier, Fergusson, de Ferranti, Ferrero, Ferri, Fich, Filippi, Fischbach, Flanagan, Focke, Franz, Ingo Friedrich, Fruh, Karl Fuchs, Fuillet, Gabert, Gaiotti de Biase, Gallacher, Awronski, Gerokostopoulos, Geursten, Ghergo, Giavazzi, Glinne, de Goede, Gontikas, Goppel, Gouthier, Gredal, Haagerup, Habsburg, Hansch, Hahn, Lord Harmar-Nicholls, von Hassel, Helms, Herklotz, Herman, van den Heuvel, Hoff, K.H. Hoffmann, Hooper, Hopper, Hord, Hume, Ippolito, Irmer, Israel, Robert Jackson, Jakobsen, Janssen van Raay, Johnson, Jonker, Jurgens, Kallias, Kaloyannis, Katzer, Kazazis, Kellett-Bowman, M. Elaine Kellett-Bowman, Key, Klepsch, Klinkenborg, Kuhn, Lagakos, Langes, Lecanuet, Lega, Lemmer, Lentz-Cornette, Lenz, Leonardi, Ligios, Louwes, Lucker, Luster, Macario, McCartin, Maher, Maij-Weggen, Majonica, Malangre, de la Malene, Marck, Mart, Simone Martin, Mertens, Michel, van Minnen, Modiano, Moller, Mommersteeg, Moorhouse, Jacques Moreau, Moreland, Mouchel, Muller-Hermann, Muntingh, Narducci, Newton Dunn, J.B. Nielsen, Calliopi Nikolaou, Konstantinos Nikolaou, Nord, Normanton, Notenboom, Nyborg, O'Donnel, Lord O'Hagan, d'Ormesson, Paisley, Pennella, Papaefstratiou, Patterson, Paulhan, Pauwelyn, Decaestecker, Pearce, Pedini, Pelikan, Penders, Pery, Pesmazoglou, Peters, Pfennig, Pflimlin, Phlix, Plaskovitis, Pottering, Poniatowski, Price, Protopapadakis, Pruvot, Purvis, Rabbethge, Sir Brandon Rhys Williams, Rieger, Rinsche, Ripa di Meana, Roberts, Rogalla, Rogers, Ruffolo, Rumor, Ryan, Salzer, Sassano, Prinz Sayn Wittgenstein-Berleburg, Schall, Schieler, Schinzel, Schleicher, Schmid, Schnitker, Karl Schon, Konrad Schon, Schwencke, Sir James Scott-Hopkins, Scrivener, Seal, Seefeld, Seeler, Segre, Seibel-Emmerling, Seitlinger, Seligmann, Sherlock, Sieglerschmidt, Simmonds, Simonnet, Simpson, Spencer, Spicer, Spinelli, Squarcialupi, Stella, Sir John Stewart-Clark, Sutra, Tolman, Travaglini, Tuckman, Turner, Tyrrell, Vandewiele, Sir Peter Vanneck, van Rompuy, Vergeer, Veronesi, Verroken, Vetter, von der Vring, Walz, Sir Fred Warner, Wawrzik, Weber, Wedekind, Welsh, Wieczorek-Zeul, von Wogau and Zecchino, pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure on the foundation of a Euro-Arab University for postgraduate students at one of the traditional meeting places of Islamic and European culture on Spanish Soil, Working Documents 1982-1983, Document 1-515/82, 16 July 1982

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From Introduction. Regional economic disequilibria was viewed as both an obstacle to and result of integration (European Commission 1965; European Commission 1962; European Commission 1969). Even within the Treaty of Rome, the Community tried to establish mechanisms to alleviate regional inequality. However, it was not until 1975 that the main mechanism of regional policy was established as a result of British and Irish enlargement: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Since then, cohesion policy has become a significant EU expenditure accounting for €347bn, or 35.7% of the total EU budget for 2007-13(European Commission Regional Policy-Info Regio 2012). It has also become a key policy linked to enlargement. The underlying principle of cohesion policy assumes that the market alone cannot solve development problems and therefore government intervention is needed. This notion is in direct contrast to the underlying principle of EU competition policy, which asserts that the free market can solve economic development problems (Meadows, interview by author, 2003). The logic underlying cohesion policy is not only counter to EU competition policy, but also regulatory policies. Unlike other EU policies, cohesion policy is not a sectoral policy, but rather territorial in nature (Leonardi, 2006). Thus at times EU regulatory policy has also unintentionally worked counter to the goals of regional policy, sometimes disadvantaging poorer regions (Dudek, 2005). As the Community has sought to ameliorate regional disparities, it meant that all levels of government: local, regional, national and supranational would need to be involved, however, member states have different territorial governance and European regional development programs have to varying degrees impacted the relationship and policy responsibility of different levels of government (Leonardi, 2006; Bachtler and Michie 1993; Marks, 1993). The very nature of regional development policy has provoked a re-examination of subsidiarity, or which level of government is the lowest and most appropriate level. The discussion of policy formulation and implementation at the lowest level possible also addresses the issue of the democratic deficit. Some argue that the closer government is to the people the more responsive and representative it is. Democracy, however, also implies that public funds are used in a transparent way and for public rather than private good. Yet, as we examine the history and current situation of EU regional funds we find that corruption and misuse still abound. Thus, to understand the history of regional policy it is imperative to look at the major transformations of the policy, how regional policy has impacted subsidiarity and the quality of democracy, become an important instrument of enlargement and contradicted or conflicted with other EU policies.

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Prior research on citizen support for European integration does not consider how individuals’ evaluations of European nationalities are associated with support. This paper fills this gap by developing a political cohesion model based on social identity theory. I claim that the probability of supporting integration increases with greater levels of trust in fellow Europeans, which assumes to reflect their positive images. Also, trust in eastern European Union nationalities has the highest impact on the probability for support, followed by trust in the southern nationalities, and then northern nationalities due to the eastern and southern nationalities relatively lower economic development. Controlling for various factors, the ordered logistic regression analysis of the European Election Study (2004) data support these claims.

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From the Introduction. In order to understand the historical roots of the current geopolitical confrontation between the EU and Russia, we have to go back to the end of the Cold War and to the catastrophic decade that it was followed by in Russian history. The dissolution of the USSR imposed serious economic hardship for Russia and for all the ex-communist East-European states. Russia was the hardest hit amongst them, as the center of the USSR's economic system it suffered most from the dissolution of regional economic ties. This crisis was just deepened by the IMF's privatization and reform campaign, which imposed austerity measures and state-asset privatization as a “shock-therapy” answer to the country's economic problems. This policy package did nothing to save Russia from economic collapse (which eventually happened in 1998), the only thing it achieved was an even stronger social and economic crisis and the enrichment of the rent-seeking ex-communist top bureaucrats by state-assets, which were sold out under-priced through diverse channels of corruption

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On June 15, 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate of the European People’s Party, was elected President of the European Commission, with the support of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. Amid unprecedented Euroscepticism, the media and many pundits predicted a record-low voter turnout and record-high results for Europhobic parties. The aforementioned parties then decided that the political outcome of these 2014 European elections would also be unprecedented. For the first time in EU history, the European political parties agreed to nominate candidates to chair the institution, which they justified by putting forward Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament has often characteristically used political discourse - the logos, to influence the EU’s institutional framework, even though it entails grappling with Member States. It took the form of reports and resolutions, like the official use of the phrase “European Parliament” in 1962, direct universal suffrage elections in 1975 and a European Union in 1984. Nominating contenders to chair the European Commission is no exception. It requires a specific political discourse whose origins can be traced back to the early years of the European Parliament, when it was still the “Common Assembly”. This political discourse is one of the elements thanks to which the European Parliament acquired visibility and new prerogatives, in pursuit of its legitimacy. However, the executive branch in all member states is not intent on yielding such prerogatives to the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has often ended up strengthening the heads of state and governments, since MEPs are forced to resort to self-discipline. The symbolic significance of its logos and, consequently, its own politicisation as a source of legitimacy, is thus undermined. For instance, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s election actually strengthened German Chancellor Angela Merkel. First she questioned the fact that the candidate whose party holds the parliamentary majority after the election should be appointed President of the Commission. Then she seemed strongly intent on democratising the Union, when she confronted David Cameron, who openly opposed Juncker, believed to be too federalist and old-fashioned a candidate. By doing so, she eventually reduced the symbolic dimension of the European Parliament’s initiative, and Juncker’s election. She also unquestionably embodied EU leadership. This paper aims at analysing Juncker’s election to the Presidency of the European Commission, as well as other questions it raises. In the first part, I lay out some thoughts about the sociohistorical context of voting in European elections in order to make the readers understand why the European Parliament should be bolder. Secondly, I try to explain how the European Parliament has used the logos as a weapon to grapple with member states for more power, as was the case during the 2014 European elections. Last but not least, I seek to show how Angela Merkel got hold of that weapon and took advantage of it, thus proving that despite MEPs’ best efforts, Juncker’s task will be all the more complicated as he was not the consensual candidate of all the governments.