Limiting the list : human rights and intangible cultural heritage

UNESCO's Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Heritage came into force in April 2006, signalling a major expansion of the global system of heritage protection from the tangible to the intangible. It is an expansion that some heritage professionals see as opening up a Pandora's box of confusions and complexities. The conservation of inanimate objects tangible sites and monuments and artefacts - is difficult enough; but the protection of heritage embodied in people raises new sets of ethical and practical issues. The paper canvasses these concerns and focuses on how the notion of human rights must be used as a way of limiting and shaping the Intangible List. In particular it outlines the ways in which the protection and preservation of cultural heritage is linked to 'cultural rights' as a form of human rights. This linkage is not clearly recognised by cultural heritage practitioners in many countries, who view their work merely as technical, or even by human rights workers, despite the abundance of opportunities around the world to witness people struggling to assert their cultural rights in order to protect their heritage and identity.

Human rights and the treatment of sex offenders

Human rights create a protective zone around persons and allow them the opportunity to further their own valued personal projects without interference from others. All human beings hold human rights and that includes sex offenders, although some of their freedom rights may be legitimately curtailed by the State. In this paper we apply the concept of human rights to sex offenders. First we briefly analyze the concept of human rights, their structure, and justification. Second, we apply our own model of human rights to the assessment and treatment of sex offenders. We conclude that a significant advantage of a human rights approach is that it is able to integrate the value and capability aspects of offender treatment.

The vacuousness of rights in the euthanasia debate

It has been claimed that the arguments for and against euthanasia have not changed in the last 120 years. Throughout this period, two rights claims have been thought to be central to the debate. The right to autonomy is invoked by many euthanasists as the main argument in support of euthanasia. This is often countered by the claim that euthanasia violates the right to life. This article argues that the relevance of these rights claims to the euthanasia debate has been overstated. More generally, it is argued that the bluntness of the rights claims in the context of the euthanasia debate is illustrative of the fact that the concept of rights is an unsuitable device for resolving moral disputes which involve conflicting rights.

Children's status and children's rights, historically and cross-culturally

In this thesis, my goal is to construct a vision of an ideal setting for children. By examining different ways of thinking about children and childhood, and by considering different approaches which have worked or do work practically, I will seek to envision something better for children. Trying to reach a better context for children will also include an inherent criticism of current conditions. Based on these criticisms, I will identify the elements that I believe can contribute to an ideal setting in which children can not only lead safe, healthy and happy lives, but also develop their own unique potential. The discipline of the history of childhood as well as cross-cultural studies show the relativistic nature of childhood. The concept of childhood, expectations of children, and societal roles for children have changed drastically over time and differ across cultures today. Children's advocates and the children's rights movement both reflect and promote changes in the context of childhood. As attitudes about childhood change, efforts arise to bring reality into line with the new ideals and images. Efforts toward improving children's rights also spread new ideas about children through the society.

Opting out of shareholder governance rights: a new perspective on contractual freedom in Australian corporate law

One of the classic debates in corporate law relates to whether the rules of corporate law are ar should be 'mandatory', in that companies must comply, or 'enabling' - meaning a set of default rules which companies have the choice of adopting or 'opting out' of through alternative contractual arrangements. The so-called 'mandatory/enabling' debate has been especially prominent in the United States fro numerous reasons, yet has also received some attention in Australia. That said, the extent to which companies can 'opt out' of corporate law has rarely been considered as a practical issue in Australia - particularly whether Australian companies can 'opt out' of provisions under the Corporations Act ("the Act"). However, just recently, two high-profile events in Australia have made 'opting out' of corporate law a relevant issue, especially the question of whether companies are free to 'opt out' of provisions of the Corporations Act  which provide express governance rights to shareholders. These events were Boral's constitutional amendment in 2003 to restrict the ability of shreholders to propose amendments to the company's constitution, and the contemplation and introduction of so-called 'pre-nuptial' agreements- designed to by-pass the right of shreholders to vote on removing directors in public companies. In the light of these two recent events, in this article the authors revisit the mandatory/enabling debate. However, rather than going over old ground as to whether a mandatory or enabling approach to corporate regulation is desirable, the authors approach the issue from a fresh perspective: that Australian Securitiesand Investments Commission's ("ASIC") existing relief powers under the Act should be extended to provide a means for companies to opt out of provisions containing shareholder governance rights.