Water depth selection during foraging and efficiency in prey capture by the egrets Casmerodius albus and Egretta thula (Aves, Ardeidae) in an urban lagoon in Rio de Janeiro State, Brazil

This study aimed to evaluate the water depth selection during foraging, the efficiency in prey capture, and the food items captured by Casmerodius albus (Linnaeus, 1758) and Egretta thula (Molina, 1782). The work was conducted at an urban lagoon, Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas, Rio de Janeiro. Four transects were made each month (two in the morning and two in the afternoon) for six months. When the birds were detected foraging, the water depth and the types of prey captured were recorded. There was no significant relationship between the foraging efficiencies of the two species. However, they differed in relation to the water depth when foraging, and also in the food items captured. Casmerodius albus captured mainly fishes while Egretta thula captured mainly invertebrates. The results suggest that the differences in water depth when foraging and the food items captured allow a differential use of the food resources available by C. albus and E. thula at Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas.

Impact of a power plant cooling system on copepod and meroplankton survival (Bahía Blanca estuary, Argentina)

The impact of a power plant cooling system in the Bahía Blanca estuary (Argentina) on the survival of target zooplanktonic organisms (copepods and crustacean larvae) and on overall mesozooplankton abundance was evaluated over time. Mortality rates were calculated for juveniles and adults of four key species in the estuary: Acartia tonsa Dana, 1849 and Eurytemora americana Williams, 1906 (native and invading copepods), and larvae of the crab Chasmagnathus granulata Dana, 1851 and the invading cirriped Balanus glandula Darwin, 1854. Mean total mortality values were up to four times higher at the water discharge site than at intake, though for all four species, significant differences were only registered in post-capture mortality. The findings show no evidence of greater larval sensitivity. As expected, the sharpest decrease in overall mesozooplankton abundance was found in areas close to heated water discharge.

Efficiency and environmental regulation: a 'complex situation'

Production of desirable outputs is often accompanied by undesirable by products that have damaging effects on the environment, and whose disposal is frequently regulated by public authorities. In this paper, we compute directional technology distance functions under particular assumptions concerning disposability of bads in order to test for the existence of what we call ‘complex situations’, where the biggest producer is not the greatest polluter. Furthermore, we show that how in such situations, environmental regulation could achieve an effective reduction in the aggregate level of bad outputs without reducing the production of good outputs. Finally, we illustrate our methodology with an empirical application to a sample of Spanish tile ceramic producers.

Efficiency and quality in local government management: the case of Spanish local authorities

This study analyses efficiency levels in Spanish local governments and their determining factors through the application of DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) methodology. It aims to find out to what extent inefficiency arises from external factors beyond the control of the entity, or on the other hand, how much it is due to inadequate management of productive resources. The results show that on the whole, there is still a wide margin within which managers could increase local government efficiency levels, although it is revealed that a great deal of inefficiency is due to exogenous factors. It is specifically found that the size of the entity, per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants or the amount of commercial activity are some of the factors determining local government inefficiency.

A Grid Supercomputing Enviroment for High Demand Computational Applications

Despite the huge increase in processor and interprocessor network performace, many computational problems remain unsolved due to lack of some critical resources such as floating point sustained performance, memory bandwidth, etc... Examples of these problems are found in areas of climate research, biology, astrophysics, high energy physics (montecarlo simulations) and artificial intelligence, among others. For some of these problems, computing resources of a single supercomputing facility can be 1 or 2 orders of magnitude apart from the resources needed to solve some them. Supercomputer centers have to face an increasing demand on processing performance, with the direct consequence of an increasing number of processors and systems, resulting in a more difficult administration of HPC resources and the need for more physical space, higher electrical power consumption and improved air conditioning, among other problems. Some of the previous problems can´t be easily solved, so grid computing, intended as a technology enabling the addition and consolidation of computing power, can help in solving large scale supercomputing problems. In this document, we describe how 2 supercomputing facilities in Spain joined their resources to solve a problem of this kind. The objectives of this experience were, among others, to demonstrate that such a cooperation can enable the solution of bigger dimension problems and to measure the efficiency that could be achieved. In this document we show some preliminary results of this experience and to what extend these objectives were achieved.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.

I want you! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power.

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

A dual characterization of incentive efficiency

We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.

Demand elasticity and market power in the spanish electricity market

In this paper we check whether generator's bid behavior at the Spanish whosale electricity market is consistent with the hypothesis of profit maximization on their residual demands. Using OMEL data, we find the arc-elacticity of the residual demand around the system marginal price. The results suggest thet the larger firms are not actually profit-msximization. We argue how the regulatory environment may drive these results. Finally, we repeat the analysis for the first session of the intra-day market where presumably firms may not have the same incentives as in the day-ahead market.

Two algorithms to find a power integral basis

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del fitxer adjunt."