Prevalence of obesity in children in north-east Italy.

This study was performed to analyse the prevalence of obesity in children living in six different areas of the north-east of Italy. The study included 1523 children (749 male, 774 female), divided into four age categories (4, 8, 10, 12 +/- 0.5 years of age, respectively). The physical characteristics of the children were measured by trained and standardized examiners. In accordance with the guidelines on the Italian Consensus Conference on Obesity (Rome, 4-6 June 1991), a child was defined as obese when his weight was higher than 120% of the weight predicted for height, as calculated from the Tanner's tables. On average, the prevalence of obesity was higher in males than in females (15.7% vs. 11%). The highest prevalence was seen in 10-year-old males (23.4%). The prevalence increased with age both in males (4 years = 3.6%, 8 years = 11.2%, 10 years = 23.4%, 12 years = 17.3%) and in females (4 years = 2%, 8 years = 13.3%, 10 years = 12.7%, 12 years = 11.9%). This tendency was maintained when calculating the obesity prevalence by other methods, such as BMI, triceps skinfold and fat mass, although the magnitude of the prevalence was different depending on the criteria used to define it. A consensus on more precise criteria to define obesity is needed for a better diagnosis of obesity in childhood and to allow a more reliable measurement and comparison of the prevalence of obesity among populations.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.