957 resultados para Moral Rights
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Predictive testing is one of the new genetic technologies which, in conjunction with developing fields such as pharmacogenomics, promises many benefits for preventive and population health. Understanding how individuals appraise and make genetic test decisions is increasingly relevant as the technology expands. Lay understandings of genetic risk and test decision-making, located within holistic life frameworks including family or kin relationships, may vary considerably from clinical representations of these phenomena. The predictive test for Huntington's disease (HD), whilst specific to a single-gene, serious, mature-onset but currently untreatable disorder, is regarded as a model in this context. This paper reports upon a qualitative Australian study which investigated predictive test decision-making by individuals at risk for HD, the contexts of their decisions and the appraisals which underpinned them. In-depth interviews were conducted in Australia with 16 individuals at 50% risk for HD, with variation across testing decisions, gender, age and selected characteristics. Findings suggested predictive testing was regarded as a significant life decision with important implications for self and others, while the right not to know genetic status was staunchly and unanimously defended. Multiple contexts of reference were identified within which test decisions were located, including intra- and inter-personal frameworks, family history and experience of HID, and temporality. Participants used two main criteria in appraising test options: perceived value of, or need for the test information, for self and/or significant others, and degree to which such information could be tolerated and managed, short and long-term, by self and/or others. Selected moral and ethical considerations involved in decision-making are examined, as well as the clinical and socio-political contexts in which predictive testing is located. The paper argues that psychosocial vulnerabilities generated by the availability of testing technologies and exacerbated by policy imperatives towards individual responsibility and self-governance should be addressed at broader societal levels. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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The social and economic changes of the last decades have enhanced the dehumanization of labor relations and the deterioration of the work environment, by the adoption of management models that foster competitiveness and maximum productivity, making it susceptible to the practice of workplace bullying. Also called mobbing, bullying can occur through actions, omissions, gestures, words, writings, always with the intention of attacking the self-esteem of the victim and destroy it psychologically. In the public sector, where relations based on hierarchy prevail, and where the functional stability makes it difficult to punish the aggressor, bullying reaches more serious connotations, with severe consequences to the victim. The Federal Constitution of 1988, by inserting the Human Dignity as a fundamental principle of the Republic, the ruler of the entire legal system, sought the enforcement of fundamental rights, through the protection of honor and image of the individual, and ensuring reparation for moral and material damage resulting from its violation. Therefore, easy to conclude that the practice of moral violence violates fundamental rights of individuals, notably the employee's personality rights. This paper therefore seeked to analyze the phenomenon of bullying in the workplace, with emphasis on the harassment practiced in the public sector as well as the possibility of state liability for harassment committed by its agents. From a theoretical and descriptive methodology, this work intended to study the constitutional, infra and international rules that protect workers against this practice, emphasizing on the fundamental rights violated. With this research, it was found that doctrine and jurisprudence converge to the possibility of state objective liability for damage caused by its agents harassers, not forgetting the possibility of regressive action against the responsible agent, as well as its criminal and administrative accountability.
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In this paper, we examine the extent to which the concept of emergence can be applied to questions about the nature and moral justification of territorial borders. Although the term is used with many different senses in philosophy, the concept of “weak emergence” - advocated by, for example, Sawyer (2002, 2005) and Bedau (1997 ) - is especially applicable, since it forces a distinction between prediction and explanation that connects with several issues in the discussion of territory. In particular, we argue, weak emergentism about borders allows us to distinguish between (a) using a theory of territory to say where a border should be drawn, and (b) looking at an existing border and saying whether or not it is justified (Miller, 2012; Nine, 2012; Stilz, 2011). Many authors conflate these two factors, or identify them by claiming that having one without the other is in some sense incoherent. But on our account - given the concept of emergence - one might unproblematically be able to have (b) without (a); at the very least, the distinction between these two issues is much more significant than has often been recognised, and more importantly gives us some reason to prefer “statist” as opposed to “cultural” theories of territorial borders. We conclude with some further reflections on related matters concerning, firstly, the apparent causal powers of borders, and secondly, the different ways in which borders are physically implemented (e.g., land vs. water).
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This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.
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As medical technology has advanced, so too have our attitudes towards the level of control we can expect to hold over our procreative capacities. This creates a multi-dimensional problem for the law in terms of access to services which prevent conception, access to services which terminate a pregnancy and recompensing those whose choices to avoid procreating are frustrated. These developments go to the heart of our perception of autonomy. In order to evaluate these three issues in relation to reproductive autonomy, I set out to investigate how the Gewirthian theory of ethical rationalism can be used to understanding the intersection between law, rights, and autonomy. As such, I assert that it is because of agents’ ability to engage in practical reason that the concept of legal enterprise should be grounded in rationality. Therefore, any attempt to understand notions of autonomy must be based on the categorical imperative derived from the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). As a result, I claim that (a) a theory of legal rights must be framed around the indirect application of the PGC and (b) a model of autonomy must account for the limitations drawn by the rational exercise of reason. This requires support for institutional policies which genuinely uphold the rights of agents. In so doing, a greater level of respect for and protection of reproductive autonomy is possible. This exhibits the full conceptual metamorphosis of the PGC from a rational moral principle, through an ethical collective principle, a constitutional principle of legal reason, a basis for rights discourse, and to a model of autonomy. Consequently, the law must be reformed to reflect the rights of agents in these situations and develop an approach which demonstrates a meaningful respect of autonomy. I suggest that this requires rights of access to services, rights to reparation and duties on the State to empower productive agency.
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Animal rights positions face the ‘predator problem’: the suggestion that if the rights of nonhuman animals are to be protected, then we are obliged to interfere in natural ecosystems to protect prey from predators. Generally, rather than embracing this conclusion, animal ethicists have rejected it, basing this objection on a number of different arguments. This paper considers but challenges three such arguments, before defending a fourth possibility. Rejected are Peter Singer’s suggestion that interference will lead to more harm than good, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s suggestion that respect for nonhuman sovereignty necessitates non-interference in normal circumstances, and Alasdair Cochrane’s solution based on the claim that predators cannot survive without killing prey. The possibility defended builds upon Tom Regan’s suggestion that predators, as moral patients but not moral agents, cannot violate the rights of their prey, and so the rights of the prey, while they do exist, do not call for intervention. This idea is developed by a consideration of how moral agents can be more or less responsible for a given event, and defended against criticisms offered by thinkers including Alasdair Cochrane and Dale Jamieson.
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A widely diffused, engaged approach understands human rights as an opportunity to enhance moral progress. Less visible has a critical realm of research that reveals the often ambiguous social life of human rights discourses. This article draws on a specific case study from the intricate issue of how activism for Arab-Palestinian Bedouin citizens in Southern Israel engages with the global human rights discourse. It follows the implications of mobilization, focusing on events related to a campaign against house demolitions in informal,unrecognised settlements. The case shows how human rights discourses tend to silence the agency of political subjects, victimizing and patronizing those who seek emancipation. The ethnographic insights emphasize the role of a range of carnivalesque and spontaneous acts ofresistance, which subvert the patronizing implications of the human rights language.
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Thesis (A.M.)--University of Chicago (Dept. of Philosophy) 1913.
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The University presents this bulletin for the benefit of the citizens of South Carolina, arguing that suggestions for moral betterment are always timely. The bulletin is intended to help citizens improve their social and moral conditions.