Les parlementaires suisses entre démocratisation et professionnalisation (1910-2010). Biographie collective des élus fédéraux et réformes du Parlement helvétique

Notre travail de thèse vise à analyser, d'une part, les principales réformes du Parlement fédéral adoptées au cours du 20e siècle et, d'autre part, l'évolution du profil sociographique pour six cohortes d'élus fédéraux (1910, 1937, 1957, 1980, 2000 et 2010), sous l'angle de sa démocratisation et de sa professionnalisation. La thèse comprend trois axes de recherche principaux. Premièrement, nous nous penchons sur les deux réformes institutionnelles censées favoriser la démocratisation du recrutement parlementaire, à savoir l'adoption de la proportionnelle pour l'élection du Conseil national en 1918 et l'introduction du suffrage féminin à l'échelon fédéral en 1971. Nous abordons également les réformes du Parlement visant, depuis les années 1970, à sa revalorisation et à sa professionnalisation. Le deuxième axe porte sur la réalisation d'un portrait collectif des élus fédéraux pour la période 1910-1980, dans le but de vérifier l'impact des réformes des règles électorales (proportionnelle et suffrage féminin) sur le profil des députés et sénateurs. Enfin, dans le troisième axe, nous abordons les transformations du profil socio-professionnel des parlementaires pendant la période plus récente (1980-2010), en lien avec la professionnalisation accrue de l'Assemblée fédérale et les changements des rapports de force partisans. Nos résultats permettent de mettre en évidence plusieurs éléments de continuité (prédominance de la catégories des indépendants, notamment des avocats, des chefs d'entreprise et des agriculteurs, et sous-représentation des salariés du secteur public ; fort ancrage local), ainsi que certains facteurs de rupture (présence accrue des femmes, moindre importance de la carrière militaire). D'autres changements dans le profil sont liés au processus récent de professionnalisation, contesté et inachevé, qui a favorisé néanmoins l'émergence de nouveaux profils sociologiques d'élus, en termes de formation, de profession (apparition du groupe des parlementaires professionnels) et de cumul des mandats économiques et politiques, avec cependant de fortes variations entre les partis et entre les deux Chambres. - Our PhD thesis aims at analysing, on the one hand, the main reforms of the Federal Parliament adopted during the 20th century and, on the other hand, the evolution of sociographical profile for six cohorts of Swiss MPs (1910, 1937, 1957, 1980, 2000 and 2010) in terms of their democratization and professionalization. Our research is composed of three main parts. Firstly, we analyse two institutional reforms which intended to promote the democratization of parliamentary recruitment, namely the adoption of proportional representation (PR) in 1918 for the election of the National Council and the introduction of women's suffrage at the federal level in 1971. We also deal with parliamentary reforms that, since the 1970s, have aimed at reasserting the political status of the Federal Assembly and at professionalizing its members. Secondly, we carry out a collective biography of Swiss MPs during the period 1910-1980, in order to verify the impact of electoral reforms (PR and women's suffrage) on the profiles of deputies and senators. Finally, we discuss the transformation of the MPs' socio-_professional profiles during the recent period (1980-2010) in connection with the increased professionalization of the Federal Assembly and the changes of the power relations within the Parliament. Our results allow us to highlight several elements of continuity (the predominance of self-employed persons, especially lawyers, business managers and farmers, and the underrepresentation of public employees; stronger background in local politics), as well as some factors of discontinuity (increased presence of women and lesser importance of the military career). Other changes of the parliamentarians' profile are related to the recent process of professionalization. Although contested and unfinished, it has promoted new sociological profiles in terms of educational background, profession (growth of the professional parliamentarians) and number of political and economic mandates held simultaneously, however with important variations between parties and between Lower and Upper House.

En busca del ciudadano Kane : los dueños de medios de comunicación y su utilización política

Aquesta recerca té com a objecte d'estudi la utilització dels mitjans de comunicació per a finalitats polítiques i intenta analitzar la relació que els polítics professionals mantenen amb els mitjans i com aquests poden ser importants dins d'un procés polític-electoral i per a la formació de l'opinió pública. El nostre objectiu general és, entre d’altres, analitzar l'estructura d’aquests mitjans i grups polítics i descriure com estan situats, utilitzant com a exemple l'estat del Rio Grande do Norte (RN), al Nord-est de Brasil. Partint de les preguntes, ¿a qui pertanyen els mitjans de comunicació i qui té el poder d'informar en l'aquest Estat? anem construïm el marc teòric, analitzant el monopoli i oligopoli en la comunicació a Brasil, especialment a la radiodifusió, en la qual hi ha una gran concentració de concessions públiques en propietat dels polítics professionals amb mandats electius i/o de grups partidaris, què pot ser anomenat de ‘coronelismo electrònic’

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

Voting after the bombing: Can terrorist attacks change the outcome of democratic elections?

Economists have recently turned their attention to the effects of terrorism. One much debated effect of terrorist attacks is its impact on the results of democratic elections. We use the electoral consequences of the terrorist attacks of the 11-M in Madrid to analyze this issue. We consider this particular experiment since the attack took place only three days before the 2004 Congressional Election, which allows the use of credible identification criteria. In particular, we use the advance voting by Spanish residents abroad, who cast their vote before the terrorist attack, to identify the effect of the bombing. We exploit this macabre natural experiment to run a difference-in-differences estimation using data on three consecutive Congressional elections. Our empirical results indicate that a terrorist attack can have a large impact on the outcome of democratic elections.

Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation

We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaignrhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over whatpolicy the candidate will implement in case he wins theelection. We develop a model of repeated elections withcomplete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaignpromises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises arebelieved by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtainthat the degree to which promises are credible in equilibriumis an increasing function of the value of a candidate'sreputation.

How political parties, rather than member-states, are building the European Union

Political party formation and coalition building in the European Parliament is being a driving force for making governance of the highly pluralistic European Union relatively effective and consensual. In spite of successive enlargements and the very high number of electoral partiesobtaining representation in the European Union institutions, the number of effective European Political Groups in the European Parliament has decreased from the first direct election in 1979 to the fifth in 1999. The formal analysis of national party¹s voting power in different Europeanparty configurations can explain the incentives for national parties to join large European Political Groups instead of forming smaller nationalistic groupings. Empirical evidence shows increasing cohesion of European Political Groups and an increasing role of the European Parliament in EU inter-institutional decision making. As a consequence of this evolution, intergovernmentalism is being replaced with federalizing relations. The analysis can support positive expectations regarding the governability of the European Union after further enlargements provided that new member states have party systems fitting the European PoliticalGroups.

Government spending and re-election: Quasi-experimental evidence from Brazilian municipalities

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent politicalparties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our researchdesign exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around severalpopulation cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We show that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentagepoints in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. In the context of an agency modelof electoral accountability, as well as existing results indicating that the revenue jumps studiedhere had positive impacts on education outcomes and earnings, these results suggest that expectedelectoral rewards encouraged incumbents to spend additional funds in ways that were valued byvoters.

Las bases sociales y políticas de la abstención en las elecciones generales españolas: recursos individuales, movilización estratégica e instituciones electorales

Este informe de investigación examina los factores sociales y políticos que han determinado el nivel y variabilidad de la abstención electoral en las elecciones generales españolas. Extendiendo los modelos de carácter psicológico y sociológico que se han empleado (con éxito relativo) para explicar la abstención española, este estudio muestra que el nivel de participación en las elecciones generales depende en buena medida de factores estrictamente políticos: la satisfacción global del electorado con la situación política del país, la implantación y capacidad de movilizaciónde los partidos políticos, el nivel de asociacionismo y 'capital social', el grado de competitividad electoral en cada área geográfica y los cálculosestratégicos que los electores realizan en función del tamaño de las circunscripciones electorales y de las distorsiones a la representación que impone la ley electoral. El informe emplea datos individuales, procedentesde las encuestas postelectorales del CIS, y utiliza regresiones multivariantes no lineales, aplicadas a muestras agregadas en panel.

Political representation in Switzerland : democratic or plutocratic ?

Les inégalités économiques se traduisent-elles dans des inégalités politiques à travers le processus de représentation électorale? Telle est la question centrale de cette thèse qui s'attache, par ailleurs, à investiguer les mécanismes qui tendent à produire une représentation biaisée des préférences politiques des citoyens en fonction de leur statut économique. Focalisé sur le cas de la Suisse et faisant usage des données de l'enquête postélectorale Selects de 2007, ce travail démontre que sur les rares sujets qui divisent les citoyens selon des clivages économiques - la redistribution des richesses et la sécurité sociale en particulier - les élus à l'Assemblée fédérale ont des préférences qui reflètent mieux les opinions des citoyens les plus riches. Cette sous-représentation des opinions des citoyens modestes et de ceux faisant partie du centre de la distribution des revenus peut en partie être attribuée à des différences dans les taux de participation et de connaissance politiques entre ces groupes de citoyens. La thèse met également en évidence le rôle joué par la représentation descriptive - autrement dit, la similitude en termes de statut économique entre les représentants et les représentés - dans la représentation des opinions et intérêts des citoyens. Par ailleurs, la structure du système partisan en Suisse ne reflétant pas la multidimensionnalité des préférences politiques des citoyens, les électeurs ne parviennent pas à traduire la complexité de leurs préférences politiques dans un choix de vote, ce qui, dans la configuration actuelle des forces politiques, tend à favoriser l'élection de représentants aux opinions proches de la droite sur les questions économiques. Enfin, une analyse de la représentation politique au niveau cantonal tend à soutenir la thèse selon laquelle le manque de régulation en matière de financement des partis en Suisse pourrait partiellement expliquer les inégalités dans la représentation des opinions politiques des citoyens aux revenus distincts. - Do economic inequalities translate into political inequalities through electoral representation? This is the central research question of this thesis, which also investigates the mechanisms that lead to potential economically based inequalities in the representation of citizens' policy preferences. Focusing on the case of Switzerland and making use of data provided by the post- electoral survey Selects 2007, this research demonstrates that regarding the rare policy domains in which the preferences of citizens are clearly linked to economic cleavages - redistribution and social security in particular - members of the Federal Assembly have policy preferences that best reflect the policy preferences of richer citizens. The under-representation of the opinions of relatively poor citizens and of those being the in the middle of the income distribution can be to some extent be explained by differences in political participation and political information across income groups. The thesis also puts forward the role played by descriptive representation - the similarity between representatives and represented in terms of their socioeconomic status - for the representation of citizens' preferences and interests. In addition, the structure of the party system in Switzerland does not reflect the multidimensionality of policy preferences among citizens who, as a result, have a hard time translating their complex preferences into a vote choice. Given the configuration of political actors, this tends to favour the election of representatives from the right who do not represent the preferences of their voters on economic issues. Finally, an analysis of representation at the cantonal level tends to confirm that the lack of party finance regulations in Switzerland may partially explain inequalities in the representation of citizens with different levels of income.

Contaminación marina en el Perú

Inventario de las principales fuentes de contaminación marina, debido a los desechos domésticos e industriales, hidrocarburos de petróleo e hidrocarburos clorinados, afín de mostrar el estado actual de la contaminación y su problemática, así como su legislación.

Sugerencias de medidas legales para mejorar el manejo pesquero

Analiza la Ley general de pesca para un común desarrollo sostenible y sugerencias en el manejo pesquero.