Rapid detection by transmission electron microscopy of mycoplasma contamination in sera and cell cultures

Transmission electon microscopy has been employed for the rapid detection of mycoplasma in sera and cell cultures. High speed centrifugation of sera or low speed centrifugation of cell debris, followed by negative staining of the resuspended pellet, detected mycoplasma contamination more frequently than a culture method followed by direct fluorescence (DAPI), which was used as a control procedure. The appearance of the mycoplasma cell border and content gives some information about particle viability.

Using information from telephone panel surveys to predict reasons for refusal

One of the key problems in conducting surveys is convincing people to participate.¦However, it is often difficult or impossible to determine why people refuse. Panel surveys¦provide information from previous waves that can offer valuable clues as to why people¦refuse to participate. If we are able to anticipate the reasons for refusal, then we¦may be able to take appropriate measures to encourage potential respondents to participate¦in the survey. For example, special training could be provided for interviewers¦on how to convince potential participants to participate.¦This study examines different influences, as determined from the previous wave,¦on refusal reasons that were given by the respondents in the subsequent wave of the¦telephone Swiss Household Panel. These influences include socio-demography, social¦inclusion, answer quality, and interviewer assessment of question understanding and¦of future participation. Generally, coefficients are similar across reasons, and¦between-respondents effects rather than within-respondents effects are significant.¦While 'No interest' reasons are easier to predict, the other reasons are more situational. Survey-specific issues are able to distinguish¦different reasons to some extent.

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).

New perspectives in the use of ink evidence in forensic science: Part I. Development of a quality assurance process for forensic ink analysis by HPTLC

The level of information provided by ink evidence to the criminal and civil justice system is limited. The limitations arise from the weakness of the interpretative framework currently used, as proposed in the ASTM 1422-05 and 1789-04 on ink analysis. It is proposed to use the likelihood ratio from the Bayes theorem to interpret ink evidence. Unfortunately, when considering the analytical practices, as defined in the ASTM standards on ink analysis, it appears that current ink analytical practices do not allow for the level of reproducibility and accuracy required by a probabilistic framework. Such framework relies on the evaluation of the statistics of the ink characteristics using an ink reference database and the objective measurement of similarities between ink samples. A complete research programme was designed to (a) develop a standard methodology for analysing ink samples in a more reproducible way, (b) comparing automatically and objectively ink samples and (c) evaluate the proposed methodology in a forensic context. This report focuses on the first of the three stages. A calibration process, based on a standard dye ladder, is proposed to improve the reproducibility of ink analysis by HPTLC, when these inks are analysed at different times and/or by different examiners. The impact of this process on the variability between the repetitive analyses of ink samples in various conditions is studied. The results show significant improvements in the reproducibility of ink analysis compared to traditional calibration methods.

Colonic movements in healthy subjects as monitored by a Magnet Tracking System

Rapport de synthèse : Le Magnet Tracking System (MTS) est une technique peu invasive d'investigation de la motilité de l'entier du tube digestif. Elle repose sur le suivi de la progression d'un aimant par des senseurs externes en temps réel et dans les 3 dimensions. Dans cette étude, le MTS a été utilisé pour étudier les caractéristiques de propulsion propres aux différents segments coliques ainsi que pour comparer le transit de l'aimant permanent du MTS à celui de marqueurs radioopaques habituellement utilisés. Dix hommes et 10 femmes ayant un transit gastro-intestinal régulier ont ingéré simultanément un aimant de MTS et une capsule contenant 10 marqueurs radio-opaques, à 20h00. Les enregistrements se sont ensuite déroulés sur 2 matinées successives de 5 heures. L'analyse des données brutes recueillies a permis de réaliser une projection spatio-temporelle de la trajectoire de l'aimant dans le tube digestif ainsi qu'une description précise de l'origine, de la direction, de l'amplitude et de la vitesse des mouvements coliques. Des radiographies d'abdomen ont permis de comparer les positions respectives des marqueurs radio-opaques et de l'aimant du MTS. Durant 90% du temps d'enregistrement, l'aimant était immobile ou présentait des mouvements alternatifs de faible amplitude. Le reste des enregistrements consiste en activité propulsive dont 20% représentent des déplacements rétrogrades et une description très précise de 34 mouvements de masses. L'analyse des déplacements démontre une distribution bimodales des vitesses voisine de 1.5 et 50 cm /min, ce tant en direction orale que caudale. Deux tiers des distances parcourues le sont à vitesse rapide. L'analyse segmentaire confirme une progression horaire absolue supérieure dans le côlon gauche que droit. L'analyse détaillée par segment colique, reposant sur la description des déplacements enregistrés correspond aux rôles reconnus des différents segments, notamment de aire de stockage et de conditionnement du côlon ascendant ou de transit du côlon descendant. La comparaison des 2 sexes démontre un nombre plus important de mouvements, particulièrement de mouvements de masse chez l'homme. Les radiographies montrent une bonne corrélation entre la position de l'aimant et celle des marqueurs radio-opaques. Le MTS permet ainsi une description précise des caractéristiques propulsives des différents segments coliques, notamment par l'analyse détaillée des progressions à vitesses lente et rapide et leurs directions. Des distinctions peuvent également être notées en fonction du sexe. Ces investigations offrent de nouvelles perspectives pour l'étude des troubles de la motilité digestive.

Fine structural variations of alphabetaTCRs selected by vaccination with natural versus altered self-antigen in melanoma patients.

Immunotherapy of cancer is often performed with altered "analog" peptide Ags optimized for HLA class I binding, resulting in enhanced immunogenicity, but the induced T cell responses require further evaluation. Recently, we demonstrated fine specificity differences and enhanced recognition of naturally presented Ag by T cells after vaccination with natural Melan-A/MART-1 peptide, as compared with analog peptide. In this study, we compared the TCR primary structures of 1489 HLA-A*0201/Melan-A(26-35)-specific CD8 T cells derived from both cohorts of patients. Although a strong preference for TRAV12-2 segment usage was present in nearly all patients, usage of particular TRAJ gene segments and CDR3alpha composition differed slightly after vaccination with natural vs analog peptide. Moreover, TCR beta-chain repertoires were broader after natural than analog peptide vaccination. In all patients, we observed a marked conservation of the CDR3beta amino acid composition with recurrent sequences centered on a glycyl-leucyl/valyl/alanyl-glycyl motif. In contrast to viral-specific TCR repertoires, such "public" motifs were primarily expressed by nondominant T cell clonotypes, which contrasted with "private" CDR3beta signatures frequently found in T cell clonotypes that dominated repertoires of individual patients. Interestingly, no differences in functional avidity were observed between public and private T cell clonotypes. Collectively, our data indicate that T cell repertoires generated against natural or analog Melan-A peptide exhibited slightly distinct but otherwise overlapping and structurally conserved TCR features, suggesting that the differences in binding affinity/avidity of TCRs toward pMHC observed in the two cohorts of patients are caused by subtle structural TCR variations.

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.

The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality

During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased significantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justification for this pattern, by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit constraints. In particular, I show that when financial constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled inexperienced wages and boosts wage inequality. This explanation is consistent with US data from 1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced wages do not change much. The model accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its stable pattern among the skilled ones. The results hold under various robustness checks and provide some interesting policy implications about the potential conflict between inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of minimum wage policy in determining the equilibrium wage inequality.

Suppliers of Priors: A Theory of Retailing Inspired by the Market for Chinese Antiquities

Adverse selection may thwart trade between an informed seller, who knows the probability p that an item of antiquity is genuine, and an uninformed buyer, who does not know p. The buyer might not be wholly uninformed, however. Suppose he can perform a simple inspection, a test of his own: the probability that an item passes the test is g if the item is genuine, but only f < g if it is fake. Given that the buyer is no expert, his test may have little power: f may be close to g. Unfortunately, without much power, the buyer's test will not resolve the difficulty of adverse selection; gains from trade may remain unexploited. But now consider a "store", where the seller groups a number of items, perhaps all with the same quality, the same probability p of being genuine. (We show that in equilibrium the seller will choose to group items in this manner.) Now the buyer can conduct his test across a large sample, perhaps all, of a group of items in the seller's store. He can thereby assess the overall quality of these items; he can invert the aggregate of his test results to uncover the underlying p; he can form a "prior". There is thus no longer asymmetric information between seller and buyer: gains from trade can be exploited. This is our theory of retailing: by grouping items together - setting up a store - a seller is able to supply buyers with priors, as well as the items themselves. We show that the weaker the power of the buyer�s test (the closer f is to g), the greater the seller�s profit. So the seller has no incentive to assist the buyer � e.g., by performing her own tests on the items, or by cleaning them to reveal more about their true age. The paper ends with an analysis of which sellers should specialise in which qualities. We show that quality will be low in busy locations and high in expensive locations.

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual's decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one's private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighborhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual’s decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one’s private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighbourhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.

Government information transparency

This paper studies a model of announcements by a privately informed government about the future state of the economic activity in an economy subject to recurrent shocks and with distortions due to income taxation. Although transparent communication would ex ante be desirable, we find that even a benevolent government may ex-post be non-informative, in an attempt to countervail the tax distortion with a "second best" compensating distortion in information. This result provides a rationale for independent national statistical offices, committed to truthful communication. We also find that whether inequality in income distribution favors or harms government transparency depends on labor supply elasticity.

Information Design

There are two ways of creating incentives for interacting agents to behave in a desired way. One is by providing appropriate payoff incentives, which is the subject of mechanism design. The other is by choosing the information that agents observe, which we refer to as information design. We consider a model of symmetric information where a designer chooses and announces the information structure about a payoff relevant state. The interacting agents observe the signal realizations and take actions which affect the welfare of both the designer and the agents. We characterize the general finite approach to deriving the optimal information structure for the designer - the one that maximizes the designer's ex ante expected utility subject to agents playing a Bayes Nash equilibrium. We then apply the general approach to a symmetric two state, two agent, and two actions environment in a parameterized underlying game and fully characterize the optimal information structure: it is never strictly optimal for the designer to use conditionally independent private signals; the optimal information structure may be a public signal or may consist of correlated private signals. Finally, we examine how changes in the underlying game affect the designer's maximum payoff. This exercise provides a joint mechanism/information design perspective.