INAPIS(National Aging Program Information System) Activity Report State Fiscal Year 2004, March 3, 2005, Vers. 1

This report shows the number of older Iowans and units of service by service category from Title III funding of the Older Americans Act, through the Administration on Aging (AoA), the Iowa Senior Living Trust Fund and limited state general fund dollars. DEA hopes that this document and the information contained within can be a useful tool for making informed planning decisions. The information provided in this report is the result of hard work and dedication from the Iowa Aging Network who work as a team with the Iowa Department of Elder Affairs toward it’s mission: "To provide advocacy, educational, and prevention services to older Iowans so they can find Iowa a healthy, safe, productive, and enjoyable place to live and work.

Information revelation and market incompleteness

\documentstyle[portada,11pt]{article}This paper shows that the presence of private information in aneconomy can be a source of market incompleteness even when it is feasibleto issue a set of securities that completely eliminates the informationalasymmetries in equilibrium. We analyze a simple security design model in which avolume maximizing futures exchange chooses not only the characteristics ofeach individual contract but also the number of contracts. Agents have rationalexpectations and differ in information, endowments and, possibly, attitudestoward risk. The emergence of complete or incomplete markets in equilibriumdepends on whether the {\it adverse selection effect} is stronger or weakerthan the {\it Hirshleifer effect}, as new securitiesare issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effectdominates, the exchange chooses an incomplete set of financial contracts, andthe equilibrium price is partially revealing.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

Information acquisition and entry

Before firms decide whether to enter a new market or not, they havethe opportunity to buy information about several variables that might affectthe profitability of this market. Our model differs from the existing literatureon endogenous information acquisition in two respects: (1) there is uncertaintyabout more than one variable, and (2) information is acquired secretly. Whenthe cost of acquiring information is small, entry decisions will be as ifthere was perfect information. Equilibria where each firm acquires only asmall amount of information are more robust than the socially undesirableequilibria where all firms gather all information. Examples illustrate theimportance of assumptions (1) and (2).

Human Resource Information System; individual Users with Work Reporting Guide, April 2003

Guide manual for using the Human Resource Information System for the state of Iowa.

Gross – to – Net Payroll Calculation Program Human Resources Information System (HRIS), 2000

Gross-to-Net is a payroll calculator modeled after the actual payroll calculation used for state employees’ paychecks. This calculator can be used to project changes in net pay when there are changes in pay amounts, hours worked, mandatory and voluntary deductions, including all pre-tax deductions such as retirement, insurances, deferred compensation or flexible spending plans. Federal and state tax withholding, retirement rates, OASDI and Medicare (FICA) are calculated using current rates.

Human Resource Information System; Payroll Time Reporting System Guide for Individual Users, April 2003

Guide manual for using the Human Resource Information System for the state of Iowa.

Labor Relations Information and News, October 2007

The purpose of this newsletter is to inform and update State agencies on relevant labor relations issues and employment law on a monthly basis, and to focus on topics or questions agencies would like more information about.

Labor Relations Information and News, July 2007

The purpose of this newsletter is to inform and update State agencies on relevant labor relations issues and employment law on a monthly basis, and to focus on topics or questions agencies would like more information about.

Labor Relations Information and News, August 2007

The purpose of this newsletter is to inform and update State agencies on relevant labor relations issues and employment law on a monthly basis, and to focus on topics or questions agencies would like more information about.

Labor Relations Information and News, September 2007

The purpose of this newsletter is to inform and update State agencies on relevant labor relations issues and employment law on a monthly basis, and to focus on topics or questions agencies would like more information about.

Improving Transition Outcomes: Resource Mapping Workshop: Additional Information

Information used/presented during the Improving Transition Outcomes Resource Mapping Workshops