The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

Sorting out measures and definitions of screening participation to improve comparability: The example of colorectal cancer.

Participation is a key indicator of the potential effectiveness of any population-based intervention. Defining, measuring and reporting participation in cancer screening programmes has become more heterogeneous as the number and diversity of interventions have increased, and the purposes of this benchmarking parameter have broadened. This study, centred on colorectal cancer, addresses current issues that affect the increasingly complex task of comparing screening participation across settings. Reports from programmes with a defined target population and active invitation scheme, published between 2005 and 2012, were reviewed. Differences in defining and measuring participation were identified and quantified, and participation indicators were grouped by aims of measure and temporal dimensions. We found that consistent terminology, clear and complete reporting of participation definition and systematic documentation of coverage by invitation were lacking. Further, adherence to definitions proposed in the 2010 European Guidelines for Quality Assurance in Colorectal Cancer Screening was suboptimal. Ineligible individuals represented 1% to 15% of invitations, and variable criteria for ineligibility yielded differences in participation estimates that could obscure the interpretation of colorectal cancer screening participation internationally. Excluding ineligible individuals from the reference population enhances comparability of participation measures. Standardised measures of cumulative participation to compare screening protocols with different intervals and inclusion of time since invitation in definitions are urgently needed to improve international comparability of colorectal cancer screening participation. Recommendations to improve comparability of participation indicators in cancer screening interventions are made.