Analysis of two-party salary negotiations: factos impeding a mutually-beneficial joint agreement

Business professionals were surveyed to explore both factors associated with negotiation propensity, as well as the strategies used by employees and employers in salary negotiations. The objective is to examine the factors that impede both pasties in reaching a mutually-beneficial joint agreement in salary negotiations. In order to achieve this objective, a review of the negotiations literature was conducted including both. Descriptive literature - present research finding and scientific theory which characterizes negotiation and examines the forces that determine it's course and outcome - as well as a review of the prescriptive literature - in order to develop practical advice given a description of hw negotiators behave. Research result show that, although there is general tendency for employers to leave room in the first offer for negotiation, employees rarely ask for more and generally accept the first offer. The sub-optimal outcome was partially a result of the employees' preferred strategies for negotiation salary: a soft approach focusing on compromised and maintaining the relationship. An analysis of the results combined with the literature explore, demonstrates that both parties exhibited a fixed-pie perspective, focusing on salary as the key issue, which impeded the search for integrative settlements and, mutually beneficial trade-offs.

Global governance, currency and trade: implications of one on the other, common problems and how to address cooperation through law at the international level

How to deal with the impacts of the exchange rate on the trade balance of Brazil? There is not a single answer to such question. In order to find out some legal approaches for this matter, this paper aims to describe and analyze the role of the IMF, WTO and the governments of Brazil and the United States on the currency misalignments, especially the extraterritorial effects of such misalignment on the Brazil’s bilateral trade with the United States. The article concludes that the Currency Swap Agreements and other bilateral solutions may minimize the distortions that the Brazilian balance of payment against the USA is carrying, due to the lack of legal solutions for the problem of the exchange rate misalignments that Brazil is facing.

Monopoly power and trade protection: cross- industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of industry concentration on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator. concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that the higher the concentration of a given industry the higher its leveI of trade protection. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in more concentrated sectors. Assuming that concentration is ;1 gCl()d proX\' for mOllopoh' po\\'er as it reduces the free-rider problem in coordinating a lobby the results in this paper indicates that interest groups with control over specific markets in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce (international) competition.

The distortion of currencies misalignments on trade Instruments: or why currencies wars are not over

The negotiations of mega agreements between the US and the Pacific countries (TPP) and between the US and the EU (TTIP) are raising the attention of experts on international trade law and economics. TPP and TTIP are proclaimed to be the designers of the rules for the XXI Century. Old trade instruments such as tariffs are said to be no more important for TTIP because tariffs are negligible among those partners but significant to for TPP. Another relevant agreement in negotiation is between the EU and Mercosul, where tariffs are the most important issue in discussion. The main purpose of this paper is to shows that tariff are important for all these agreements, not because of its nominal value, but because the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on tariffs are so significant that all concessions can be distorted by overvalued and by devaluated currencies. The article is divided into several sections: the first gives an introduction to the issue; the second explains the methodologies used to determine exchange rate misalignments and also presents some results for Brazil, US and China; the third summarizes the methodology applied to calculate the impacts of exchange rate misalignments on the level of tariff protection through an exercise of “misalignment tariffication” and examines the effects of exchange rate variations on tariffs and their consequences for the multilateral trading system; the fourth creates a methodology to estimate exchange rates against a basket of currencies (a virtual currency of the World) and a proposal to deal with persistent and significant misalignments related to trade rules. The fifth presents some estimates for the main PTAs. The conclusions are present in the last section